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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This doctorate looks at the role of parliamentary select committees in the UK 
House of Commons. Though the literature on this topic is extensive, this 
research project explores the issue from a distinctive vantage point. While 
research on committees has predominantly focused on their outputs, such as 
committee reports, in order to assess the effectiveness of Parliament in holding 
the executive to account, this thesis looks at the input-side to committee work. It 
explores the individual beliefs, everyday practices and perennial dilemmas of 
parliamentary actors in select committees. In doing so, this thesis argues that 
understanding beliefs and practices of committee members, chairs and staff are 
crucial ways to better comprehend the way that scrutiny works in the House of 
Commons. This PhD finds that scrutiny is contested in a range of ways by a 
range of actors. In taking actors’ interpretations seriously, this PhD reveals that 
each actor has their own performance style, which is used to enact beliefs about 
scrutiny. At its most simple, this PhD argues that scrutiny is pushed and pulled 
in different (sometimes conflicting) directions by parliamentary actors. There is 
no such thing as uniform, systematic select committee scrutiny; there exist only 
dense webs of scrutiny that rely upon committee members, chairs and staff to 
enact their roles in such ways to be conducive to holding the executive to account. 
These dense webs of scrutiny affect committee relationships, their ability to 
question witnesses in select committees, and construct consensus in writing 
reports.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
arliamentary studies has traditionally not engaged with themes of 
everyday life as a topic to study. It is, justifiably, associated with 
ordinariness and normality. This ordinariness is pervasive: from the 
way we choose to organise our personal and working spaces to the way that we 
communicate with others both verbally and non-verbally. We do not notice the 
everyday as in some way politically significant or relevant for analysis precisely 
because it is perceived to be typical, routine, settled, established, standard, 
common – perhaps even boring, unremarkable, mundane. However, as we try to 
negotiate the world around us, it is important to realise that this ordinariness 
and this normality that we associate with the everyday is something that we have 
willed into being. As such, everyday practices are the result of our 
interpretations about the world, and the choices that we have made as a result 
(or, indeed, others have made on our behalf (willingly, unwillingly; knowingly, 
unknowingly)). Everyday life is only ordinary or unremarkable insofar as we 
interpret that to be the case. This is an important point because it implies the 
possibility that everyday practices are deeply political issues that deserve 
detailed attention. And yet, British political science, particularly the sub-
discipline of parliamentary studies, has (until recently) largely overlooked or 
underplayed the value of exploring the everyday lives of political actors. This 
thesis seeks to engage directly with everyday practices as an analytical tool to 
better understand political phenomena and outcomes. This contributes to a 
wider ideational turn in political analysis (Hay, 2011), which has the potential to 
have considerable impact: theoretically, it asserts the relevance of interpretation 
in political science over positivist explanations that have dominated the second 
P 
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half of the twentieth century; analytically, it centralises the importance of ideas, 
beliefs, practices, and traditions as explanatory tools; and methodologically, it 
offers novel ways to study political phenomena that have hitherto relied on 
traditional modes of inquiry. An ideational or interpretive turn is particularly 
important for the study of parliaments and legislatures because these 
institutions lie at the heart of democratic political systems. Taking an 
interpretive approach enables us to deepen our understanding of what happens 
in those institutions on a day-to-day basis, and how those quotidian practices 
make an impact on the broader political landscape. This seems to be needed at a 
time of declining trust in politics and a rise in cynicism over the motivations of 
elected representatives (Flinders, 2012a; Hay, 2007b; Judge, 2014). This is, 
arguably, a global trend, and one to which politics in the United Kingdom has 
not been immune. If politicians are not being accused of wrongdoing or 
misleading the public, they are found to be useless or ineffective (King and 
Crewe, 2013). Parliament, in particular, is perceived to symbolise this failure 
through its alleged inability to challenge the executive. And yet, the House of 
Commons has developed a range of mechanisms to hold government to 
account.1 This PhD explores this topic, looking specifically at the changing role 
of select committees in the House of Commons. 
 
In taking an interpretive lens, select committee scrutiny in the House of 
Commons poses a number of interesting questions. This doctoral research is 
guided by the following three research questions: 
1. How can we understand the everyday lives of parliamentary actors? 
2. How do political actors interpret and perform their role on select 
committees? 
3. In what ways do everyday practices affect parliamentary scrutiny? 
To answer these three questions, this thesis is correspondingly split into three 
broad parts, each containing three chapters. 
 
The first three chapters comprise Part I, in which I seek to answer the first 
research question. In Chapter 1, I explore our current knowledge of Parliament 
                                                          
1 Though ‘Parliament’ can be taken to mean both the House of Commons and the House of 
Lords, in this thesis it generally refers to the House of Commons, unless stated otherwise. 
Moreover, while ‘Parliament’ refers to the institution, ‘parliament’ refers to a specific time 
period or legislatures in more general terms. 
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and parliamentary scrutiny, and attempt to identify scholarly traditions of 
parliamentary and legislative studies. Though I identify four traditions 
(historical, rational choice, sociological and interpretive), the field of 
parliamentary studies has not, historically, engaged in theoretical reflection. 
This means that a large amount of research does not explicitly align with any 
scholarly tradition. In part, this may be due to the legacy of Westminster model 
and legalistic approaches to the study of Parliament. Though current scholarship 
has made significant contributions to our understanding of parliamentary 
government in the UK, I argue that parliamentary studies would benefit from a 
more theoretically explicit approach. I address this issue directly in Chapter 2, in 
which I reflect on theoretical possibilities for understanding Parliament. I 
propose an interpretive analytical approach based loosely on the work of Mark 
Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes (2003, 2006, 2010). Their work has made a big impact 
to the study of British governance, in which their decentred approach looks to 
unpack individual beliefs, everyday practices, webs of belief or traditions, and 
dilemmas that political actors face. In Chapter 2, I review and build upon their 
work in an attempt to encourage an interpretive parliamentary studies with a 
focus on analysing everyday practices as performances (in the theatrical sense of 
the word). This has methodological implications, which I address in Chapter 3. 
Here, I explain the methods used in empirical sections. I predominantly rely on 
participant and non-participant observation; semi-structured interviews with 
committee members, chairs and staff; and, textual analysis. I supplement these 
three methods with quantitative data and secondary material to enhance the 
rigour of the findings presented here.  
 
In Part II, I look at how parliamentary actors interpret their scrutiny roles 
(thereby engaging with the second research question). Chapter 4 looks at 
Members of Parliament, specifically exploring how individual committee 
members interpret and enact their scrutiny role. 2  I argue that committee 
members can perform scrutiny in at least six different ways: (i) as specialists and 
advocates, (ii) as lone wolves, (iii) as constituency champions, (iv) as party 
helpers or safety nets, (v) as learners or (vi) as absentees. These performances 
are affected by other individual beliefs, parliamentary practices and dilemmas 
that MPs face every day. Chapter 5 looks at committee chairs, who not only 
                                                          
2 While capitalised ‘Members’ refer to Members of Parliament or MPs, non-capitalised 
‘members’ refers to committee members only.  
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interpret scrutiny in different ways, but additionally interpret and enact a 
leadership role. I show that chairs are likely to perform one of two roles: either, 
they seek to act as catalysts of committees, and thus seek to work with 
committee members; or, they seek to act as chieftains of their committees, and 
thereby seek to impose their agenda onto the committee. Chapter 6 turns to 
select committee staff, who have traditionally been overlooked in parliamentary 
studies. Clerks undertake a range of roles to support committees. Their beliefs 
are underpinned by a commitment to being hidden, unparalleled service to the 
House, and passionate impartiality.  
 
How do these interpretations and practices affect parliamentary scrutiny? This is 
addressed in Part III. I begin by exploring the relationships between 
parliamentary actors (predominantly MPs) in Chapter 7. In particular, I look at 
how committees sustain parliamentary relationships, create norms and values 
and build performance teams, which in turn affect how committees undertake 
inquiries. I place this in a wider web of scrutiny. In Chapter 8, I look at the effect 
of everyday practices on who gives evidence to committees, and identify the 
range of dilemmas that committees face in trying to gain a range of diverse 
witnesses for oral evidence. These dilemmas are often played out in a way that 
sustains a London-centric, male-dominated elite. This raises questions over 
Parliament’s ability to represent a diversity of interests in holding the 
government to account, and broader issues about the place of Parliament in the 
policy process. I bring the ideas raised in both Part II and Part III together in 
Chapter 9, in which I posit the broad conclusions of the thesis and return to the 
three research questions posed above. In sum, this thesis argues that: first, an 
interpretive approach – specifically the concepts of beliefs, practices, traditions 
and dilemmas – offers novel ways of understanding parliamentary scrutiny; 
second, committee members, chairs and staff interpret scrutiny in diverse (and 
occasionally conflicting) ways, which they subsequently enact or perform with 
equal diversity; and third, those interpretations are crucial in explaining how 
committees build consensus and gather evidence, both sustaining and 
overcoming dilemmas that committees face every day. This matters because it 
means that committees push and pull in a range of different (occasionally 
contradictory) directions. There arguably is no such thing as ‘systematic’ 
scrutiny but, rather, only dense ‘webs’ of scrutiny that rely upon parliamentary 
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actors to identify and interpret scrutiny in such ways as to make them conducive 
to committee scrutiny. This is an important contribution to the wider literature 
because it arguably changes our perception of the role of select committees in 
British politics and highlights the importance of everyday practices in scrutiny 
processes. 
 
This outline indicates that the following chapters are a departure from our 
current knowledge of Parliament’s select committees. Indeed, this PhD is an 
explicit attempt to push our current understanding of committees to new limits 
and identify new ways of studying scrutiny along the committee corridor of the 
Palace of Westminster. This matters because MPs’ everyday behaviour both 
within and beyond select committees affects the wider role of Parliament in 
British politics. In order to explain all of this, this PhD begins in earnest. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I: Theoretical Foundations 
 
 
There are more ideas on earth than intellectuals can imagine. And these ideas 
are more active, stronger, more resistant, more passionate than ‘politicians’ 
think. We have to be there at the birth of ideas, for or against them. Ideas do 
not rule the world. But it is because the world has ideas (and because it 
constantly produces them) that it is not passively ruled by those who are its 
leaders or those who would like to teach it, once and for all, what it must think.  
 
– Michel Foucault3 
 
 
In these first three chapters, I focus on the theoretical principles that underpin 
this research. In Chapter 1, I begin by looking at the current scholarship on 
Parliament and, in doing so, identify an ‘interpretive’ gap. In response to this 
gap, I then develop the analytical framework that guides Part II and Part III 
(Chapter 2), before closely examining the methodology of this PhD (Chapter 3). 
Taken together, this theoretical part will set the stage for later empirical chapters. 
 
  
                                                          
3 Quoted in Didier Eribon (1991, p.282). 
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Chapter 1: Traditions 
 
 
 
 
s the Hansard Society’s most recent report on political engagement 
testifies, the general public do not hold Parliament in high esteem (only 
32% of the public say they are satisfied with how Parliament works 
overall) (Hansard Society, 2016). In November 2013, the prominent journalist, 
Jeremy Paxman, even went so far as to describe politics in the United Kingdom 
as a ‘green-bench pantomime’ and the House of Commons as a ‘remote and self-
important echo-chamber’ (Plunkett, 2013). This, arguably stereotypical, view of 
Parliament is shared by academics: for example, Ian Ward (2004, p.42) 
described it as ‘puerile, pathetic and utterly useless’; meanwhile, and more 
recently, Anthony King and Ivor Crewe (2013, pp.361-2) refer to the House of 
Commons as ‘peripheral’, ‘totally irrelevant’ and ‘passive’. And yet, as Matthew 
Flinders and Alexandra Kelso (2011) argue, this is a misleading caricature. 
Academic research within the field of parliamentary and legislative studies 
disputes the view that Parliament acts merely as a talking shop or rubber stamp 
at the mercy of an all-powerful executive. Rather, Parliament not only has a 
considerable legislative role to play (Thompson, 2015b), but affects policy-
making more generally (Russell and Cowley, 2016).  
 
In this first chapter, I review the academic literature to better understand how 
much we do know about the place of Parliament in British politics, specifically 
the role and purpose of select committees, and to situate this PhD in its wider 
context. The literature on Parliament is significant and wide-ranging, covering 
topics as diverse as the constitutional arrangements of the political system; the 
effect of devolution and the European Union on the function and effectiveness of 
A 
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Parliament; public perceptions of parliamentary activities; the different ways in 
which Members of Parliament (MPs) seek to influence legislation; how 
parliamentary actors are socialised; the pressures and strains that MPs face; a 
greater understanding of politicians’ motivations and priorities; and, intra- and 
inter-party dynamics within the Houses of Parliament. Axiomatically, it is not 
possible to cover this vast range. Instead, this review is limited to understanding 
the perceived role of select committees in the UK as part of a broader thematic 
discussion about the scholarly traditions that have affected parliamentary 
research. In this way, this chapter cuts across a range of issues and engages not 
only with one specific aspect of Parliament’s scrutiny role, but additionally 
examines the theoretical, analytical and methodological principles that underpin 
much of the sub-discipline of parliamentary and legislative studies. To do so, 
this chapter is split into three sections. I begin, in the first section, with a brief 
overview of the role and function of select committees in context of wider 
parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms in the UK. This charts a very brief history of 
select committees from the context of their introduction in 1979 to the present 
day. Additionally, I look at how scholars have made sense of select committees. 
In other words, I explore what the academic literature tells us about committee-
based scrutiny in the House of Commons. In the second section, I situate this 
literature in wider scholarly traditions. I begin by looking at the organising 
perspective of parliamentary studies: the Westminster model. This model 
(closely associated with modernist empiricism in British political science 
generally) has a significant influence on parliamentary studies (and, indeed, 
British political science more widely (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, pp.24-31; 2006, 
pp.35-55)). With that in mind, I identify four scholarly traditions in 
parliamentary and legislative studies: historical, rational choice, sociological and 
interpretive traditions. These traditions are important reference markers for 
parliamentary studies because they affect the analytical focus and 
methodological tools employed by political scientists in their study of Parliament, 
particularly with regards to research on select committees. That said, these 
traditions are not clearly demarcated or explicit cleavages: some studies overlap 
and borrow elements from different traditions to form hybrids; many more do 
not place themselves in any tradition at all. This makes an overview of the 
scholarship’s intellectual roots more challenging, yet also more important. I try 
to bring this together in the third section, in which I summarise what we know 
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about parliamentary select committees but, perhaps most important, what we do 
not know and, in doing so, situate this PhD’s original contribution to the field. 
Importantly, this chapter does not merely give an overview of the literature, but 
seeks to identify the ways in which the study of Parliament has been approached. 
This matters because, traditionally, parliamentary and legislative studies has 
arguably lacked theoretical and conceptual reflection. Consequently, the 
predominant focus of research has been on institutional relationships, which 
possibly overlooks other, fruitful avenues of research that focus on everyday 
practices of parliamentary actors – which this thesis pursues. Before getting to 
this stage, however, the chapter must start with a summary of the topic in more 
general terms, and it is here that our discussion begins. 
 
 
1.1. Select committees and their history 
 
Parliamentary scrutiny is not limited to select committees. It can be conducted 
through written and oral Parliamentary Questions; in public bill committees; 
pursued directly between frontbench and backbench colleagues; as part of 
activities by all-party parliamentary groups (APPGs); or through debates on the 
floor of the House and in Westminster Hall.4 Nonetheless, departmental select 
committees are perceived to be part of a systematic system of scrutiny or, as Alex 
Brazier and Ruth Fox (2011, p.354) put it, ‘the principal mechanism through 
which the House of Commons holds the executive to account’. Here, I discuss, 
first (and briefly), the role and function of select committees, second, a concise 
historical overview of committees’ development, and third, a discussion over 
academic research on select committees. 
 
1.1.1. The role and function of select committees 
 
Departmental select committees exist to: ‘examine the expenditure, 
administration and policy’ of government departments and their associated 
public bodies (HC SO No. 152(1)). In addition to departmental committees, a  
                                                          
4 All-Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs) are informal groups set up and run by MPs and 
peers, and some also have extensive involvement from individuals and organisations outside 
Parliament to support administration and activities. As they are informal groups, they have 
no official status within Parliament to conduct scrutiny. Nonetheless, many MPs count 
involvement with APPGs as part of their scrutiny work. 
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Table 1.1. Select committee core tasks (from Liaison Committee, 2012a, p.10) 
Overall aim: To hold Ministers and Departments to account for their policy and decision-
making and to support the House in its control of the supply of public money and scrutiny 
of legislation 
Task 1: Strategy 
Examine the strategy of the department, how it has identified its key 
objectives and priorities and whether it has the means to achieve 
them, in terms of plans, resources, skills, capabilities and 
management information. 
Task 2: Policy 
Examine policy proposals by the department, and areas of emerging 
policy, or where existing policy is deficient, and make proposals. 
Task 3: Expenditure 
and performance 
Examine the expenditure plans, outturn and performance of the 
department and its arm’s length bodies, and the relationships 
between spending and delivery of outcomes. 
Task 4: Draft bills 
Conduct scrutiny of draft bills within the committee’s 
responsibilities. 
Task 5: Bills and 
delegated legislation 
Assist the House in its consideration of bills and statutory 
instruments, including draft orders under the Public Bodies Act. 
Task 6: Post-
legislative scrutiny 
Examine the implementation of legislation and scrutinise the 
department’s post-legislative assessments. 
Task 7: European 
scrutiny 
Scrutinise policy developments at the European level and EU 
legislative proposals. 
Task 8: 
Appointments 
Scrutinise major appointments made by the department and to hold 
pre-appointment hearings where appropriate. 
Task 9: Support for 
the House 
Produce timely reports to inform debate in the House, including 
Westminster Hall, or debating committees, and to examine petitions 
tabled. 
Task 10: Public 
engagement 
Assist the House of Commons in better engaging with the public by 
ensuring that the work of the committee is accessible to the public. 
  
range of further committees exist to scrutinise government: cross-cutting select 
committees provide thematic, whole-of-government scrutiny; domestic or 
internal committees look at administrative issues within the House of Commons;  
joint committees with the House of Lords may be established to provide more 
detailed scrutiny across Parliament; and, other ad hoc or temporary committees 
may examine specific issues. Departmental and cross-cutting investigative 
committees are the core pillar of scrutiny in the House of Commons, and 
therefore the predominant focus in this research project. In sum, this results in 
25 select committees (see Appendix A for a full list). 
 
Committees are cross-party and made up of between nine and 18 MPs. The party 
balance reflects that of the House of Commons. Over the 2010 parliament, a 
typical select committee of 11 members would usually have had five Labour Party 
MPs, five Conservative Party MPs and one member from a third party (often a 
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Liberal Democrat) (in 2015, a typical committee would have six Conservative 
members, four Labour members and one from a third party). Similarly, chairs 
were allocated based on party balance. In 2010, the Labour Party held ten chairs, 
the Conservative Party held 12 chairs and the Liberal Democrats held three 
chairs. The precise balance is informally agreed by party whips (also referred to 
as the ‘usual channels’) but approved by the House. Since 2010, committee 
members have been elected through their party groups, while the chair is elected 
by the whole House, both by secret ballot (for a more detailed summary, see 
Rogers and Walters (2015)). 
 
In order to carry out scrutiny, committees usually undertake inquiries, which 
involves taking written and oral evidence before publishing a final report. 
Committees can investigate any topic of their choosing (and guided by the 
Liaison Committee’s core tasks (see Table 1.1)). Increasingly, committees have 
also begun to hold one-off evidence sessions, undertake ‘evidence checks’ and 
scrutinise government in more innovative ways to engage with the public 
(Liaison Committee, 2015). All select committees have the power to ‘send for 
persons, papers and records’ (HC SO No. 152(4a)). They are supported by a 
small secretariat of around six permanent members of staff that work towards 
the committees’ inquiries full-time, as well as specialist advisers that are 
appointed on an ad hoc, part-time basis. The current arrangements have not 
always existed (indeed, they are still changing), and so it is worth (briefly) 
examining the development of select committees since their inception.   
 
1.1.2. The development of select committee scrutiny 
 
Though the present-day structure and operation of parliamentary select 
committees results from reforms undertaken in 1979, committees have a long 
history that stretches from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see Kelso, 
2009b, for a detailed history). Indeed, the Public Accounts Committee (which 
made headlines throughout the 2010 parliament) was introduced by William 
Gladstone in 1861. The case for departmental committees grew throughout the 
1930s but, with the prospect of political extremism during the later 1930s and 
the Second World War between 1939 and 1945, the issue did not achieve any 
salience. It took many more years and a growing body of academic research (e.g. 
Interpreting Parliamentary Scrutiny 
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Crick, 1970; Walkland, 1960) before experiments with select committees were 
introduced in the 1960s (known as the Crossman reforms). However, it was not 
until 1979 when an incoming Conservative government, led by Margaret 
Thatcher, was persuaded to introduce a coherent, departmental-based select 
committee system (Giddings, 1994; Kelso, 2009b, pp.83-98). Until then, 
resistance took many forms but included an unwillingness from the executive to 
cede power to the backbenches, and fear from parliamentarians that select 
committees would divert attention away from the main chamber of the House of 
Commons.  
 
The system introduced in 1979 was well-received (Ryle and Richards, 1988), but 
suffered a number of shortcomings: chairs were not paid (limiting incentives for 
an alternative parliamentary career path); committees were not given the power 
to force ministers to attend; the executive was not forced to accept committee 
recommendations; and no time was allocated for reports to be debated in the 
chamber. Arguably one of the biggest weaknesses, however, was the way MPs 
would be selected for committee service. Proposed membership was made to the 
Committee of Selection on behalf of party whips, effectively ensuring that 
political parties controlled who would make up committees and lead them. 
Between 1979 and 2010, but especially since 2000, a number of attempts were 
made to strengthen select committee scrutiny to ameliorate some of these 
weaknesses. Notably, the aforementioned core tasks were introduced during this 
period, as well as: further powers to appoint sub-committees and joint inquiries 
with other committees; the creation of a Scrutiny Unit to increase select 
committee resources; additional payments introduced for committee chairs to 
incentivise an alternative career structure; and, the introduction of evidence 
sessions between the prime minister and the Liaison Committee (see Table 1.2 
for a summary, and Flinders (2002, 2007) for a discussion). Whilst these 
reforms arguably strengthened select committees, the continued problem of 
appointing members to committees remained (despite attempts to change this in 
2002 (Kelso, 2003)). 
 
In 2010, arguably the most important reforms since 1979 took place with respect 
to select committees. It came at a time when Parliament faced a crisis of 
confidence following the MPs’ Expenses Scandal (Kelso, 2009a). In response to  
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Table 1.2. Timeline of select committee reform 
Year Nature of reforms Key report(s) Reference 
1966 
Crossman reforms: introduction of committees 
on agriculture, science and technology, 
education, race relations and immigration, 
overseas aid/development, and Scottish affairs. 
Procedure 
Committee (1965) 
Walkland 
(1976) 
1979 
Introduction of departmental select committee 
system by the newly elected Conservative 
government and led by Norman St. John 
Stevas. 
Procedure 
Committee (1978) 
Kelso 
(2009b, 
pp.95-101) 
2002 
Introduction of core tasks, additional pay for 
committee chairs, Liaison Committee evidence 
sessions with the prime minister, and 
introduction of the Scrutiny Unit. 
Liaison Committee, 
(2000) 
Modernisation 
Committee (2002) 
Flinders 
(2007) 
2010 
Wright reforms: creation of the Backbench 
Business Committee, and a shift from 
appointing MPs to select committees to a 
system of elections. 
Reform Committee 
(2009) 
Russell 
(2011) 
 
the scandal, the prime minister, Gordon Brown, established the Committee on 
Reform of the House of Commons to look at ways in which the reputation of 
Parliament could be restored. The subsequent reform package, known as the 
Wright reforms (after Tony Wright, who chaired the committee), included the 
introduction of a Backbench Business Committee, to give backbench MPs the 
opportunity to influence the parliamentary timetable, and changes to committee 
membership, shifting from selection by party whips to a process of electing 
members (through party groups) and chairs (by the whole House) (for a 
discussion of these changes, see Russell (2011), and Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). 
Though these reforms have been widely praised, the repercussions are not fully 
known, but to which discussion returns. For now, it brings attention to what we 
do know about select committees. 
 
1.1.3. Studying select committees 
 
A number of commentators and academics (indeed, parliamentarians 
themselves) have discussed, analysed and evaluated the select committee system. 
One important strand of the literature, already implied in the previous sub-
section, relates to the extent of parliamentary modernisation and reform. This 
has made an important contribution to our understanding of Parliament because 
it provides rich (yet also sometimes very broad) historical context for 
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understanding parliamentary select committees, as summarised briefly above. 
This includes aforementioned work by Flinders (2002, 2004, 2007) and Kelso 
(2003, 2009a, 2009b), as well as perspectives from parliamentarians (Power, 
2007; Wright, 2004). Frequently, this literature has distinguished between 
modernisation or efficiency reforms, on the one hand, and effectiveness reforms, 
on the other. Whilst the former results in making parliamentary processes more 
streamlined to sustain the executive, the latter results in strengthening 
Parliament’s capabilities to scrutinise the executive. As a result, this literature 
has often focused on the relationships between executive and Parliament, and 
sought to evaluate the effectiveness of select committees.  
 
A second strand of the academic literature on committees focuses more directly 
on the issue of select committee policy impact. Though some scholars do not 
view select committees as particularly important or meaningful (Mattson and 
Strøm, 1995), this view is not shared by most other research in the field. Andrew 
Hindmoor et. al. (2009), for example, look at the Education and Skills 
Committee between 1997 and 2005, and evaluate the extent of committee 
influence positively (though also cautiously). They look at, first, how many 
committee recommendations were accepted by government and, second, 
interview a range of parliamentary actors to establish influence. They 
acknowledge that identifying broad patterns and consistent effects is difficult, 
though note specific instances of (often informal) committee influence. Meghan 
Benton and Meg Russell (2013) have conducted a very similar piece of research, 
but looked at many more committees (seven case study committees) over a 
longer time period (1997-2010). They find that 40% of committee 
recommendations were accepted by the executive for their case study 
committees between 1997 and 2010 (including 55% of small-level, 31% of 
medium-level, and 14% of large-level proposed changes to government policy). 
These findings have been broadened out and summarised in more recent 
research by Meg Russell and Philip Cowley (2016) and Meg Russell et. al. (2016), 
who conclude that, contrary to our assumptions about parliaments and 
legislatures, the UK Parliament ‘exerts a significant influence on government 
policy’, particularly with regards to ‘anticipated reactions’ and behind-the-scenes 
negotiations (Russell et. al., 2016, pp.304-6). Further, more specific, research 
has been conducted by: Michael Tolley (2009), who looks at the effectiveness of 
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the Joint Committee on Human Rights; Robert Hazell et. al. (2012), who look at 
the effectiveness of pre-appointment scrutiny hearings in the House of 
Commons; Hugh Bochel et. al. (2015), who examine the accountability 
mechanisms in place for government security and intelligence agencies; and 
David H. Foster (2015), who explores the effectiveness of the Backbench 
Business Committee. Collectively, these studies reinforce the findings found by 
others that committee-based scrutiny does make an impact on government, 
though a quantifiable figure is difficult to ascertain. Often, this debate is couched 
between the term ‘power’, which has connotations of formal mechanisms of 
scrutiny, and ‘influence’, which indicates informal mechanisms to hold the 
executive to account, including aforementioned ‘anticipated reactions’ and 
behind-the-scenes negotiations. Very recently, Hannah White (2015a, 2015b, 
2015c) has conducted research to explore these factors in more detail by looking 
at how select committees approach their work and how those approaches make 
an impact on government. She finds that committees have a diverse range of 
activities, but they are also (collectively) constrained by a lack of resources.  
 
A small, though increasing, amount of research has begun to explore not only 
approaches taken by committees, but other input-related factors to scrutiny. 
Dennis Grube (2014), for example, explores the ‘drama’ of accountability 
hearings, noting that adversarial hearings encourage ‘blame games’ (Hood, 2011) 
between parliamentary and executive actors. To take another example, Richard 
Berry and Sean Kippin (2014) gave a snapshot of who gave evidence to 
parliamentary committees during November 2013 to establish the diversity of 
witnesses on which select committees base their evidence. This literature on the 
input-side of select committee activity has, however, been relatively small, 
especially in comparison to the research conducted on the policy impact of 
parliamentary select committees. Whilst the literature on committees has 
employed a variety of methodological tools and techniques, this indicates that, 
on the whole, the literature remains focused on institutional relationships 
between Parliament and executive. These studies have therefore made a 
significant contribution to our understanding of Parliament. That said, it also 
seems to reveal that the literature on select committees has not explicitly sought 
to reflect on the theoretical principles that underpins its research (for exceptions, 
see Cole and McAllister, 2015; Monk, 2010). Theoretical reflection matters 
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because it affects the approaches that we take in studying Parliament and, 
indeed, the methods we use to conduct those studies. In order to offer a little 
more coherence to the field of parliamentary and legislative studies, the next 
section attempts to identify traditions on which parliamentary studies is based.  
 
 
1.2. Traditions in parliamentary studies 
 
The rigour and relevance of current research on Parliament has made significant 
contributions to explaining parliamentary behaviour and executive-legislative 
relationships. This section does not attempt to critique the literature, but rather 
to examine their approach and focus, and identify broad traditions on which the 
scholarship is based. I identify: historical, rational choice, sociological and 
interpretive traditions. These do not exhaust analytical possibilities, nor are 
distinctions between them always clear-cut. Some studies overlap and borrow 
elements from different traditions to form hybrids, whilst many others do not 
place themselves in any tradition at all. This makes an overview of the 
scholarship’s intellectual roots more challenging, compounded yet further by the 
broader heritage on which British political science has been built, namely the 
Westminster model (WM). This deserves brief comment before the 
aforementioned traditions are examined because the legacy of the WM on 
parliamentary studies (indeed, British politics more generally) has been, and 
continues to be, significant. 
 
1.2.1. The legacy of the Westminster model and modernist empiricism 
 
Studies of Parliament by British scholars have arguably been pervaded by what 
Andrew Gamble (1990, p.405) termed a dominant ‘organising perspective’ or 
British political tradition. Understood through the prism of Whig historiography, 
it stresses the centrality of political institutions, continuity in British history, and 
gradual change of the political system (p.407). Gamble identifies this as part of 
the Westminster model (WM). Amongst other things, the WM is commonly 
associated with an appeal to the sovereignty and primacy of Parliament; the 
centrality of individual ministerial responsibility to the House of Commons; and, 
the selection of the executive through a competitive, adversarial electoral system 
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(Gamble, 1990; see also Lijphart, 2012). The model and its assumptions are used 
to explain the ‘standard account’ of the British state (Judge, 2014, pp.1-18) by 
placing Parliament in a broader constitutional context and focusing analysis on 
institutions, rules, procedures and formal organisations of government and state. 
Consequently, debates revolve around the extent to which parliamentary 
government in the UK still follows the central tenets of the Westminster model. 
This includes, for example, debates over the extent of parliamentary sovereignty 
in the UK (in light of devolution, the relationship between the UK and the 
European Union, and incorporation of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Judge, 2014, 
pp.107-34)), or the extent of ministerial responsibility to Parliament (especially 
given significant restructuring of the British state since 1979 (Flinders, 2002, 
2004; Woodhouse, 2003)). These debates continue to rage, in part because there 
is no single agreed definition of the model (see Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, pp.24-
31; Rhodes, Wanna and Weller, 2009, pp.1-9), and while this indicates that the 
Westminster model has come under challenge both as an idealised version of the 
British constitution and as an empirical-descriptive model, it remains resilient in 
British political science, which may be the result of a wider modernist empiricist 
tradition within parliamentary studies. 
 
Both the narratives of the Westminster model and the focus of analysis on 
institutions, rules and formal organisations of government indicate a traditional 
approach to the study of Parliament with shared methodological assumptions. 
Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes (2003, p.27) summarise this as: ‘the tools of the 
lawyer and the historian to explain the constraints on both political behaviour 
and democratic effectiveness’. A great deal of research focuses on the 
interpretation of documents, texts and parliamentary procedure to locate the 
formal and informal decision-making powers of the two Houses of Parliament 
(e.g. Blackburn, Kennon and Wheeler-Booth, 2002; Norton, 2013; Rush, 2005). 
Indeed, this has been a lasting legacy for parliamentary and legislative studies in 
the UK, which has arguably prevented further theoretical reflection within the 
sub-discipline (Waylen, 2010, p.354). Thus, as Flinders (2011, p.308) puts it, 
there is an almost uniquely British approach to political studies as a cooperative 
enterprise between practitioners and academics, with little sophisticated 
modelling, a preference for qualitative methodologies, and a tendency to locate 
analysis within a normative democratic theory with a focus on British politics. As  
  
Table 1.3. Approaches to the study of Parliament 
Legacy of the Westminster model: An organising perspective that often underpins analysis in British politics, the WM is perceived to describe essential 
features of the British state. It focuses on the rules, procedures and formal organisations of government.  It emphasises: the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, the importance of ministerial accountability to Parliament, and the selection of the executive through an adversarial electoral system. 
Tradition Analytical focus 
Contribution to 
parliamentary studies 
Contribution to select 
committee research 
Methodology Key examples 
Historical 
Role of historical 
context in shaping 
behaviour of MPs 
Situates parliamentary 
change and reform in its 
historical context 
Explains the broad 
history of select 
committees and how they 
have changed 
Textual and historical 
analysis, supplemented 
with semi-structured 
interviews 
Kelso (2009) 
Rational choice 
Asserts that all actors 
are goal-seeking 
Explains institutional 
behaviour in rational, 
utility-maximising terms 
Select committees are 
useful for giving 
information to MPs, but 
lack formal power 
Quantitative analysis of 
data sets, including surveys 
and voting records 
Mattson and 
Strøm (1995) 
Sociological 
Influence of rules, 
norms and values on 
MPs 
Helps us to understand how 
MPs conceptualise and are 
socialised into their role 
No detailed studies 
Survey data and semi-
structured interviews 
Searing (1994), 
Rush and 
Giddings (2011) 
Interpretive 
Shifts focus from 
institutional 
landscapes to everyday 
practices 
Explains parliamentary 
activities and practices in 
terms of the interpretations 
and practices of MPs 
No detailed studies 
Ethnographic techniques 
including interviews and 
observation 
Crewe (2005, 
2015) 
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the previous section has indicated, this is arguably true of research on select 
committees, too, where research has often focused on the balance between 
executive and legislature, particularly with regards to the extent of select 
committee influence over policy (e.g. Benton and Russell, 2013; Hindmoor et. al., 
2009). This has done much to shed light on our otherwise limited understanding 
of the policy impact of the House of Commons vis-à-vis the executive and 
disputes the caricatures of Parliament as a talking shop or rubber stamp.  
 
As indicated earlier, many studies of Parliament overlap and borrow from 
different intellectual roots, while many more do not engage in theoretical 
reflection at all. Perhaps it is the dominance of the Westminster model that 
explains this. In an attempt to offer a little more coherence, I identify four broad 
traditions to parliamentary studies, three of which owe some sort of debt to the 
WM (either directly or indirectly), and one that draws more from 
anthropological approaches (see Table 1.3 for a summary). In each discussion 
that follows, I explore: the broad principles that underpin the approach, the 
methodological tools employed by those approaches, and the key debates or 
knowledge claims within the tradition, particularly with reference to select 
committees.   
 
1.2.2. The historical tradition 
 
Historical institutionalism (HI) has obvious roots from the organising principles 
outlined above, especially in sustaining the importance of historical context. HI 
has developed into a cohesive analytical framework of its own in response to 
debates over the role of institutions in the 1980s (Hay, 2002, pp.10-13). It is 
underpinned by a belief that political actors are rule-following satisfiers, 
interpreting dominant value systems and fitting their actions to institutional 
rules of the game. This means that actors’ preferences are socially and politically 
structured by their surroundings, i.e. the institutional setting within which they 
operate (for a summary, see Sanders, 2006). This assumption about actors’ 
behaviour has consequences for political analysis. It implies that institutions and 
political agents act in the future as they have done in the past. This describes the 
notion of ‘path dependency’, or as Faith Armitage (2012, p.137) puts it: ‘[p]ath 
dependency describes the tendency of institutions to be self-perpetuating and 
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static’. This stability is reinforced by the concept of ‘sunk costs’, which Stephen 
Krasner (1984) explains as ‘capital stock’ in the form of information, trust and 
shared expectations that sustains the bedrock of institutions. These established 
structures facilitate the exchange of information and tacitly coordinate 
behaviour. Subsequently, future policy choices are constrained by the past. 
Accepted ways of doing things, either through habit, tradition or legal precedent 
reduce uncertainty (and therefore potential risks) for political actors. However, 
that is not to say that the approach fails to appreciate political change. Change is 
caused by critical junctures or windows of opportunity, which presume 
equilibrium or inertia until there is a confluence of circumstances that are 
capable of provoking change to take place. This may include things such as 
exogenous shocks, policy learning, destabilisation of institutional frameworks, 
or ambiguity between institutional principles and their application to a specific 
event. Central to HI is that change occurs in an incremental fashion. It is 
evolutionary and does not happen frequently, which has self-evident similarities 
to long-established views of the Westminster model (see above). 
 
Taken together, these concepts have allowed HI to make an important 
contribution to parliamentary studies, allowing scholars to explain both the 
stability of the British political system through path dependency but also giving 
a convincing account of changes that have taken place at key points in 
Parliament’s history. A good example of this is the debate about the nature of 
political reform in the House of Commons. Kelso (2003) outlines two 
perspectives. The first, attitudinal view, proposes that parliamentary reform 
depends on the inclination of Members and the satisfaction of three conditions: 
first, there must be disequilibrium with current arrangements; second, there 
must be a coherent reform agenda; and third, there must be some sort of 
leadership. These three factors amount to a critical juncture and their confluence 
allows for the opportunity for change. Philip Norton (1983; 2013, p.292) gives 
two examples: the introduction of departmental select committees in 1979 (MPs 
on both sides of the House desired reform; the Procedure Committee had 
published timely reform proposals; and Norman St John-Stevas, leader of the 
House, provided leadership), and the reform of select committees in 2010 (the 
MPs’ Expenses Scandal created a crisis of confidence in Parliament; the Wright 
Committee provided coherent reform proposals; and leadership came from Tony 
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Wright). This agency-centred view has been challenged by a second perspective 
on political reform, namely the contextual view. It emphasises the contextual 
nature of parliamentary reform, specifically the weight of history as a 
constraining force. According to Kelso (2009b, p.25):  
 
[T]he structured institutional context of parliament has a highly significant 
degree of influence over those actors who operate there, and … parliament’s 
path dependency substantially constrained the range of reform options that 
might be realistically contemplated. 
 
Proponents of this view (Crick, 1965; Flinders, 2002; Walkland, 1976) argue that 
reform originates, and is sustained by, the executive. In this vein, the 
introduction of departmental select committees in 1979 is actually something 
that maintains the pre-existing path of institutional development. Kelso (2009b, 
pp.95-8) argues that the reforms adopted in 1979 did not significantly upset the 
constitutional status quo in that the executive watered down the package of 
reforms to maintain its dominance over backbench parliamentarians. Others 
have also pointed out that, though the three conditions set out by Norton are 
important (and indeed may be necessary), they must be considered in 
combination with the political climate in which MPs find themselves (Power, 
2007; Russell, 2011).  
 
This debate is an important illustration of the impact and contribution of 
historical institutionalism to our understanding of Parliament, and specifically 
the evolution of the select committee system. It also allows us to make three 
broader claims about HI and parliamentary studies. First, the broad focus of the 
approach is (perhaps unremarkably) on institutional roles and landscapes. For 
example, the debate about select committees is usually about reform, and 
usually about reform of the balance between Parliament and executive. It is less 
often about individual political actors (such as committee chairs, members of 
staff, etc.) and their specific influence in shaping political outcomes. Second, it 
indicates that norms and values are inextricably linked to the weight of history, 
which forms the foundation for explaining stability in British politics. Third, and 
closely related to the second, analysis focuses on key events and historical 
processes. These three factors indicate that historical context is a pivotal 
analytical, structural and methodological anchor. For example, Armitage’s (2012) 
research on Speakership elections uses HI to paint an historical analysis, 
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pointing to key elections and their procedural impact on the broader 
institutional processes. Elsewhere, Flinders (2004) locates his research on the 
relationship between Parliament and arm’s-length bodies (ALBs) within an 
historical analysis of the British ministerial department and the importance of 
that history on contemporary debates. To undertake these studies, academic 
research predominantly relies on qualitative methods, including textual analysis, 
commentary of key events, and (where possible) semi-structured interviews with 
elites. This allows academics to both access the historical background and assess 
the views of those involved in parliamentary activities. In privileging history, two 
consequences follow. First, it limits the potential for agency and their individual 
interpretations of the context in which they find themselves by attributing a 
strong causal role to historical context. Second, and in part as a consequence of 
the first, the framework predisposes research to focus on long-term changing 
relationships between institutions (such as the executive and Parliament) and 
less about the individuals that act within it. As a result, these studies may 
overlook political agency, the unintended consequences of daily life in 
Parliament and the importance of those everyday practices on broader events 
and traditions in parliamentary politics. 
 
1.2.3. The rational choice tradition 
 
In contrast to HI, the approach adopted by rational choice theorists and analysts 
places political agency at the heart of their research. However, political agency is 
developed in a very precise fashion, presuming that human behaviour is 
inextricably bound up with self-interest. As Kaare Strøm (1997, p.158) puts it: 
‘[b]esides all their other charming idiosyncracies [sic], legislators are goal-
seeking men or women who choose their behaviour to fit the destinations they 
have in mind’. Rational choice scholars are aware that re-election is a means to 
an end, which can be diffuse (making the world a better place) or particular 
(securing a specific policy outcome). However, to achieve those ends politicians 
need to maximise their power through office-seeking, utility-maximising 
behaviour. This assumption is extended to all political actors and parliamentary 
institutions, who are governed by a will to utility maximisation. This forms the 
bedrock of rational choice approaches to political science. 
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The basic assumption of self-interest as the driving force in human behaviour 
has profound consequences for parliamentary studies. At the broadest level, the 
founding assertion refashions the Westminster model as a chain of delegation 
and accountability: voters delegate their sovereign power to elected 
representatives; elected representatives in turn delegate decision-making power 
to the executive; and the executive delegates the implementation of decision-
making to the civil service and ALBs (Strøm, Müller and Bergman, 2003). In this 
Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) inspired model, the legislature remains the 
principal over the executive, and ultimately the people remain in control of the 
political class. Although an idealistic simplification of a complex reality, it 
mirrors the basic precepts of the Westminster model but, importantly, removes 
the model of historical context and minimises the role played by norms and 
values that might otherwise shape parliamentary behaviour. Rather, the model 
maximises self-interest of all involved because it is designed to: ‘minimize the 
efficiency and transparency losses caused by multiple principals and agents 
observed in other Western democracies’, which, ‘avoids confusion about political 
responsibility’ (Saalfeld, 2003, p.620). With respect to select committees, 
Saalfeld (pp.635-6) argues that these committees are seen as useful in providing 
information to politicians and the public at low cost. Though they have improved 
government accountability, their utility is left wanting due to a lack of formal 
powers over the executive (for example, the executive established what are 
known as the Osmotherly Rules that, though Parliament has never accepted 
them, restrict the extent to which civil servants can give evidence to committees 
in order to maintain the executive’s interpretation of the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility). The simple framework for rational choice theory means that it is 
ideal for quantitative analysis. This has made a substantial contribution to 
legislative studies in that it has offered broad comparative trends between a 
multitude of parliamentary systems of government, of which Ingvar Mattson and 
Kaare Strøm (1995, pp.249-307), who compare legislative committees across 18 
European democracies, is just one example. In contrast to other studies that do 
not base their research on rational choice (for example, Russell and Cowley, 
2016; Russell et. al., 2016; Thompson, 2015a), Mattson and Strøm (1995, p.260) 
find that House of Commons committees are ‘the most deviant case’ of their 
dataset and not seen as powerful compared to their other 18 country examples.  
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Though rational choice approaches are popular in European and American 
legislative studies (e.g. Döring, 1995), they have arguably not made significant 
inroads in a British context, especially with regards to research on select 
committee scrutiny. The legacy of the Westminster model may have contributed 
to this; the focus on historical context, procedures and precedents, unwritten 
rules (norms and values), and informal policy influence sits uneasily with a 
rational choice framework that simplifies behaviour by political actors to self-
interest. Moreover, the breadth of the analysis necessarily sacrifices depth and 
nuance to which British scholars are often accustomed given parliamentary 
actors’ reliance on unwritten rules. There is some research that has attempted to 
take account of that. Christopher Kam (2009), for example, explores the role of 
socialisation in the House of Commons and its effect on party unity in 
Parliament from a rational choice perspective. He argues that shared 
expectations about ‘appropriate behaviour’ (his definition of social norms) may 
help leaders to maintain control of situations by imposing obligations or 
promoting a sense of duty amongst MPs to vote with their party and to support 
their leaders. For Kam, supported by quantitative findings, socialisation 
processes actually form an important method by which political parties assume 
loyalty, leading him to conclude that social norms reinforce self-interested 
behaviour (Kam, 2009, pp.189-204). That said, Kam’s conception of 
socialisation is considered in a very specific way, namely loyalty to the leader. 
This creates conceptual issues given that both the idea of socialisation and 
loyalty are not uncontested. A more nuanced approach is taken by Philip Norton 
(2001), who applies rational choice theory to parliamentary procedure. Echoing 
the concept of sunk costs (discussed in the previous sub-section), Norton argues 
that parliamentary procedures change when the costs of governing are too 
constraining. He cites Labour’s demanding legislative programme in 1997 as an 
example of change; in other areas, MPs accept parliamentary procedure because 
the benefits of amending procedures outweigh the resources needed for change 
to occur. Norton’s approach links rational choice theory with historical 
institutionalism, not only indicating the frequent decision by scholars to mix 
approaches, but also that the fundamental principle of rational choice – self-
interest – does not explain parliamentary behaviour in full. Indeed, rational 
choice scholars acknowledge that non-policy motivations ‘may encompass a 
great swathe of the human condition, including such powerful focuses as love, 
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jealousy, compassion, vanity, spite, and greed’ (Strøm, 2003, p.81). And yet, the 
focus of analysis by rational choice analysts maintains that behaviour is 
ultimately dependent only on instrumental self-interest while other factors are 
rarely considered. 
 
Scholars in this tradition frequently adopt positivist and quantitative methods to 
study parliamentary behaviour because of their ontological and epistemological 
commitment that politicians’ motivations are known and can be studied 
objectively. This relies on the availability of data from publicly identifiable (and 
quantifiable) sources, such as formal powers of parliamentary committees or the 
voting behaviour of politicians. Whilst this does indicate broad, generalisable 
trends, it also sacrifices depth and nuance and, as noted previously, overlooks 
informal relationships that are far more complex than rational choice scholars 
are willing to admit (or include in their analyses). While some scholars believe 
these methods ensure rigour, parsimony and objectivity, others argue that 
rational choice theorists ignore other causal mechanisms, whether the weight of 
history, as proposed by historical institutionalism (above), or norms and values, 
as proposed by sociological approaches, to which we now turn. 
 
1.2.4. The sociological tradition 
 
A noticeable trend in research on parliamentary studies attempts to address the 
problems posed by the historical tradition (such as the lack of agency) and the 
rational choice tradition (equating agency with self-interest). The nature of 
academic study within this third tradition covers a wide range, which makes it 
difficult to offer a neat summary of the application of its principles to the study 
of Parliament. That said, it is possible to identify at least two strands of work 
within this broad tradition, namely: role theory and socialisation processes. 
 
Theories and debates about representatives’ roles have their roots in the famous 
address given by Edmund Burke to his constituents in 1774, in which he 
distinguished between ‘delegate’ and ‘trustee’ interpretations of what it means to 
be a Member of Parliament (Norman, 2014, pp.76-8). This proved to be 
influential for normative debates regarding the representative ideal of politics 
(Pitkin, 1967). Political scientists have used this distinction in order to examine 
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how politicians interpret their role, something which was popular in the 1950s 
and 1960s (e.g. Eulau et. al., 1959; Wahlke et. al., 1962). While interest in role 
analysis has declined, there is still a stream of literature on this topic (e.g. King, 
1974; Radice et. al., 1990). Most famously, Donald Searing (1994) looks at the 
norms and values of politicians at the Palace of Westminster. Searing’s study 
brought together elements of institutionalist and behaviouralist approaches, 
covered in the previous sections, by combining the powerful force of rule-
following and ties this together with the idea that politicians can and do act 
purposefully in their own right. He does not reject self-interest as a motivation 
for action, but rather argues that it is one of many causes for political agents to 
pursue a course of action. Searing interviewed 521 MPs during 1970-71 to 
explore how MPs conceive of their role. Based on their responses, he identifies 
four preference roles (Policy Advocate, Ministerial Aspirant, Constituency 
Member and Parliament Man) and four position roles (Parliamentary Private 
Secretary, Whip, Junior Minister, and Minister), each of which also have sub-
categories. While Searing notes that roles are not mutually exclusive, he 
nonetheless implies that each role is fairly fixed with little role switching. This 
has been criticised by others. For example, Rudy Andeweg (1997), basing his 
research on survey data from the Dutch Parliament, identifies similar roles to 
Searing, including: advocates, parliamentarians and partisans (the lack of 
constituency-focused roles comes from the lack of geographical representation 
in the Netherlands). However, Andeweg also considers the possibility for role 
switching, which Searing does not. Other examples of role analysis include 
research conducted by Kaare Strøm (1997), who re-framed the approach as one 
about strategies of legislators (thereby creating stronger links to rational choice 
theory), and Roger Scully and David Farrell (2003), who identify social 
arbitrator (policy advocate), interest articulator (constituency-focused), 
parliamentarian and party-oriented roles (for a discussion, see Andeweg, 2014; 
more widely on roles, see Blomgren and Rozenberg, 2012). 
 
A related theme to role analysis is how MPs are socialised into their roles, 
something which is taken up by Michael Rush and Philip Giddings (2011). In 
their study, they look at how MPs are socialised into three different, multi-
faceted roles: legislative, scrutiny and constituency roles. According to Rush and 
Giddings (p.56): 
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[L]egislative socialisation [is] the process by which newly elected members of a 
legislature become acquainted with the institution’s rules and norms of 
behaviour. This process may, to a significant degree, shape their attitudes 
towards the legislature and their role and behaviour in it. 
 
They go on to identify functional, attitudinal and behavioural socialisation. The 
foundation of their approach is that norms and values matter and, subsequently, 
the focal point of their analysis is the interaction of those norms and rules with 
the perceived political identities and the institutional context in which actors 
find themselves. In order to do this, Rush and Giddings rely on survey data 
collected from MPs, but also make use of semi-structured interviews and 
documentary analysis where appropriate (note the difference between this 
approach and that of Kam, raised above). This type of research is taken a little 
further by Sarah Childs (2004, 2014), who analyses the role of gender in the 
House of Commons and the extent to which women have a different style of 
behaving in Parliament.  
 
Research in this tradition rejects the assumption made by rational choice 
scholars that MPs’ always behave in a self-interested, utility-maximising way. 
Rather, they look at the claims that political actors make about their role and use 
interviews, survey data and media analysis to explore what roles MPs adopt and 
how the institution has socialised MPs into their various roles. They have 
allowed us to consequently pose questions about MPs’ behaviour that other 
approaches have not, such as the extent to which MPs perceive themselves to be 
following the will of their party, their constituents, or the will of Parliament. 
More widely, it examines how their role fits into the wider normative framework 
of the British constitutional system, i.e. narratives surround the Westminster 
model. However, these approaches are not without criticism, either. The work 
conducted by Searing is based on interviews from some 45 years ago, while the 
data on which Rush and Giddings rely is based on research from the 1990s. 
Crucially, Searing’s study was conducted almost a decade before select 
committees were introduced, while Rush and Giddings’ work is based on 
research from the 1990s and well before committee reforms took place. More 
generally, research in this tradition often relies on claims made by interviewees 
or survey respondents without supplementing those findings with other data.  
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1.2.5. The interpretive tradition 
 
Some scholars have taken the principles of the sociological tradition further. In 
the last five to ten years, an emerging literature has combined traditional 
parliamentary research topics with innovative methods drawn from 
anthropological and post-structuralist perspectives to re-focus analysis in 
parliamentary studies. Emma Crewe and Marion Müller (2006, p.7) criticise 
traditional political science, including studies in the sociological tradition, as too 
focused on institutional structures; instead, they argue that the study of politics 
would benefit from exploring the effects of rituals, ceremonies and symbolism in 
political behaviour. For example, Marion Müller (2006) compares constitutional 
oath-taking in the UK, USA, France, European Parliament and Germany, 
arguing that studying these rituals and practices helps us to understand the 
political orientation of legislative actors. Elsewhere, Marc Abélès (1988, 2007) 
has studied the rituals and traditions of French local, regional and national 
politicians, and argues that studying political rituals allows us to better 
understand the resulting legitimacy in political decisions. The most 
comprehensive attempt to conduct an analysis of the UK Parliament using 
anthropological perspectives comes from the innovative work of Emma Crewe 
(2005, 2015). In her two volumes, she studies the House of Lords (2005) and 
House of Commons (2015) to establish the broad rituals, manners, rhythms and 
everyday behaviour of peers and MPs. She demonstrates that politicians do not 
act according to self-interest or historical context alone, though both may be 
important factors. She asserts that politicians’ behaviours are underpinned by a 
range of motivations and enacted in a diversity of ways. Crucially, they are 
affected by political cultures that emerge within the Palace of Westminster to 
create sometimes very distinct tribes. In addition to Crewe’s research, there has 
been other work that looks at the way in which rituals, ceremonies and the 
symbolic affect democratic practices and political outcomes. For example, in 
Shirin M. Rai and Rachel E. Johnson’s (2014) recent edited collection, authors 
look at, among other things, the way representation is performed, the rituals of 
parliamentary behaviour and their effect on gender norms, and the politics of 
space, design and architecture. Indeed, Rai’s research has led her to suggest a 
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new framework for analysing parliaments and legislatures based on the idea that 
political behaviours and actions are political performances, which we can study 
by looking at, amongst other things, the physical embodiment of performances, 
the settings in which they occur, and examining speech acts and auditory 
rhythms. These help us to better understand political representation (identifying 
authenticity, mode, liminality, and resistance as key factors) (Rai, 2015b).  
 
This new analytical focus, matched with ethnographic methodological 
techniques, poses new questions for the way in which parliamentary scholars 
understand and explain the roles of legislatures. The work conducted by Crewe 
and Rai are at the forefront of breaking away from what may otherwise be part of 
the sociological tradition. Rather, this research has carved out an interpretive 
tradition that focuses its attention on the everyday performances of political 
behaviour. That said, this tradition remains in its infancy and research has not 
been conducted on a range of parliamentary processes, including select 
committee scrutiny in the House of Commons. Moreover, there are trade-offs to 
be made in following this tradition. In particular, generalisability and parsimony 
(so often an important consideration) must be sacrificed in favour of depth and 
nuance. The approach also throws open a host of epistemological questions 
about subjectivity and the role of the researcher vis-à-vis their research that a 
simpler framework might very well avoid. 
 
Taken together, this discussion has shown that there are at least four traditions 
within parliamentary studies. However, an important caveat must be stressed: 
the scholarship on Parliament is far more complex and nuanced than this review 
offers. Scholars cannot be divided into these traditions easily (nor, perhaps, 
would they want to be) for the simple reason that most scholars do not clearly 
articulate or identify the ontological and epistemological roots on which they 
base their research.5 It could well be argued that the sub-discipline has not 
engaged in significant theoretical reflection (rightly or wrongly), instead 
preferring an inductive method inherited from the Westminster model and 
modernist empiricism (see also Flinders, 2011, p.308).  
                                                          
5 For example, research by Philip Cowley (2002, 2005), Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart (1997, 
2010, 2014), or Alison Plumb and David Marsh (2013), though high-quality and pertinent 
research, does not identify an analytical reference point. Though this is an important field, it 
is not possible to place this field of research into a scholarly tradition. This is not uncommon. 
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1.3. Identifying a research agenda 
 
What this review indicates is that analysis of committees, specifically, and 
scrutiny, more generally, has focused on the function of legislatures in the 
twenty-first century and particularly the conflicting demands placed on the 
Westminster model following far-reaching constitutional reforms. Historical 
institutionalism has given us the historical context within which select 
committee reform has taken place. Rational choice theorists remind us of the 
instrumental motivations that often affect MPs’ behaviour. However, as the 
sociological tradition argues, rational choice scholars arguably overstate their 
case. We must also look to the norms and values to explain behaviour, which the 
emerging interpretive tradition has taken much further than conventional 
research in the sub-discipline has done to date. 
 
As a result of research undertaken on select committees, specifically, we have a 
better understanding of their history and development, especially since 1979. 
Not only can we better understand the nature of parliamentary reform 
(efficiency versus effectiveness reforms), but we can also place this in wider 
debates about the causes of reform (attitudinal versus contextual perspectives). 
Additionally, we know that select committee scrutiny does make a difference on 
government policy as a result of a range of mixed-methods approaches that have 
looked at committee recommendations and interviewed parliamentary actors 
about committee impact. That said, there remain a range of things that we 
simply do not know about committees, especially when coming from sociological 
or interpretive traditions. On the whole, we do not know how parliamentary 
actors, including committee members, chairs and staff, interpret their role on 
select committees. As a result, our knowledge of how parliamentary actors seek 
to perform their committee duties or how contrasting visions of scrutiny affect 
accountability processes remains thin. Furthermore, we do not know much 
about the evidence-gathering process itself. Whilst the majority of research has 
focused on committee reports’ impact on government, the question of what goes 
into making a committee report in the first place has often been overlooked 
(Hannah White’s research is a notable exception). Furthermore, though most 
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research has acknowledged the importance of consensual reports by select 
committees, few have looked at how consensus can be achieved given the 
radically different perspectives of committee members. 
 
Our lack of knowledge on certain topics can be explained by the dominance of 
certain parliamentary traditions that were identified in the previous section. The 
legacy of the Westminster model and modernist empiricism, in particular, have 
ensured a greater focus on institutional relationships between executive and 
Parliament. It has only been in recent years that this dominance has been 
challenged, and especially so by the nascent interpretive tradition in 
parliamentary studies. Indeed, this approach, which asks questions about the 
role of the everyday practices and interpretations of political actors, is 
particularly important because it links effectively to the previous paragraph’s 
discussion about what we do not know regarding parliamentary scrutiny 
undertaken by select committees in the House of Commons. As the introduction 
to this thesis has made clear, it is precisely this gap that this doctoral research 
project seeks to fill by asking three questions relating to interpretations of 
scrutiny and everyday practices. These are: 
1. How can we understand the everyday lives of parliamentary actors? 
2. How do political actors interpret and perform their role on select 
committees? 
3. In what ways do everyday practices affect parliamentary scrutiny? 
These are important questions that hope to complement the current scholarship 
on scrutiny in the House of Commons, and questions with which the remainder 
of this thesis seeks to engage. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of current trends in research on select 
committees in the House of Commons as part of a broader discussion on the 
ways in which scholars approach and study parliaments and legislatures in the 
UK. I have sought to clarify what could otherwise be perceived to be an 
unreflexive scholarship (particularly with regards select committee scrutiny). 
This discussion has identified four dominant traditions that pervade the 
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scholarship, underpinned more broadly by the legacy of the Westminster model 
and modernist empiricism. The interpretive tradition has begun to challenge this 
and, in doing so, identified an interesting gap in the literature on scrutiny. 
Whilst some academics (Emma Crewe and Shirin M. Rai, for instance) have 
begun to address the theme of the everyday in parliamentary activities, their 
research has not explored everyday practices of select committees. This indicates 
a fruitful avenue for further research that will complement the current literature 
on select committees. Thus, this chapter has been able to identify a clear 
research gap on select committees. Furthermore, given the focus of this chapter 
on the everyday, this research sits squarely within the nascent interpretive 
tradition. In order to fill this aforementioned gap using an interpretive approach, 
it requires further reflection on the ontological and epistemological foundations 
that guide this doctoral thesis. So, in the next two chapters, I ask: what are 
everyday practices? How important are they in affecting events, processes, 
institutions and traditions in Parliament? What underpins these everyday 
practices? How can we study them?  
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esearching everyday practices has only recently become a topic of 
interest within the field of parliamentary and legislative studies. This is 
not necessarily surprising given not only the legacy of modernist 
empiricism (discussed in the previous chapter) but also the wider belief that 
‘everyday life’ is ultimately about ordinariness and therefore unremarkable, 
mundane and ultimately unworthy of political study. And yet, a research focus 
on everyday practices can give us interesting perspectives about political 
processes and outcomes in the House of Commons that would complement more 
output-focused research on select committees that Chapter 1 has summarised. 
Having identified such a gap, it falls to this chapter to reflect more deeply on the 
theoretical foundations that guide this research project, with the aim of offering 
a philosophically rigorous and conceptually consistent outline to study everyday 
life in Parliament. This requires substantial depth because taking this approach 
to parliamentary studies has only recently begun to develop. In order to do this, 
this chapter is broken into three sections. The first section explores the broad 
philosophical roots that underpin this doctoral research. This is important 
because these ontological and epistemological outlooks significantly shape the 
topics that we choose to analyse, the methodological approaches that adopt to 
study those topics, and the way we then go on to evaluate our empirical findings. 
I draw on anti-foundationalist themes to explain the interpretive (and, by 
consequence, contested) nature of politics. This centralises the importance of 
interpretation, beliefs and everyday practices. In the second section, I examine 
the consequence of taking an anti-foundationalist perspective to political 
analysis. Though there exist a wide range of analytical frameworks that apply 
R 
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such philosophical roots and principles, both from outside parliamentary studies 
(such as Norman Fairclough’s (2010) discourse analysis or Maarten Hajer’s 
(2009) frame analysis) and within it (such as Shirin M. Rai’s (2015b) analysis of 
ceremonies and rituals), I take the work of Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes 
(2003, 2006, 2010) as a starting point. The broad thrust of their approach has 
given us novel ways to study political issues, and has not only made a significant 
impact on British political science generally, but some of their empirical work 
has also touched on parliamentary issues (Rhodes et. al., 2009, pp.184-218). I 
summarise their key concepts – amongst them beliefs, traditions, dilemmas and 
practices – and explain their strengths and weaknesses for empirical research. In 
the third and final section, I tailor their analytical framework to something that 
is more explicitly focused on everyday practices. I draw on dramaturgical and 
anthropological insights to supplement Bevir and Rhodes’ approach to define 
everyday practices in terms of style, space and speech. In sum, this means that 
we can examine everyday practices through not only parliamentary actors’ 
beliefs, traditions and dilemmas about the world, but also in how they seek to 
enact or perform those ideas in their everyday behaviour as they navigate their 
scrutiny world (i.e. creating a sense of meaning-in-action). This forms the 
bedrock of the analysis that follows in empirical chapters. 
 
 
2.1. Philosophical foundations 
 
Philosophical reflection is important because empirical and conceptual debates 
often depend on our deeper theoretical outlooks (Hay, 2007a, pp.115-6). Our 
ontological and epistemological assumptions affect the research agenda that we 
pursue and the rigour of our empirical research. Additionally, engaging with 
these philosophical and theoretical questions helps to ensure that we remain 
reflexive and self-critical thinkers. This indicates, then, that this discussion is 
not about matching a research method to a research question; rather, these 
considerations shape our fundamental outlook on political science. So, in this 
section, I consider the ontological and epistemological roots on which this 
research based. I begin with the broad thrust of anti-foundationalist philosophy. 
These foundations lead us to an interpretive approach. In the second sub-section, 
I identify a definition of politics that encompasses interpretation and 
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contestation as its central pillars. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship 
between interpretation, power and practices, which has considerable 
implications for an interpretive analysis of everyday practices in select 
committees of the House of Commons. 
 
2.1.1. Anti-foundationalism 
 
Most interpretive approaches to political science have their roots in anti-
foundationalist philosophy, which broadly asserts that our knowledge of the 
world cannot be regarded as certain (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010, p.42). Anti-
foundationalism suggests that there is, as the name implies, no foundation or 
essence to reality. In contrast to positivists, who assert that objective meanings 
are ‘out there’ in the world waiting for us to discover or find them, anti-
foundationalists take as their starting point the principle that social (and 
political) realities are constructed through our experiences of and engagement 
with what we perceive of the world. Some scholars have taken anti-
foundationalism to mean that reality can have no meaning apart from what is 
believed by a particular group and that, therefore, all knowledge is relative 
(Trigg, 1985, p.22). However, this is a simplistic conclusion to draw from a more 
complex theory. Rosalyn Deutsche (1991, p.21) explains the consequences of 
anti-foundationalism differently: 
 
This does not mean, as it is frequently held, that no reality exists or that it is 
unknowable, but only that no founding presence, no objective source, or 
privileged ground of meaning ensures a truth lurking behind representations … 
any claim to know directly a truth outside representation emerges as an 
authoritarian form of representation employed in the battles to name reality. 
 
Anti-foundationalism does not mean, therefore, that reality does not exist, but 
rather that individuals do not have pure, unmediated or objective access to it. As 
a consequence, an anti-foundationalist approach to knowledge is committed to a 
more holistic understanding of reality (or realities) by emphasising the 
contestable nature of truth. It suggests that truths are contingent, provisional 
and socially negotiated through communication and everyday actions; they are 
temporary, fleeting and valid only until new, more convincing interpretations 
become accepted. This is not only true of social sciences, but also the natural and 
physical sciences, as Thomas Kuhn (2012) famously pointed out, and which has 
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since been examined by others (Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Latour, 1999; 
Longino, 1990). That is not to say that objectivity is not possible; it remains a 
regulative ideal. In contrast to positivism, however, facts are not ‘given’ to us, 
but shared through our collective commitment to certain ideas and a rejection of 
others. As Mark Bevir (1999, p.98) explains, we need to think of objectivity in 
terms of agreed facts: 
 
Objective knowledge arises from a human practice in which we criticise and 
compare rival webs of theories in terms of agreed facts. An agreed fact is a piece 
of evidence nearly everyone in a given community, especially any of them 
present as witnesses, would accept as true. 
 
Concepts and ideas we have of the world (such as ‘parliamentary sovereignty’, 
‘accountability’, ‘scrutiny’) only make sense as part of wider webs of belief, or 
traditions of thought. We build or construct these webs through theories we have 
in an attempt to categorise, explain and narrate our experiences. Rival theories 
and webs of belief must be tested, compared and negotiated, and it is through 
this process that objectivity becomes possible (see Bevir, 1999, pp.78-126 for a 
more detailed discussion). Thus, it is through our experiences of the world that 
we (attempt to) make sense of it. In doing so, we naturalise social and political 
realities, or will them to be ordinary, normal and routine because we accept 
them as part of our everyday life. It is in this vein that R.A.W. Rhodes (2011, 
pp.280-309) explains everyday life as ‘willed ordinariness’.  
 
Such philosophical foundations have implications for the way we define and 
undertake research on political phenomena. Before examining the implications 
on analysis, however, this discussion requires a little further comment with 
respect to how we define politics and the political, and the nature and role of 
power within politics. 
 
2.1.2. Politics as contestation 
 
In taking interpretation seriously, political behaviour is inherently unstable and, 
crucially, becomes value-laden, even if consensus on some issues, actions or 
practices have been stable for centuries. Things could always be interpreted in 
different ways, but those other ideas may be beyond the horizon of what is 
politically acceptable, legitimate or even imaginable within a particular tradition. 
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What makes something political is the contested nature of social practices in 
that it describes the contest of ideas and resources with respect to how society 
should ordered, preserved or changed (Mouffe, 2000). Politics is not necessarily 
about the resolution of a conflict, the settlement of a dispute, or the (ostensibly 
successful) outcome of a policy. Rather, it describes the process of contestation 
itself. The ‘resolution’ of a conflict, if accepted by a community, is merely a 
settled – and contingent – set of social practices which remain inherently 
unstable, complex and value-laden (for a discussion, see Hay, 2007b). As Alan 
Finlayson (2007, p.452) puts it:  
 
If we begin with a clear and distinct concept of politics as the ‘arena’ within 
which we see expressed the irreducible and contested plurality of public life, the 
ineradicable contestation of differing world-views, then it is clear that what is 
distinct in politics is not the presence of beliefs but the presence of beliefs in 
contradiction with each other, not decisions about courses of action but of 
dispute over decisions and courses of action. 
 
This discussion places contingency and contestation at the heart of how we 
define politics. It envelops politics as a process, constantly open to the possibility 
of change (even if this is unlikely), and about the values and beliefs that actors 
hold. Concomitantly, the nature of a ‘settled’ or ‘resolved’ dispute is nothing 
more than an established order produced by everyday life, including our 
ordinary, unremarkable, routine practices. This often takes the form of rituals, 
ceremonies, signs and symbols (Bourdieu, 1977; Kertzer, 1988; Rai, 2015a). 
These institutionalised forms of behaviour are the way by which we navigate our 
social and political worlds. However, they also affect the options available to us 
as political actors. As Steven Lukes (1975, p.301) argues with respect to rituals: 
 
[Rituals] define as authoritative certain ways of seeing society: it serves to 
specify what in society is of special significance, it draws people’s attention to 
certain forms of relationship and activity – and at the same time, therefore, it 
deflects their attention from other forms, since every way of seeing [is] also a 
way of not seeing. 
 
Rituals and, by extension, everyday practices contribute to the dominant social 
and political order by sustaining particular sets of relationships and points of 
view. Thus, everyday practices create a sense of order by disguising or concealing 
conflicts, political differences and social tensions (Rai, 2015a). Rituals authorise 
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and restrict, prioritise and disperse, open and close. Crucially, these decisions 
are affected by power relationships, which deserves direct attention.  
 
2.1.3. Politics, power, practices 
 
The concept of power is almost always associated with politics (Hay, 2002, 
pp.168-93). Indeed, given the above discussion, in which politics is presented as 
a set of contingent practices, power is an important point that requires 
discussion. Power has the ability to sharpen, blur, strengthen, soften and link 
policies and arguments together. Power is the force that mediates a rupture of 
contesting practices and traditions. This means that the issue of power is just as 
much about ‘what’ it is but also about ‘how’ it operates. Power must be seen in 
terms of strategic relationships that engage with political contests. This follows 
the spirit of Michel Foucault’s (2000b, pp.337-8) work on power, who argues 
that: 
 
[I]f we speak of the power of laws, institutions, and ideologies, if we speak of 
structures or mechanisms of power, it is only insofar as we suppose that certain 
persons exercise power over others. The term “power” designates relationships 
between “partners”. 
 
Power is therefore relational and fluid, and varies considerably between 
individuals. Furthermore, power relations ‘are exercised, to an exceedingly 
important extent, through the production and exchange of signs’ (ibid.). This 
links back to the point made above that practices (played out as rituals and 
through signs and symbols) are deeply political and indicates that we must focus 
our analysis of power relations to what Foucault termed a ‘regime of practices’. 
He explains, with reference to his work on penal systems (Foucault, 2002a, 
p.225 (emphasis original)): 
 
[T]he target of analysis wasn’t “institutions”, “theories”, or “ideology” but 
practices – with the aim of grasping the conditions that make these acceptable 
at a given moment; the hypothesis being that these types of practice are not just 
governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic 
circumstances – whatever role these elements may actually play – but, up to a 
point, possess their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence, and 
“reason”. It is a question of analysing a “regime of practices” – practices being 
understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed 
and reasons given, the planned and the taken-for-granted meet and interconnect. 
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In this quote, Foucault identifies the link between power and everyday practices 
(though he arguably goes a little too far in removing agency), something to 
which we return in later sections of this chapter. Here, it is worth noting that the 
inextricable links between politics and contestation require us to pay attention to 
everyday practices because politics, contestation and power manifest themselves 
through those rituals, symbols, signs, routines, and so on.  
 
Overall, we can see that everyday practices are deeply political. In defining 
politics in this way, it reinforces the guiding principle of anti-foundationalism 
that political realities are contested and negotiated, something which 
complements wider democratic principles about competition between ideas. 
Indeed, without the contest of ideas, whether played out on the floor of the 
House of Commons between government and opposition or on the sofas of 
breakfast news programmes between politicians and journalists, political action 
and reaction would be reduced to technocratic problem-solving. This is pivotal 
for the way in which we analyse scrutiny in the House of Commons and the 
everyday lives of MPs because it suggests that we need to take seriously the way 
in which they interpret their behaviour and the importance that they attach to 
scrutiny in the first place. This has significant repercussions for the way in which 
we approach political science, and raises questions over how we can analyse 
interpretations of scrutiny and their enactment in everyday practices. It is to this 
that discussion now turns. 
 
 
2.2. The interpretive approach in British political science 
 
There are a diverse range of approaches available to us to engage in an 
interpretive analysis (for an overview, see Wagenaar, 2011), but I take the 
approach adopted by Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2006, 2010) as a starting point. 
Importantly, this research comes from similar epistemological roots, and so it is 
intuitively linked to the ideas raised in the previous section. The concepts and 
type of analysis that they have conducted have allowed them to apply their 
framework to a range of contexts. Other scholars have also applied Bevir and 
Rhodes’ approach. Among other things, this includes: community leadership in 
local government (Sullivan, 2007), crisis management in policy departments  
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Table 2.1. Bevir and Rhodes’ interpretive approach: concepts 
Concept Definition 
To 
decentre 
To decentre is to unpack practices as the contingent beliefs and actions of 
individuals, challenging the idea that inexorable or impersonal forces drive 
politics. 
Narratives 
Narratives are a form of explanation that works by relating actions to 
individual beliefs and desires that produce them. This allows us to capture the 
way in which events happened in the past or are happening today. 
Situated 
agency 
Individuals are ‘situated’ in wider webs of beliefs (traditions), which will 
largely shape their beliefs; yet, they retain a capacity for ‘agency’ in that they 
may respond to traditions, beliefs, practices and dilemmas in novel ways. 
Beliefs 
Beliefs are the basic unit of analysis, in that they are the interpretations of 
individuals of their world and their surroundings.  
Traditions 
Traditions are ‘webs of belief’, and form the ideational background in which 
agents find themselves. Usually, agents will adopt beliefs from traditions as a 
starting point, but may amend them (usually in response to dilemmas). 
Dilemmas 
A dilemma is an idea that stands in contradiction to other beliefs, thereby 
posing a problem for individuals. Dilemmas may be resolved by either 
accommodating the new belief in the present web of beliefs, or replacing old 
beliefs with new beliefs. 
Practices 
A set of actions that often exhibits a stable pattern across time. Practices are 
the ways in which beliefs and traditions manifest themselves on an everyday 
basis. 
  
(Wilkinson, 2011), and beliefs of local government elites (Gains, 2009) (for a 
discussion, see Bevir and Rhodes, 2012, pp.203-4). Some research has also 
touched on parliamentary contexts (Rhodes et. al., 2009, pp.184-218). That is 
not to say that their approach is not without problems. For example, Bevir and 
Rhodes privilege ideas and beliefs over and above other concepts (including 
dilemmas and practices) that crucially affects analysis. Notwithstanding these 
shortcomings, Bevir and Rhodes offer us a philosophically rich and conceptually 
developed framework to guide empirical research on the House of Commons, 
and therefore deserves detailed attention. 
 
For Bevir and Rhodes, ideas and beliefs are, arguably, the basic unit of analysis 
to explain political phenomena. To undertake their analysis, Bevir and Rhodes 
(2010, p.73) argue that we need to ‘decentre’ interpretations and concepts used 
by political actors. By this, they mean an analytical focus on ‘the social 
construction of a practice through the ability of individuals to create and act on 
meanings’. As scholars, we must ‘unpack a practice as the disparate and 
contingent beliefs and actions of individuals’, and, in doing so, challenge the idea 
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that ‘inexorable or impersonal forces, norms, or laws define patterns and 
regularities in politics’. Often, this takes the form of narratives or stories because 
this is the way in which political actors make sense of the world around them 
(for more on narrative analysis, see Bevir, 2006). This focus on ideas, 
interpretations and beliefs echoes earlier discussions about the contested nature 
of social and political realities. It hinges on a range of concepts that guide Bevir 
and Rhodes’ analysis, which are summarised in a little more depth here (and 
summarised in Table 2.1).  
 
2.2.1. Situated agency 
 
Following their anti-foundationalist principles, Bevir and Rhodes reject the idea 
that individuals can form and act on beliefs in a vacuum, which means that they 
ultimately reject the idea of an autonomous subject or self. Though this chimes 
strongly with post-structuralist themes, the two interpretive scholars distinguish 
between autonomy and agency. They argue that, while actors cannot access 
experiences and reason in a ‘pure’ way or autonomous from their social context, 
actors still react to ideas and interpret beliefs in their own, novel ways. In their 
own words (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010, p.74): 
 
As anti-foundationalists, we reject the possibility of an autonomous self, which 
forms beliefs and acts on pure experiences or pure reason. All experiences and 
reasoning occur within a web of beliefs. Yet to reject autonomy is not necessarily 
to reject agency. To accept agency is to imply people have the capacity to adopt 
beliefs and actions, even novel ones, for reasons of their own, and in so doing 
they can transform the social background. So, agency is possible, but it is always 
situated in a particular context. 
 
Actors depend on this context to make sense of their world but, through their 
own ‘local’ reasoning (i.e. reasoning in their specific context), they are able to 
influence and modify it. This indicates a symbiotic relationship between 
individuals’ interpretations and beliefs and the broader webs of belief. Beliefs 
inform actions and practices; these beliefs and practices weave wider webs of 
belief, or traditions, which in turn offer a starting point for further development 
of beliefs or actions (for a discussion, see Hay, 2011, pp.175-7). 
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2.2.2. Traditions 
 
Traditions are the social context within which agents find themselves, or the 
‘situation’ in ‘situated agency’. They are webs of beliefs that act as organising 
perspectives or ideational context for individuals, groups and other political 
actors. Without traditions, actors would be thrust into the world in a vacuum, 
something that patently does not happen. As such, Bevir (2010, p.263) 
concludes that ‘individuals are to a large extent what social traditions and 
practices make them’. This has strong echoes to concepts of social structure or, 
to put it into Kuhnian language, paradigms (Kuhn, 2012, pp.43-51). Policies, 
beliefs and actions are naturalised as possible, legitimate and normal ways of 
behaving within this context. However, Bevir and Rhodes (2010, p.78) argue 
that traditions cannot fix or determine behaviour in the same way that a 
paradigm would do because agents still have a capacity to interpret traditions in 
novel ways. So, traditions offer ‘starting points’ to political actors, who are under 
no obligation to follow a web of beliefs (for a detailed discussion, see Bevir, 1999, 
pp.174-220). 
 
The flexibility of traditions has been a point of criticism from other scholars for 
at least two reasons. First, it makes it appear elusive and too agency-focused. 
Martin Smith (2008, p.146), for example, summarises traditions in the following 
ways: as a process of socialisation, inherited beliefs, the basis for institutions, a 
set of power relations, influential but not deterministic, strong because they 
socialise, weak because they are fallible (echoed by McAnulla, 2006). This 
implies that the explanatory force of the interpretive approach ignores social 
structures and that the concept of tradition is extremely fragile. Second, and 
possibly more damning, it is not clear why some traditions exert greater appeal 
on political actors than others, or why some aspects might resist modification. 
Jason Glynos and David Howarth (2008) make this point very well, and suggests 
that something is missing from Bevir and Rhodes’ analysis. Bevir and Rhodes 
(2008a, pp.172-4) have responded to these criticisms: first, they point out that 
social structures need to be disaggregated with reference to beliefs, dilemmas 
and traditions; second, the concept of tradition is a pragmatic concept and 
therefore it is applied in different ways according to different circumstance or 
analytical focus; and third, the concept of tradition can be linked to that of 
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power in that: ‘power can refer to the restrictive consequences of the actions of 
others in defining what we can and cannot do’, and therefore their analysis of 
narratives and stories are ‘studies of both power and resistance’. This means that 
individuals’ possibilities for action are restricted in that traditions suggest what 
is acceptable, legitimate or even imaginable within a particular web of beliefs, 
thereby sustaining some traditions while others become less convincing for 
political actors (see also Bevir and Rhodes, 2008b, 2010).  
 
2.2.3. Dilemmas 
 
Traditions are not static, but change in response to dilemmas. The concept of 
dilemma is rooted in Mark Bevir’s The Logic of the History of Ideas, in which he 
argues that (1999, pp.221-2):  
 
People develop, adjust, and transform traditions in response to dilemmas, where 
dilemmas are authoritative understandings that put into question their existing 
webs of belief. Dilemmas prompt changes of belief because they consist of new 
beliefs and any new belief necessarily poses a question of the agent’s webs of 
belief. 
 
This quote encapsulates the basic way in which a dilemma works, both in Mark 
Bevir’s post-analytic philosophy and in his joint work with Rhodes. A dilemma 
comes about through a tension between two or more beliefs, but, crucially it 
depends on an actor interpreting two (or more) beliefs in this way. Given actors’ 
capacity for agency and interpretation, dilemmas can come from anywhere: 
reading a book, personal moral reflection, contrasting experiences of the world, 
empirical evidence and/or statistics, unintended consequences, shock events, a 
faux pas, natural and/or artificial disasters, and many more beside (Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2006, pp.9-11). Conflicts between beliefs play out in different ways in 
that new beliefs could: (i) be discarded as unconvincing, (ii) be accommodated 
within the web of beliefs, or (iii) replace an older belief. This could then lead to 
ripple effects because it could now come into conflict with other beliefs within a 
tradition. This is how, incrementally, slowly and painfully, traditions and 
practices change over time. Alternatively, the introduction of a single new belief 
could have such substantive effects that the coherence of whole traditions are 
ripped apart. This shows that traditions cannot be all-encompassing or totalising, 
given the capacity for agency that Bevir and Rhodes have identified. An excellent 
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summary that ties together the concept of dilemmas with beliefs and traditions 
can be found in the concluding chapter of Bevir and Rhodes’ Governance Stories 
(2006, p.166 (emphasis added)): 
 
[P]atterns of governance arise as the contingent constructions of several actors 
inspired by competing webs of beliefs formed against the background of diverse 
traditions. Our governance stories thus explain shifting patterns of governance 
by focusing on the beliefs and actions by which a host of people construct varied 
practices. They explore some of the diverse ways in which situated agents are 
changing the boundaries of state and civil society by constantly remaking 
practices as their beliefs change. 
 
Dilemmas matter because they help us to understand the contingent nature of 
British politics and the central mechanism to explain political change in the 
interpretive approach. They also identify the limits of webs of belief and how 
everyday practices come into conflict with one another. However, the concept 
has also been criticised by some because it seems underdeveloped. Colin Hay 
(2011, pp.178-9), for example, points out that when the concept has been applied, 
it is ‘used to refer to little more than the simple juxtaposition, combination and 
recombination of ideas and insights’. This is especially problematic given that 
politics is ultimately about contestation (see above). Dilemmas are fundamental 
to how political actors negotiate the world around them and as a result it is, first, 
impossible to brush the concept aside and, second, disappointing that the 
concept hasn’t been substantively developed. This is a point to which we return 
in the next section (see also Geddes, 2014). 
 
2.2.4. Practices 
 
Bevir and Rhodes (2010, p.75) argue that practices are part of a macro-level 
analysis that allows researchers to decentre prevailing social practices that 
sustain institutions, such as a policy department in Whitehall or, as in our case, 
parliaments and legislatures (and specifically select committees). In their own 
words: 
 
A practice is a set of actions, often a set of actions that exhibit a pattern, perhaps 
even a pattern that remains relatively stable across time. Practices often give us 
grounds for postulating beliefs, for we can ascribe to people only in interpreting 
their actions. Nonetheless, practices cannot explain actions because people act 
for reasons of their own. People sometimes act on their beliefs about a practice, 
Chapter 2: Theory 
47 
but, when they do, we still explain their action by reference to their beliefs about 
the practice, and, of course, these beliefs need not be accurate. 
 
Contrary to beliefs or traditions, Bevir and Rhodes’ concept of practices has, 
arguably, developed less consistently. It was not a clearly defined concept in 
Interpreting British Governance (2003) or Governance Stories (2006); but by 
2010, in The State as Cultural Practice, the concept is discussed in its own sub-
heading. The reason for the omission is fairly straight-forward in that Bevir and 
Rhodes privilege beliefs over actions (or at least maintain a clear epistemological 
divide between the two), which means that it has received less philosophical 
reflection. This arguably poses questions over the analytical purchase of the 
interpretive approach. Hendrik Wagenaar (2012), for example, believes that the 
concept should be central to interpretive approaches because individuals 
construct meaning not only through interpretation, but through action (which 
can confirm, alter, or discard beliefs). Bevir and Rhodes (2012, p.201) insist that 
practices embody beliefs and ‘cannot properly be discussed without reference to 
these beliefs’, which, though true, does not ameliorate the criticism that beliefs 
are only ever partial and actions are ‘a move into an only partly known and 
knowable world’ (Wagenaar, 2012, p.92). In other words, both beliefs and 
actions offer explanatory value in political science. This illustrates a current 
weakness in the analytical framework, to which I return shortly. 
 
Bevir and Rhodes’ interpretive approach, notwithstanding criticisms identified 
above, has received significant attention in British political science (especially 
regarding governance and the state (Turnbull, 2016)). It offers a way by which 
we can inject theoretical ideas into studying the House of Commons. This means 
that we can adopt the broad thrust of Bevir and Rhodes’ framework. However, as 
noted in previous paragraphs, their approach requires further refinement, 
especially with regards to the concept of everyday practices (and, to a lesser 
extent, their concept of dilemmas). This is particularly important because of the 
preceding section’s linkage between politics, contestation, power and their 
manifestation through practices. It is to this issue that discussion now turns. 
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2.3. Towards interpretive parliamentary studies 
 
In this section, I build on the analytical framework identified above. First, I 
attempt to supplement the concept of practices by drawing on a rich literature 
on performance to deepen analytical possibilities. This is necessary given the 
discussion in earlier sections about the anti-foundationalist principles on which 
an interpretive analysis is based. I then, in the second sub-section, summarise 
how the interpretive concepts of situated agency, beliefs, traditions, dilemmas, 
and practices, matter for an interpretive parliamentary analysis.  
 
2.3.1. The centrality of practices 
 
Given the emphasis placed on the everyday in the first section, the importance of 
practices in political analysis cannot be understated. Thus, it is not just what 
people say about what they do that matters, but also requires us to closely focus 
on their actions, and what those actions tell us about their beliefs (and, by 
extension, the traditions on which those beliefs are based). Moreover, even if 
practices are only a manifestation of individual beliefs (as Bevir and Rhodes 
maintain), we still need a detailed explanation of the concept. Given its centrality, 
it is a little surprising that Bevir and Rhodes did not articulate the concept in the 
same level of detail as traditions, beliefs and dilemmas. However, this does not 
mean that the framework introduced by Bevir and Rhodes is not useful. Rather, 
it requires further depth and clarification. Axiomatically, the literature on 
practices is wide-ranging and contested, which makes a concise discussion (let 
alone definition) of practices difficult. As such a discussion goes beyond the 
parameters of this chapter, this thesis offers a bricolage conceptualisation of 
‘everyday practices’ by drawing on a rich literature and a range of authors. In 
particular, I take inspiration from the literature on dramaturgy, which draws on 
similar ontological and epistemological roots discussed earlier, and especially 
the dramaturgical concept of ‘performance’.  
 
The metaphor of everyday practices as performances is a fruitful way by which 
we can analyse the myriad ways in which practices manifest themselves in 
everyday behaviour. The literature on this has been widely established and 
grows far beyond the realm of the political. For example: the anthropologist, 
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Victor Turner (1982), believed performance to be a natural form of human 
expression; elsewhere, Erving Goffman (1990) argued that the ‘self’, the 
‘performer’ and the ‘character’ are enmeshed if not equated. There is no better 
way to demonstrate this than through an extended extract from Jean-Paul Sartre 
(1969, p.59), in which he examines a performance at a café: 
 
His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He 
comes towards the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a 
little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for 
the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk 
the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with 
the recklessness of a tightrope-walker by putting it in a perpetually unstable, 
perpetually broken equilibrium which he perpetually re-establishes by a light 
movement of the arm and the hand. All his behavior [sic] seems to us a game. 
He applies himself to chaining his movements as if they were mechanisms, the 
one regulating the other; his gestures and even his voice seem to be mechanisms; 
he gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things. He is playing, he is 
amusing himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can 
explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café. There is nothing there to 
surprise us. The game is a kind of marking out and investigation. The child plays 
with his [sic] body in order to explore it, to take inventory of it; the waiter in the 
café plays with his condition in order to realize it. 
 
This illustrates that an individual takes on an established social role and enacts 
this according to a range of codes. In political terms, Maarten Hajer (2009, p.7) 
argues that, through the presentation of the political self, meaning is given, roles 
are defined and narratives of conflict or cohesion are promoted. In order to take 
on these roles and perform effectively, performers need to interpret their 
surroundings (which links us back to ‘situated agency’, above). Performers need 
to interpret the social norms, values, etiquette, expectations and accepted modes 
of behaviour associated with that situation, which consequently requires 
practical judgements as well as taken-for-granted or tacit knowledge. A 
performance, then, has a range of elements. Here, I limit discussion to three: 
style, space and speech. 
 
Style. Erving Goffman (1990, pp.34-5) identifies two elements of what I term a 
performance style: first, the appearance of the performer (including dress and 
body language), which indicates the social status of the individual; and, second, 
the manner adopted by the performer (gestures, tone of voice, etc.) which 
functions to indicate the role that the performer expects to play. He describes 
that performers idealise their enactment by trying to remove blemishes to the 
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contrary of their intentions, or ‘conceal action which is inconsistent’ with ‘ideal 
standards’ (ibid., p.50). Actions are stylised according to a set of informal codes 
or cues (of course, the performer is under no obligation to accept these codes 
and cues, and may choose to subvert them). Non-verbal behaviour could include, 
among other things, scratching heads, waving hands, knocking on desks or other 
furniture, clapping or shrugging shoulders. These are signs that can symbolise 
shock and awe, disagreement or agreement, etc. More generally, performance 
styles are the ways in which situated actors negotiate their political space as 
everyday practices, which reveals much about the identities of individuals, their 
beliefs, and their knowledge and/or interpretation of the world. 
 
Performances, of course, do not occur in isolation. Other actors are present as 
part of a cast in an enactment, which Goffman (ibid., pp.83-108) refers to as 
‘performance teams’. The relations within teams are vitally important. At the 
most basic level, a smooth performance depends on every individual remaining 
committed to their role and to their script. Goffman calls this a ‘working 
consensus’ among all participants, in which actors are expected to follow social 
codes or etiquettes, and to suppress their immediate feelings or urges of the 
contrary in order to allow for a temporarily acceptable social interaction (ibid., 
pp.20-1, pp.90-1). In doing so, collective performances layer each actor into their 
respective role, which may of course change depending on the setting or 
situation of the performance, but which in each case determines their status in 
social and political terms. This reinforces earlier points about the significance of 
power relationships that influence everyday practices (though, as noted, actors 
are free to subvert dominant social cues if they so choose). Certain performances 
become naturalised, and turn into rituals, ceremonies, routines or, in short, 
practices. 
 
A team enacts its performance in front of an audience (note, though, that 
audiences behave both as spectators and perform as audiences; similarly, 
performers are spectators of each other as an enactment occurs (for a discussion, 
see Fitzgerald, 2015)). For Goffman (ibid., p.108, pp.74-5), a team has 
‘something of the character of a secret society’ because each actor is ‘in the know’ 
of the performance, which the audience respects to allow the performance to 
take place; too close an inspection would prevent the performance from being 
Chapter 2: Theory 
51 
enacted successfully and so the audience needs to co-operate through distance 
between itself and the performers. This brings to mind a distinction between 
insiders and outsiders, or an ‘us’ and a ‘them’. In doing so, it allocates different 
performance roles, with some playing central parts and others supporting roles. 
More fundamentally, it demarcates between those that should be included in a 
performance and those that act as an audience. This is part and parcel of social 
interaction, and crystallised especially through the physical demarcation of 
space. 
 
Space. Shirin M. Rai (2015b, p.1183) argues that: 
 
The backdrop, the stage, the entry and exit points shape the kind of politics that 
is performed, the shifts and struggles that take place – who constructs, reflects, 
claims and polices the space of politics. 
 
Space privileges certain types of behaviour, allowing some practices to occur, 
while others are seen as illegitimate, wrong or inappropriate. It follows that the 
way space is used or organised (whether intentionally or unintentionally) is 
important to regulate behaviour. Nirmal Puwar (2010), for example, has 
examined the way in which parliamentary spaces are gendered to segregate men 
from women. Elsewhere, Jean-Philippe Heurtin (2003) showed that the layout 
of the French parliamentary assembly changed seven times over the French 
revolutionary period in order to reflect different political priorities and values of 
its members. In his own conceptualisation of performances, Goffman defines 
spatial arrangements in terms of both a ‘front stage’ and ‘back stage’: on the 
front stage, performances are enacted, involving the furniture, décor, physical 
layout, and background items which supply the scenery and provide props for 
actors (Goffman, 1990, pp.32-3). At the back stage, preparations take place, 
illusions are constructed, props and personal items are stored or hidden, dress is 
adjusted and scrutinised, rehearsals take place and, more generally, where 
performers can relax and ‘step out of character’ (ibid., pp.114-5). Axiomatically, 
there is a tension or weakness in this approach because it implies that actors can 
step outside of their social setting or web of beliefs, which, in line with the 
discussion in previous sections, is not the case. That said, distinguishing 
between a front stage and a back stage is still helpful because they entail 
different types of performances, with different expectations, social codes and 
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cues, participants, and audiences (Rai, 2015b, p.1184). So, in as much as a back 
stage exists, it remains a stage. This links physical space back to ideational 
contexts: our interpretation, our knowledge (tacit or explicit) is fundamental to 
identifying appropriate stages or contexts in which we act, demonstrating the 
enduring connection between beliefs and practices. 
 
Speech. Political actors may follow a script and stage directions, whether written 
and formalised, or unwritten and informal. These must fall in line with the 
appropriate social cues or performance styles as well as the appropriate setting 
or stage. Some voices, tones of voice or auditory rhythms are encouraged to fill 
spaces; others are assigned the status of hysterical, chaotic or disruptive and 
consequently marginalised (Puwar, 2010, p.299); some voices can be ‘cultured’ 
or well-modulated, while others still are pejoratively labelled as ‘shrill’ 
(particularly with respect to gender) or ‘rough’ (particularly with respect to 
social class) (Rai, 2015b). More generally, as Theodore Schmauk put it over a 
century ago (1890, p.113): 
 
With reference to the various properties of tone, we say a voice is rich, full, deep, 
piercing, sweet, rough, smooth, ringing, bird-like, flute-like, trumpet-like, manly, 
womanly, child-like. As a reflection of the apparent natural mental state of the 
speaker, a voice is pathetic, solemn, tranquil, grave, serious, animated, gay, 
playful, mirthful, rollicking, melancholy, sublime, courageous, scornful, defiant, 
threatening, despairing, awe-stricken, alarmed, horrified, revengeful, kind, 
tender, hopeful, truthful. 
 
Therefore, language, vocabulary or tone of voice are things that sharpen or blur a 
particular performance in a particular setting; some voices are regarded as ‘fit’ 
for certain performances, others are not. This is undoubtedly true of politics, too. 
We are all too aware of the public’s disdain for shouting, booing and making 
animal noises in the main chamber of the House of Commons, for example. Yet, 
these rituals persist. This is because this type of behaviour has arguably become 
part of established performances within adversarial (and gendered) British 
political traditions. The nature of voice is therefore something that deserves 
further attention as part of a wider parliamentary performance and everyday 
practice in terms of how this affects scrutiny in select committees. Whilst delving 
further into the literature on speech analysis, discourse analysis or rhetorical 
analysis arguably goes beyond the purview of this chapter (and perhaps the 
analytical framework identified here), it is sufficient to note that we must be  
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Table 2.2. Everyday practices as performances 
Concept Definition 
Style 
Adoption of manners, appearances, and actions; an attempt to follow social 
cues; and an attempt to conceal behaviour that would be inconsistent to the 
present performance. 
Space 
The organisation of stages in order to create a particular type of performance, 
including furniture, décor, physical layout and background items. These may be 
distinguished between front and back stages. 
Speech  
In addition to the content of a speech act, this includes the particular 
vocabulary, style of speech, tone of voice and so on. Broadly, this is closely 
related to studying the rhetoric of political actors. 
  
sensitive to the voices that are attached to parliamentary performances and the 
spaces that they fill (for more detail, see Finlayson and Martin, 2008; Finlayson, 
2007; Hajer, 2009). 
 
The literature on performance helps us to clarify the concept of everyday 
practices, and gives us, in addition to individual beliefs, three additional tools to 
analyse and unpack everyday practices, namely: styles, or appearances, manners, 
routines, and actions that actors adopt; space, or the setting or stage on which 
actors perform; and speech, or what actors say and how they say it, which we 
could also think of scripts and storylines (see Table 2.2 for a summary). In this 
way, this section helps to develop and take forward the interpretive approach 
developed by Bevir and Rhodes. It refines and sharpens their analytical 
framework by introducing a more developed conceptualisation of practices. This 
arguably has ripple effects for other concepts. So, with respect to beliefs, we 
must explore how actors produce or react to meaning-in-action; with respect to 
traditions, we can better understand how they are sustained through established 
performance styles and the power relationships they entail; and regarding 
dilemmas, we can see how contradictory beliefs and traditions are pushed and 
pulled in different directions and played out through everyday practices. Indeed, 
this last point is crucial because it ameliorates earlier shortcomings identified 
with the concept of dilemmas. As Foucault (2002a, p.236, emphasis added) says 
(with respect to penal reform): 
 
If prisons and punitive mechanisms are transformed, it won’t be because a plan 
of reform has found its way into the heads of the social workers; it will be when 
those who have a stake in that reality, all those people, have come into collision 
with each other and with themselves, run into dead ends, problems, and 
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impossibilities, been through conflicts and confrontations – when critique has 
been played out in the real, not when reformers have realized their ideas. 
 
The crucial point here is that this quotation centralises the importance of 
everyday life (‘those who have a stake in that reality’) or everyday practices in a 
context of conflict or contestation. Social order is sustained through these 
practices but, on a day-to-day basis, political actors confront dilemmas in which 
they must make choices to sustain, amend or discard performance styles. This is 
ongoing and becomes part of everyday practices. This suggests, in keeping with 
anti-foundationalist philosophy, that knowledge of the world is provisional and 
order is only ever the appearance of order through social negotiation, through 
ritual, through everyday protocols. More generally, this establishes practices as 
the intersection or nodal point between beliefs and traditions; they are the 
mechanism through which beliefs and traditions are ‘played out’. Thus, everyday 
practices are the central analytical focus for this doctoral study. It is now worth 
turning to how these concepts form a framework for analysis that can be applied 
to a parliamentary context. 
 
2.3.2. A framework for analysis 
 
The above offers a conceptually rich way by which we can analyse select 
committee scrutiny in the House of Commons. With respect to situated agency 
and traditions, we must focus analysis on the context in which parliamentary 
actors are placed in interpreting and enacting their roles. We already know that 
MPs, clerks, researchers, journalists and visitors are situated into what may be 
termed the Westminster ‘bubble’ or ‘village’. We also know that most official 
accounts of the parliamentary system formally assert the importance of the 
Westminster model as a tradition that guides institutional relationships in 
Parliament (Judge, 2014). However, is it possible to offer further nuance and 
depth about particular situations and traditions? With respect to this research 
project, we can focus on and ask ourselves about the context in which committee 
members, chairs and staff operate as part of the scrutiny work on select 
committees, and the wider webs of belief that inform scrutiny in the House of 
Commons. 
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Table 2.3. A framework for analysing select committee scrutiny 
Concept Analytical focus Applied in this PhD 
Situated 
agency 
How committee members, chairs 
and staff are situated in a particular 
context to undertake parliamentary 
scrutiny 
Chapter 4 (membership trends), 
Chapter 5 (Wright reforms), Chapter 6 
(the Committee Office) 
Beliefs 
The ways in which parliamentary 
actors interpret their role on select 
committees  and associated 
concepts 
Chapter 4 (members’ beliefs), Chapter 5 
(chairs’ beliefs), Chapter 6 (staff 
beliefs), Chapter 8 (beliefs about 
evidence) 
Traditions 
The wider parliamentary traditions 
in which committee members, 
chairs and staff find themselves 
Chapter 1 (scholarly traditions), 
Chapter 7 (webs of scrutiny), Chapter 9 
(scrutiny in context) 
Dilemmas 
The problems that parliamentary 
actors confront based on how they 
have interpreted and enacted their 
role 
Chapter 4 (members), Chapter 5 
(chairs), Chapter 6 (staff), Chapter 8 
(evidence) 
Practices 
How parliamentary actors have 
chosen to enact the interpretations 
of their roles and associated 
concepts 
Chapter 4 (members), Chapter 5 
(chairs), Chapter 6 (staff), Chapter 7 
(relationships) 
   
Turning from traditions to individual beliefs, we cannot assume that committee 
members, chairs and staff act with rational self-interest, as other approaches 
have done, but rather that actors pursue a wide range of behaviours due to a 
variety of interpretations about their role. Thus, we must look to their 
interpretations of scrutiny in order to make better sense of their approach to 
their role. This, in turn, has consequences for the everyday practices of select 
committees. Here, we can focus on how parliamentary actors act on their beliefs 
to create meaning-in-action. We can look at the performance styles of committee  
members, chairs and staff; the relationships between them to understand the 
‘performance teams’; and the spatial arrangements that affect scrutiny behaviour 
on different stages. These parliamentary practices are constantly made and re-
made through the clash of beliefs and traditions in Parliament. These clashes are 
caused through dilemmas between interpretations of scrutiny and a multitude of 
other parliamentary roles and pressures that committee members, chairs and 
staff face in order to undertake their functions and enact their roles. Thus, when 
studying scrutiny by select committees, this concept helps us to understand the 
decisions that MPs and staff have to make when conducting scrutiny. However, 
this PhD is not a diachronic analysis, which means that the following empirical 
chapters cannot analyse changes in belief in response to dilemmas over time. 
Rather, the following analysis offers a snapshot of perennial and ongoing 
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dilemmas that actors face. In adjudicating between beliefs and dilemmas, 
parliamentary actors establish certain performance styles and it is these 
performance styles that forms the focus of the research. Taken together, we can 
better understand how scrutiny is conducted in the House of Commons with 
reference to a range of concepts that guide parliamentary actors. The above 
outlines the analysis that follows. Clearly not all concepts can be analysed in 
detail (due to space, resource and time limitations), and clearly the concepts are 
also closely interwoven. This means it will not be possible to isolate each factor 
and give a clearly demarcated analysis of just beliefs, just practices, or just 
dilemmas (something demonstrated by the overlapping chapter foci in Table 
2.3). It may well be that we lose some conceptual clarity as we venture into the 
rich detail of empirical discussion. However, these concepts are always there, 
either directly and explicitly to explain parliamentary behaviour, or indirectly 
and implicitly, to guide discussion further.  
 
In sum, the aim is to decentre parliamentary practices of committee members, 
chairs and staff to demonstrate that scrutiny of the House of Commons depends 
on how parliamentary actors have interpreted the concept, acted upon it in their 
everyday lives, and how dilemmas have affected those practices. The empirical 
sections that follow will examine these key issues in more depth with reference 
to the way in which scrutiny is interpreted, performed and problematised in 
select committees of the House of Commons. In Part II, the spotlight turns on 
the key characters of this research project: committee members (Chapter 4); 
chairs of committees (Chapter 5); and parliamentary staff (Chapter 6). In each of 
these chapters, I ask: How do they interpret their role? What beliefs guide them? 
What role(s) do they consequently adopt on different stages? How are these 
roles affected by dilemmas? In Part III, I turn attention to how those 
interpretations affect scrutiny in the House of Commons: in Chapter 7, I look at 
how committees build ‘performance teams’ by exploring the relationships 
between committee members and chairs both within and between committees; 
and, in Chapter 8, I examine the dilemmas that committees face in gathering 
evidence. Finally, in Chapter 9 I tie all this together to indicate how everyday 
practices affect scrutiny (see Table 2.3 for a summary). 
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Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter began by charting the ontological and epistemological roots that 
underpin this doctoral research project. This was an important exercise because 
such issues strongly affect the focus of research that we, as scholars, go on to 
pursue. In this case, it has emphasised the importance of individual beliefs and 
everyday practices to make sense of the world around us. This has consequences 
for the way in which we view (i) politics, namely as contestation, and (ii) power, 
namely as relationships that constrain others. From this, it was necessary to 
explain how such principles could be rendered useful for political analysis. Bevir 
and Rhodes’ work has offered a significant starting point. In this chapter, I have 
sought to offer further depth and discussion on their work, particularly with 
regards to the centrality of everyday practices as an analytical focus. This, then, 
hopes to make a distinctive contribution to the debate on the added value of 
interpretive approaches to studying political issues. Specifically, this chapter has 
shown that everyday practices are crucial to understand and explain the 
relationship between beliefs, traditions and dilemmas. It offers us a 
philosophically rigorous and conceptually consistent way to study scrutiny in the 
House of Commons, and it is this framework for analysis that underpins this 
PhD’s approach to interpretive parliamentary studies and the empirical findings 
that follow. However, before jumping ahead to the empirical sections, a question 
remains: how are we to operationalise our analytical framework? This question 
turns our attention from the philosophical underpinnings to the practical 
questions of methodology, which are examined in the next chapter. 
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ocating the importance of the ideational as a research focus demands 
not only discussing why everyday practices matter, but also how they 
can be studied. This is the central concern of this chapter, where the 
overall aim is to offer a pragmatic focus as to how interpretive principles that 
underpin this research project have been applied at an empirical level to 
parliamentary select committees in the House of Commons. Though an 
interpretive approach to political science rests on a philosophical analysis of 
action as meaningful, and therefore does not prescribe any particular method 
(Bevir, 2006, p.283), a number of influential studies tend to privilege qualitative 
research methods, especially through the use of observation techniques. For 
example, R.A.W. Rhodes (2005, 2007, 2011) uses non-participation observation 
and interviews for his work on everyday life of ministers and permanent 
secretaries. Elsewhere, Catherine Durose (2009) explores the everyday work of 
frontline workers in local governance through a six-month period of observation 
and 45 interviews. And, at an anthropological level, Emma Crewe (2005, 2015) 
spent two years in the House of Lords for her anthropological study of the upper 
chamber, with a similarly detailed approach to her volume on the House of 
Commons. This shows that there is some variety in the way that interpretive 
scholars can undertake empirical research, but it also shows that there is an 
emphasis on qualitative techniques – particularly on participant and non-
participant observation (for a summary, see Table 3.1). In this PhD, I adopt such 
methods: (i) participant and non-participant observation; (ii) semi-structured 
interviews with committee members, chairs and staff; and (iii) textual analysis of 
written records with small databases on committee MPs and witnesses. This 
L 
  
Table 3.1. Application of interpretive principles  
Scholar(s) Topic Approach Methods Key reference 
R.A.W. Rhodes 
Everyday life of 
ministers and 
permanent secretaries 
Interpretive political 
studies 
Non-participant observation of two ministers and three 
permanent secretaries for about 7 days each; 35 
interviews that totalled 67 hours; supplemented study 
with written records 
Rhodes (2011) 
Catherine Durose 
Frontline workers in 
local governance 
Interpretive political 
studies; narrative 
analysis 
Observation for six months; 45 interviews through 
snowballing 
Durose (2009) 
Francesca Gains 
Local bureaucratic 
elites 
Institutional 
interpretivism 
100 interviews in a representative range of 15 local 
authorities, with chief executives, leaders, and many 
other stakeholders 
Gains (2009) 
Neil Ward, Andrew 
Donaldson and 
Philip Lowe 
Foot and mouth 
disease crisis of 2003 
in the UK 
Policy framing 
Reports from national inquiries, written submissions, 
notes from meetings, interviews with stakeholders, and 
experiences from Ward as member of the Rural Task 
Force 
Ward et. al. (2004) 
Maarten Hajer 
Governance in an age 
of mediatisation  
Discourse analysis and 
dramaturgy 
Interviews, looked at public events, studies documents, 
observed a range of meetings 
Hajer (2009) 
Shirin M. Rai 
Ceremonies and rituals 
in parliaments and 
legislatures 
Political performance 
framework (PPF) 
Non-participant observation of the Indian Parliament 
(details not cited) 
Rai (2015b) 
Emma Crewe 
Rituals, manners and 
ceremonies in the 
House of Lords 
Anthropology 
Access to the Palace of Westminster through a staff 
pass for two years. Attended a range of meetings, 
observed peers, shadowed staff, watched ceremonies; 
interviewed 199 peers, 63 members of staff and 26 
other individuals; sent out a survey  
Crewe (2005) 
Interpreting Parliamentary Scrutiny 
60 
chapter will explore each method in turn, but I will discuss observation in more 
depth because it most directly challenges the conventional methods adopted and 
employed in British political science (especially in parliamentary and legislative 
studies). Over the course of each section, I summarise the key analytical focus 
and the strengths and weaknesses of the method, indicate the contribution that 
the method makes to our understanding of scrutiny in the House of Commons, 
and explain how the method has been applied in this research project. In the 
concluding section, I bring together the three methods and discuss how this 
combination results in a robust interpretive methodology. 
 
 
3.1. Participant and non-participant observation 
 
Some textbooks on methodology, designed specifically for political researchers, 
do not mention observation as a method in a scholar’s armoury to understand 
and explain political issues (e.g. Box-Steffensmeier et. al., 2010). In others, 
ethnographic techniques are treated with some suspicion. For instance, Peter 
Burnham et. al. (2008, pp.280-1) believe that the challenge falls on the 
participant observer to convince scholars that their analysis is accurate and valid 
rather than offering ‘merely impressionistic accounts of alternative lifestyles’. 
This implies that to make use of this research method is distinctive (and perhaps 
even a little daring). There are indeed sparse examples of published research in 
British parliamentary studies using such ethnographic methods (with notable 
exceptions covered in Chapter 1). There are a number of reasons for this, but the 
most decisive seems to be the positivist legacy in the social sciences that forbids 
the use of creative methods in the name of ‘validity’, ‘reliability’ and 
‘generalisability’. Additionally, of course, there are practical issues that have 
often limited this type of research: it is resource intensive and often 
unpredictable, rendering carefully thought-through research designs to the 
dustbin. Consequently, gaining funding for this type of research can be difficult. 
There is also a wider assumption that other, more conventional, ways of doing 
political science can achieve the same results. After all, we have studied political 
elites, specifically those in the House of Commons and its select committees, for 
decades (as noted in Chapter 1). So, what is the added value of ethnographic 
research? 
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3.1.1. Analytical focus 
 
The inherent value of observation (whether as a participant or non-participant) 
is that it allows researchers to look at political issues from a new vantage point. 
Observation opens what is ordinarily hidden in official documents and 
structured interviews. Documents have been written for a particular audience 
and a specific purpose, which may make it difficult to tease out hidden meanings 
in texts (or, indeed, meanings written in plain sight). Moreover, documents tend 
to be final products in which the process of writing has been airbrushed out. The 
value of observation is that the research is able to access meaning ‘in the making’, 
or as Rhodes et. al. (2007a, p.2) put it: 
 
It is characterised by ‘deep immersion’ in social worlds to understand day-to-
day practices, and how these practices become meaningful. Ethnographers 
emphasise and observe human acts and interaction in physical, economic and 
social context. They understand how these acts and interactions become 
meaningful because of bigger symbolic and interpretive structures that are the 
outcome of earlier acts and interactions. Ethnographers try to grasp the ‘making’ 
of meaningful social behaviour. 
 
This quote illustrates the fundamental benefit of observation, which focuses the 
analytical lens on everyday practices, connecting those to beliefs of political 
elites and examining how they make an impact on politics. This is important 
because, as Chapter 2 was at pains to point out, everyday practices are the 
process by which we create meaning and enact our beliefs. In observing those 
processes (and in some cases participating in them), the researcher is able to see 
social and political behaviour through the vantage point of political actors. In 
this way, observation allows researchers to analyse the everyday behaviour of 
groups and individuals because researchers have access to what Dvora Yanow 
(2004, p.12) calls local knowledge: ‘the very mundane, yet expert understanding 
of and practical reasoning about local conditions derived from lived experience’. 
It is a kind of non-verbal knowing that evolves from seeing and interacting with 
other people, places or things over time. This is crucial, especially in the context 
of the previous chapter that emphasised the importance of performance styles 
(manners and appearances, unwritten norms and values, social cues), spatial 
arrangements (different settings and stages), and forms of speech (tone of voice, 
vocabulary, and so on). The key analytical focus of observation, then, is on 
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micro-level, everyday behaviour and it is this that makes this research method 
pivotal in this study of everyday parliamentary practices. Other research 
methods, such as interviews and textual analysis, would possibly miss the 
nuances of minute everyday influences, or at best offer a partial view of them 
because they offer only a snapshot of beliefs or practices (Soss, 2006, pp.138-40). 
Observation often takes place over a period of months that enables deeper 
immersion to grasp not only the importance of everyday practices, but 
additionally the everyday relationships between political actors, and between 
actors and their political environment. In doing so, a key aim is to see the world 
as the actors see it, and experience it as they experience it. Despite this positive 
analytical focus, there are a number of perceived shortcomings of undertaking 
this type of ethnographic research. Notably, there are issues regarding validity 
and generalisability; positionality of the researcher; and, entry and access issues. 
These deserve further comments (covered in turn). 
 
3.1.2. Validity and generalisability 
 
A limitation of the analytical focus identified above is that it prevents scholars 
from designing a deductive research framework, and thus being able to test 
theories, hypotheses and concepts. Keeping to research designs is not possible 
for those employing participant and/or non-participant observation because of 
the inductive nature of the approach. Consequently, ethnographic research is 
perceived to be subjective, with obvious validity and reliability issues. The 
assumption of subjectivity in observation is often contrasted to objectivity in 
other research methods (notably quantitative approaches). To take this view, 
however, is to ignore the epistemological principles outlined in the previous 
chapter, in which a single, universal truth is not possible in a world of contested 
meanings. Therefore, preferences for an ‘objective’ research project that is 
‘generalisable’ miss the point: there is no single, objective and generalisable way 
to interpret practices. This does not mean that research on everyday practices is 
inauthentic or invalid, but rather that a comprehensive or totalised 
interpretation of Parliament is not possible, and in any case not the aim of this 
study. Rather, the aim here is to enrich existing theories by providing nuance 
and depth to the way that political actors interpret their role in the House of 
Commons and specifically how those interpretations affect their work in 
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scrutinising the executive. This requires scholars to follow their intellectual 
curiosities, and prioritise their observations. Through deep immersion, 
researchers are able to reach ‘theoretical saturation’ where they note recurring 
themes, where the same names get mentioned, or where key events are often 
cited (Crang and Cook, 2007, pp.14-5). A key issue is when and how to follow 
our curiosity without compromising the rigour of research designs. Researchers 
make these types of decisions all the time, especially with regards to what is 
perceived to be important to study, what interests them in their research, and 
what is more likely to gain funding in an increasingly competitive and 
marketised system of higher education. This is not limited to political, or even 
social scientific, research (Latour and Woolgar, 1986). This does not diminish 
our research but, hopefully, strengthens it. 
 
3.1.3. Positionality 
 
The above discussion demonstrates that researchers play a key role in all 
research, which is arguably accentuated in inductive fieldwork research. This 
feeds into the second issue indicated above, namely about the positionality of the 
researcher. Mike Crang and Ian Cook (2007, p.9), both experienced 
ethnographers, believe that ‘research is an embodied activity that draws in our 
whole physical person, along with all its inescapable identities’. Ethnographic 
research involves relationships developed between people of similar and/or 
different cultures, classes, genders, sexualities, (dis)abilities, generations, 
nationalities, skin colours, faiths and/or other identities. A key point is that 
research on everyday practices and social (political) relationships is made out of 
everyday practices and social relations, too. This raises a key question about the 
effect of the researcher on participants, and indeed the effect of fieldwork 
experiences on the researcher. It has long been accepted that the presence of an 
observer can change behaviour amongst those being studied (Landsberger, 
1968). This can take a number of forms: participants can behave in terms of how 
they expect the researcher to behave, as opposed to how they would behave 
without an observer; some participants may feel uncomfortable being observed, 
and so try to limit any controversial or normatively ‘deviant’ behaviour; others 
may stress practices that they deem as normatively good; still others might 
ascribe reasons for acting in a particular way because that is what they believe 
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the researcher wants to hear (either to support their research or purely to 
impress them); and, finally, some participants may react (positively or negatively) 
to the way that the researcher dresses or speaks. Clearly this prevents what 
positivists would deem to be access to ‘pure’ forms of data because observers 
cannot see ‘natural’ behaviour. However, these effects are pervasive in all social 
interaction and flows naturally out of Erving Goffman’s (1990) ideas on 
dramaturgy (see Chapter 2). Researchers perform their role in the same way that 
other actors do. We can acknowledge this without condemning this research 
technique because, as pointed out repeatedly, objectivity and neutrality do not 
exist in the positivist sense. Additionally, the social relations between researcher 
and respondent can reveal quite a lot about the priorities, values and beliefs of 
those under study (Hunter, 1995, p.160). Moreover, sustained involvement in a 
group can help to overcome formalities. Getting to know people and building 
their trust breaks down barriers, enabling the researcher to gain valuable 
insights to the respondents’ lives. 
 
A related issue to the above is to prevent the researcher from ‘going native’. This 
could have significant repercussions for research in that researchers may wish to 
champion their colleagues, they may be unable to critically examine events and 
issues (and make erroneous conclusions as a result), and more widely fail to 
problematise social and political relationships (Busby, 2011, p.14). There are 
various mechanisms to minimise this risk, notably by maintaining distance as a 
‘professional stranger’ (Rhodes et. al., 2007b, p.223), such as undertaking 
analysis or academic research alongside fieldwork. 
 
3.1.4. Entry and access 
 
Entry and access have been cited by academics as one of the most difficult 
aspects of engaging in ethnographic research (Hunter, 1995, pp.154-6; Moeran, 
2009, p.141). This is especially true of political elites, which are, by their very 
definition, exclusive social groups with high entry barriers. Political elites keep 
their cards close to their chests, for this is imperative to their political survival in 
which different political parties, factions and groupings out-compete one 
another, especially in the context of an adversarial political culture such as that 
found in the UK House of Commons. This means that the issue of trust becomes 
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a central concern for both the researcher and the research participants. Mutual 
trust is a key foundation for both sides: the researcher needs to trust participants 
to tell the truth; participants need to trust the researcher not to twist or exploit 
what they say and do in private. Without a sense that sensitive information will 
remain private (or at least anonymous), ethnographic research will not be 
possible.  
 
Anthropologists have noted that the best way to gain entry to the field is through 
a personal contact (Fetterman, 2010, pp.36-7). This reinforces a tension about 
subjectivity, but so long as researchers are sensitive to this issue, and do not 
predetermine with whom they engage as a result of this (where possible), then 
the method of snowballing can be an effective mechanism to build high-trust 
relationships. That said, access is a fragile opening through which the researcher 
conducts fieldwork. Hugh Gusterson (1995), in his study on scientists in 
laboratories working on nuclear weapons, was beset with problems over access 
as he was unable to gain necessary security clearance for some of his research, 
This meant that, whilst the personnel were described as ‘polite’ and ‘friendly’, 
they were also ‘profoundly unhelpful’ (p.191). Access cannot be taken for granted 
and demands constant renegotiation. This demonstrates the power of elites, 
which has implications for later analyses of fieldwork and the extent to which 
field notes can be used in publications. R.A.W. Rhodes et. al. (2007b, pp.214-6) 
point out that the powerful can refuse interviews, deny access, delay publication 
and declare documents secret or confidential at their own discretion – even after 
previously giving the researcher permission. This can not only frustrate research 
designs, but even limit a future career for researchers. Of course, this becomes 
less likely as the outsider/insider distinction breaks down (usually as trust 
increases). Mirko Noordegraaf (2007, pp.100-1) comments, on his own research 
on the Dutch civil service: 
 
Once I was ‘in’, there was hardly any signs of hesitance or attempts to obscure 
things. In fact, after a few meetings, ‘being there’ is either regarded as ‘normal’ 
or it is not noticed at all, especially when encounters involve lots of people and 
outsiders. 
 
Similarly, Rhodes (2007, p.25) comments that he became ‘part of the furniture’ 
and ‘blended in with the wallpaper’ to such an extent that occasionally he was 
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almost left behind as ministers and civil servants rushed from one meeting to 
another. 
 
The key issues discussed here demonstrate that there are formidable challenges 
that ethnographic researchers need to negotiate in their fieldwork, particularly 
in making research valid and authentic, accepting the positionality of the 
researcher, and managing to negotiate and re-negotiate access to places, papers 
and persons. Though of course it is not easy to overcome these issues, there are 
obvious consequent benefits to undertaking this type of research. The analytical 
focus dovetails almost perfectly with the analytical framework proposed in 
Chapter 2, giving researchers the opportunity to recover the beliefs, values and 
ideas of political actors, and locate these within wider traditions or webs of belief. 
With these issues in mind, it is now possible to have a frank discussion about 
how this method is applied to this research project. 
 
3.1.5. Application 
 
I worked as a research assistant to a select committee in the House of Commons 
for 14 weeks during the second half of the 2010 parliament (which amounted to 
approximately 600 working hours). Every week, I was able to observe private 
and public meetings of the committee (which I refer to as ‘my’ committee in this 
project), attend and participate in team meetings, observe proceedings of 
parliamentary debates and evidence sessions, helped to write briefing material 
for committee members and the chair, and contributed to the drafting of 
committee reports (as well as a range of other duties). This was supplemented 
with negotiated access to observe other committees’ private meetings and team 
meetings. I supplemented my observations through watching and analysing 100 
hours of evidence session made available online, which was conducted after my 
research placement. Collectively, this means that I was both participant and 
observer: I was a full member of the committee staff team and contributed to 
their work, whilst also able to observe the everyday lives of MPs and staff. 
 
The opportunity to undertake this fieldwork was organised through my doctoral 
supervisor (who identified key contacts), the Scrutiny Unit in the House of 
Commons (which organised the research placement) and the Economic and 
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Social Research Council (which part-funded the placement). My fieldwork time 
was restricted both temporally (14 weeks) and spatially, in that I had only partial 
access to the Palace (a ‘blue’ pass had limitations about unaccompanied access, 
and in any case I could not – rightly – roam through ‘Member’s Only’ areas). 
This doctorate is not, then, an ethnography of Parliament, though it uses 
ethnographic techniques (Fetterman, 2010, p.39). None of this invalidates the 
research, but simply highlights the practical limitations of ethnographic research 
in political science and in elite settings.  
 
The precise details of which committee I supported, and at what presice point 
during the 2010 parliament, will remain confidential (indefinitely). This is to 
protect the anonymity of my former colleagues. Though this may not be ideal in 
that it does not allow the reader to grasp the full context of certain events, beliefs 
or practices, it allows (with the approval of the Committee Office) me more 
candour in empirical sections and allows me to construct an authentic picture of 
parliamentary practices. This research has received ethics approval from the 
University of Sheffield, and both the Head of the Scrutiny Unit and I agreed to 
the terms of the research placement through written and verbal agreements (see 
Appendix B and C). However, confidentiality remains a necessary aspect of the 
Committee Office (discussed in Chapter 6), which means that the use of 
fieldwork notes is restricted. 
 
As part of my fieldwork, I kept a fieldwork diary (FWD). This is a personal, 
private and confidential journal, and not accessible to anyone other than myself 
(indefinitely). There are four comments to make about this regarding process, 
content, style and status. First, the process. I wrote rough notes using pen and 
paper at the time of events or closely afterwards, and then wrote these into a 
journal at weekends. Within two months of the internship, notes were typed up 
to make it easier to read and search for key ideas. Second, the content. The FWD 
contains observations from a range of things that happened in Parliament (and 
also references to things outside). It contains discussions with staff and MPs, 
summaries of meetings, and summaries of my interviews (see next section). It 
summarised what I did each day and observations of what others did (in terms 
of performance styles, space and speech). The vast majority of the content is 
ordinary behaviour that would be banal to anyone except myself. Third, the style. 
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The diary is written as an entirely confessional account, in the first person, in 
which I observe and reflect personally on the research process and my general 
everyday life. Any persons mentioned have been made anonymous through a 
code. Every paragraph was numbered for citation purposes. Fourth, the status. I 
draw on the FWD in empirical work, all of which is referenced as ‘FWD 
<paragraph number>’. Where possible, I have sought approval from the 
Committee Office to make direct references to the FWD. Approval has not been 
sought if the issue has been corroborated by at least two interviewees and/or 
written records, refers to information already in the public domain, or relates to 
details that are judged sufficiently minor. 
 
 
3.2. Semi-structured elite interviews 
 
There are significant advantages to using interviews, in general, but particularly 
for this study on ideas and beliefs of political elites. As Crang and Cook (2007, 
p.69) point out: ‘the main aim of interviewing in ethnographic research is to 
allow people to reveal their own versions of events in their own words’. This is 
ultimately why interviews are sought, and a central plank of the interpretive 
approach to political science. 
 
This discussion needs to be linked to the epistemological values outlined in 
Chapter 2, which affects the status of the interview as a research technique. 
Political actors cannot, and do not, report ‘given facts’. Rather, they present a 
particular narrative or story and, in doing so, they will undoubtedly omit certain 
details and emphasise others (ibid., 2007, p.11). We do not have ‘pure’ access to 
respondents’ accounts and lives. This does not mean interviews lose their value. 
As Jody Miller and Barry Glassner (2004, p.126) point out, ‘[r]esearch cannot 
provide the mirror reflection of the social world that positivists strive for, but it 
may provide access to the meanings people attribute to their experience and 
social worlds’. This analytical focus on beliefs, values and priorities of 
respondents is fundamental, and dovetails very well to the analytical framework 
because it stresses a sense of agency that scholars may neglect if looking at only 
textual forms of data or third-person accounts. Traditions and practices are 
sustained by a belief in them by political actors. Interpretive research is not just 
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about what happened to someone, but how they reacted to and felt about events, 
ideas and dilemmas (Soss, 2006, pp.141-3). Indeed, this is also where we find 
added value of interviews over observation: it is often not possible to stop events 
as they unfold or interrupt practices to ask detailed questions about why they 
occur. These questions are possible in interviews. This feeds into a bigger point 
about the value of interviews, i.e. that they are often the only way to access the 
view of elites (Lilleker, 2003, p.213; see also Seldon, 1996, p.353): 
 
Much of what occurs in politics is ‘off-stage’ and is either unrecorded or it is 
locked away under a 30 or 50-year rule and therefore inaccessible. This making 
contact with those within the political process is often the only way of 
uncovering details about your area of research. 
 
Moreover, files can be incomplete or wrong; they can focus on administrative 
process rather than the causes and/or effects of events; or there can be too many 
of them for us to make sense of which ones were important (Booth and Glynn, 
1979; Davies, 2001). Interviewees can tell us which documents mattered and 
how they interpreted their importance (Seldon, 1996, p.358). That is not to say 
that written records are not important – they are a fundamental source of data 
in their own right and, additionally, help us to corroborate claims made by 
respondents (see next section). This turns out discussion to an important 
perceived limitation of interview data: truth and bias. 
 
3.2.1. Truth and bias 
 
Jeffrey Berry (2002, p.680) notes that interviewees are under no obligation to 
tell us the truth or to be objective about their views. Even if they are trying to be 
truthful, actors may exaggerate their own role unconsciously, or their memories 
could fail them. Both affect the reliability and accuracy of their accounts. But, as 
Brian Rathbun (2008, p.690) indicates, some scholars take this too far and 
assume that these problems are irresolvable. Corroborating the account of one 
interviewee against others, and other types of source (written records and 
observation in this study), help us to ensure authenticity and truthfulness. More 
fundamentally, as Rhodes et. al. (2007b, p.221) remind us: 
 
All of us during our everyday lives develop skills in interpreting what others 
mean when they speak to us. Thus, we judge whether someone is lying by many 
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verbal and body cues. We do not leave such skills at the door of the interview 
room. Every interview involves such judgements. 
 
This point implies that interviews are two-way experiences, which reminds us 
that it is not possible to access the beliefs of political actors in some neutral way. 
Interviews require good rapport, without which questions can fall flat, answers 
will be generic and uninformative, and discussion more generally will be brief. 
As Miller and Glassner (2004, pp.141-2) point out: 
 
Meaning is not merely elicited by apt questioning, nor simply transported 
through respondent replies; it is actively and communicatively assembled in the 
interview encounter. Respondents are not so much repositories of knowledge – 
treasuries of information awaiting excavation – as they are constructors of 
knowledge in association with interviews. Interviews are collaborative 
accomplishments, involving participants in meaning-making work in the 
process. 
 
They describe interviews as an ‘interpersonal drama with a developing plot’ 
(ibid., p.149). This directly speaks to Goffman’s idea, developed in Chapter 2, 
that social interactions are a performance, which includes interviews. Interviews 
are not an exchange of words or information alone, but also involve physical 
gestures, silences, use and tone of voice, and laughter. These are all things that 
the interviewer needs to consider. Indeed, we are part of this drama in that we 
choose to wear certain types of clothes, try to appear disarming, always arrive on 
time to give a perception of reliability and punctuality, ask questions in a 
particular way to elicit the responses we want, and so on (Morris, 2009). All of 
this depends, in part, on the type of interview that researchers pursue (my own 
interviews were semi-structured (see below)). Semi-structured interviews, an 
often followed technique, are delicate balancing acts. Interviews can be more like 
conversations at times, with a certain give-and-take, which makes interviews 
unpredictable. That is both an advantage and a danger of interviews, but in any 
case makes them very resource intensive. This shows that there can be 
considerable limitations to interviewing. Most of these can be overcome or 
negotiated in some way, and, in any case, the shortcomings are outweighed by 
the original contributions that interviews can make to political research. That 
said, this often depends on access, which can be a substantial problem. This 
moves our discussion explicitly towards the application of the techniques in this 
doctorate. 
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Table 3.2. Interviewees 
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Members 12 9 5 23 8 15 9 12 2 
Chairs 6 3 1 10 3 7 3 6 1 
Staff 3 0 2 10 3 7 - - - 
Total 21 12 8 43 14 29 12 18 3 
          
 
3.2.2. Application 
 
I undertook 43 semi-structured interviews (see Table 3.2 for a summary), which 
were scheduled, one-on-one meetings with select committee members, chairs 
and staff.6 All of these (except one) took place during my fieldwork in London 
(and thus on the parliamentary estate). In order to identify appropriate 
interviewees, I used a snowballing technique, where I invited individuals 
through email, but often followed it up with a telephone call. I began by 
interviewing MPs from the committee that I worked for, and followed 
recommendations from clerks. I requested an interview with almost every chair 
of departmental select committees and interviewed ten of these. These became 
priority committees in that I focused on interviewing MPs that served on those 
committees and the clerks that worked for them. This has been useful, but of 
course wasn’t fool-proof: not all of my invitations were accepted. Those that 
agreed to an interview clearly had an interest in select committees and believe 
their role was important as part of scrutiny processes. Though this could skew 
the empirical findings about how MPs interpret their scrutiny role, I was 
predominantly interested in precisely why MPs did serve on committees. All 
interviewees (with two exceptions) were recorded using a recording device, 
which helped to ensure that the record of the meeting was accurate and 
complete. The drawback of this was that some interviewees were less open on 
                                                          
6 This excludes the countless informal conversations I had during my fieldwork in the House 
of Commons. I spoke to people as we rushed to and fro meetings, on my way to the office, in 
the cafeteria, in our committee office, over the phone, in emails, at bus stops, in the 
Westminster Gym, and in the Palace’s numerous bars – amongst others. 
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record, who gave me further material off-the-record afterwards. I believe that 
the advantages of recordings outweighed not recording interviews because 
encounters rarely strayed into sensitive areas. If they did, then I reassured 
interviewees I would not quote them without their permission (let alone make 
those quotes attributable to them in any way). All interviewees signed an 
informed consent form (with one exception) (see Appendix D for a standard 
interview consent form).  
 
All interviews were semi-structured. I arrived to each interview with a set of 
three themes that I wished to discuss (interpretation of their role, approach to 
their role, relationships between political actors), as well as a more detailed 
checklist of sub-topics (see Appendix E). Despite these themes, every interview 
was different in terms of content, and differed radically in terms of timing. Some 
discussions ran through the topics of conversation in order without fuss and 
fairly briskly; others veered off into a range of directions. I was very flexible 
because I wanted to understand the priorities and beliefs of parliamentary actors. 
A rigidly structured interview would have prevented this. That said, it meant that 
emphasis of my themes changed, making conventional comparisons between 
interviews difficult. I draw on interviews heavily throughout my account, which 
explains frequent and detailed quotations. Direct quotes are cited through a code 
(M denoting committee member, C denoting chair, and S denoting staff) and 
italicised. 
 
 
3.3. Supplementary data: textual analysis and descriptive statistics 
 
Observation and interviews are the main forms of data on which I draw in my 
empirical sections, which are used to also corroborate one another where 
possible. However, in order to do so most effectively, textual forms of data are 
key to supplement this doctoral research, as well as small databases on (i) 
committee MPs, predominantly their attendance records; and (ii) on oral 
witnesses during the 2013-14 parliamentary session. A few comments on these 
supplementary forms of data are necessary but, as they are not the main 
research methods, not the same level of detail as the previous two sections. 
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While textual analysis of primary and secondary written records are not the 
foundational method in this doctorate, documents are a key part of the House of 
Commons. Parliament produced hundreds of pages of documents every single 
day, both internal and external, and they play a role throughout the everyday 
lives of all political actors involved. Documents keep Parliament running though 
routine tasks of recording, filing, archiving and retrieving information. Indeed, 
given the emphasis of research on committee outputs, many would regard select 
committee reports as the most important output from scrutiny. Therefore, any 
analysis of scrutiny in the House, specifically looking at the work of select 
committees, needs to keep in mind that written records are key to understanding 
how organisations actually work. This importance cannot be understated 
because it begs a number of key questions: who produced a written record and 
why? How was it produced? And how was it then used? These questions fit 
together very well to the overarching research agenda of this doctorate in that it 
is concerned with the way in which select committees interpret their role and 
how they undertake their work. Part of this requires asking questions about the 
production of committee reports and the evidence on which they are based, the 
way that they frame arguments and ideas, and the way that this helps them 
become authoritative to political actors. This analytical focus can be linked to the 
methodological focus of analysing written documents. 
 
In asking the questions above, it becomes clear that written records enshrine 
what Paul Atkinson and Amanda Coffey (2004, p.59) call a ‘distinctively 
documentary version of social reality’. They go on: ‘They have their own 
conventions that inform their production and circulation. They are associated 
with distinct social occasions and organized activities’. Documents are products 
or artefacts in their own right. They are important for what they contain, but also 
what they command and instruct. They are often resources for further action, 
such as briefing material for MPs (Prior, 2004). This indicates that documents 
are not neutral, although they often appear that way (indeed, it is partly their 
aim) (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004, p.61): 
 
Documents are often used to create a certain kind of predictability and 
uniformity out of the great variety of events and social arrangements. That is, 
after all, one of the most important features of the bureaucratic mode of social 
organization: persons and courses of action are reconstructed in terms of the 
categories and rules of the organization itself. 
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In other words, documents can focus on the administrative process that 
consequently limits or removes any sense of agency. The lack of a clear 
individual author is often intentional so that a report appears more authoritative 
and even scientific; the aim is to create a reality that exists independently of any 
individual observer, interpreter or writer (ibid., 2004, pp.71-2). For this reason, 
other sources of data, such as interviews and observation, are crucial to fully 
understand where a document has come from. More broadly, this shows that 
there is bias in documents: they are edited and incomplete. In part, this makes 
them interesting to study in the first place, but it means that we must treat 
documentary evidence like ‘an untrustworthy witness’ (MacDonald, 2008, 
pp.286-7), and must ask questions about the reason for its existence, the way it 
was produced, the intended audience for the document, and so on. In order to do 
so, there are often four criteria used to evaluate textual forms of information: 
authenticity (concerns ‘genuineness’ – whether or not the document is what it 
purports to be); credibility (questions about the sincerity and accuracy of the 
document); representativeness (does the document constitute a representative 
sample of all the documents as they originally existed?); and, meaning (what are 
the literal and deeper meanings of the document?) (Burnham et. al., 2008, 
pp.209-12). Though this places doubt on the value of documents, they are very 
useful and play a key role in Parliament. 
 
3.3.1. Application 
 
I used textual analysis to explore the way that documents are used in select 
committees. As mentioned before, this was not done systematically in that I 
undertook a discourse analysis or content analysis of a representative sample of 
briefings or reports because this would not help to answer the research 
questions about beliefs and traditions. Therefore, it is not possible to offer a 
quantifiable summary of how many documents I read or analysed. I looked at 
reports from committees, email exchanges, copies of speeches, magazines and 
newspaper articles (online and in print), press cuttings, the Official Report 
(Hansard), guidelines and instruction manuals, evidence submitted to 
committees, briefings for MPs (I had access to 29 briefs from five committees), 
correspondence between committees and ministerial departments, and so on 
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and so forth. I looked at the way that reports are produced, and the way that 
written briefing material is used by committee members and chairs in evidence 
sessions (though much more could be done). This offered a great way to 
supplement first-person accounts and corroborate observations. Indeed, where 
interviews or observations were not possible, written documents offer crucial 
access to subject material. Of course, as a participant observer in the Palace and 
working for the Committee Office, I was partly responsible for producing written 
briefings and contributing to draft reports, which also added further nuance. 
 
In addition to these textual forms of data, as mentioned, I constructed two small 
databases for this research project. The first was a small database, based on the 
sessional returns of the 2010 parliament, in which I collected information on the 
attendance rates for committee members and chairs. This database covers: 
attendance rates by each member by session and by committee; the number of 
meetings that the committee held; the gender breakdown of committee 
membership; and the number of reports published by each of the 24 committees 
under study (the Liaison Committee is excluded from this dataset). This 
database is predominantly used in Chapter 4 (on committee members), though 
see Appendix F for a summary. I additionally added information on committee 
chairs’ backgrounds, which is used in Chapter 5 (see especially Table 5.2). The 
second database is one on oral witnesses that gave evidence to select committees 
during the 2013-14 parliamentary session. Information on these witnesses was 
collected from the UK Parliament website and order papers, as well as publicly 
available information on witnesses online. This database covers: organisational 
breakdown, geographical location and gender. This data is used predominantly 
in Chapter 8 (and see Appendix G and H for a summary). In due course, both 
databases will be made publicly available. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Taken together, participant observation and semi-structured interviews, when 
supplemented with textual analysis of written records (and even a small set of 
descriptive statistics) offer an overarching interpretive methodology. Each 
method makes a distinctive contribution to this research project, which the three  
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Table 3.3. Applying the analytical framework: methods 
Method Application Analytical focus 
Non-participant and 
participant 
observation 
Working as research assistant to 
a select committee for 14 weeks 
Performance styles, spaces 
and speeches; dealing with 
dilemmas 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
43 interviews (23 committee 
members, 10 chairs, 10 clerks) 
Beliefs about scrutiny roles, 
practices and dilemmas 
Textual analysis and 
descriptive statistics 
A range of written records and 
two databases on MPs and 
witnesses 
Situating actors in broader 
context; identifying 
dilemmas 
   
sections above have identified. Participant and non-participant observation 
allows us to see beliefs in action, i.e. everyday practices. Interviews focus on 
individual beliefs and how they may be part of wider traditions. All three – 
individual beliefs, everyday practices and parliamentary traditions – are affected 
by and make an impact upon written records. This is axiomatic in a literate 
society. The key point, however, is that no single method is able to capture all 
elements of the interpretive analytical framework. It is their combination that 
creates a robust methodology. So while observation gives us microscopic detail 
to study everyday behaviour at a very deep level, we are left with questions as to 
its wider validity and value once we leave the field; interviews give respondents 
an opportunity to explain their beliefs, but nonetheless we face questions about 
the truthfulness of their responses; and, written records are pervasive and 
foundational to keep Parliament running, but they would seem to be as partial as 
the political actors from whom we gather first-hand accounts; and, finally, 
quantitative data can illustrate broad brush trends, but not the nuance and 
texture that interpretation requires. Through ‘triangulation’ (Davies, 2001) we 
are able to corroborate what we ask interviewees with what they actually do by 
observing them in action; we are able to compare and contrast our observations 
with written records to understand the linkage between texts and behaviour; and, 
we can ask interviewees about which documents matter and what role they 
played in writing them. In sum, as Table 3.3 shows, this PhD therefore focuses 
on observation (14 weeks in Parliament) to explore how parliamentary actors 
enact their role and deal with dilemmas they face; interviews (43 in total) to 
identify and examine the beliefs that actors hold; and, texts and data (records 
and databases) to situate parliamentary actors in context and to give broad 
brush trends. In doing so, these methods dovetails to capture relevant fieldwork 
material to help answer the research questions identified and discussion in the 
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Introduction in that we are able to answer how political actors interpret and 
perform their role on select committees and how their everyday practices affect 
the wider traditions of parliamentary scrutiny in the House of Commons. This 
does not mean that the empirical sections are faultless. Every methodology has 
its limitations, including this one. It cannot offer a comprehensive picture of how 
all MPs interpret their role, nor is it possible to evaluate the role of ideas and 
beliefs against standards of what makes an ‘effective’ select committee system. 
Rather, this project was more specific in that it draws significantly from the 
committee for which I worked and more generally insights from the things that I 
was able to see over my stay in the Committee Office.  
 
Fieldwork for this project produced a swathe of information, which required 
detailed analysis to answer the research question. In line with the analytical 
framework, I used an open form of coding by which I read through my FWD, 
transcriptions and various texts to develop various themes associated with 
individual beliefs, everyday practices, and parliamentary traditions (Crang and 
Cook, 2007, pp.137-9). This analysis established categories and codes, which 
became hooks on which the following empirical sections are based. It is to those 
that we now turn. 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II: Interpreting Scrutiny 
 
 
Welch Schauspiel! Aber ach! ein Schauspiel nur! 
 
– Faust7 
 
 
In each chapter that follows, I apply the analytical framework set out in Chapter 
2. I do this in three ways. First, I situate agents in their organisational and/or 
historical context. Second, I ask: how does each actor interpret their role? In 
doing so, I describe how individual beliefs relate to everyday practices and 
performance styles. Third, I conclude each chapter by identifying broader 
themes associated with their role, moving from individual beliefs and practices 
to how actors negotiate everyday dilemmas. 
 
 
  
                                                          
7 Author’s translation: ‘What spectacle! But oh! a spectacle and nothing more!’. Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe (1808) Faust I, v. 454 / Faust. 
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Chapter 4: Members 
 
 
 
 
n May 2010, 650 Members of Parliament were elected to the House of 
Commons. At the broadest level, representatives are assumed to exist to 
serve the interests of their constituents in Parliament. Precisely what this 
means in terms of everyday activity, however, is part of the realm of contestation 
(echoing some themes from Chapter 2). This is exacerbated in the House of 
Commons because representatives do not have a job description, and their 
election depends not on professional experience or applying job-specific 
expertise, but on the will of some 70,000 constituents or so every five years. As a 
result, to be an MP is to be subject to a permanent sense of job insecurity and 
general day-to-day unpredictability. This also means that MPs can – and do – 
interpret their role as they wish, and consequently focus their energy on things 
that they deem important. In doing so, they often ascribe differing importance to 
representing their constituents, supporting their political party, or seeking to 
work towards a perceived national interest. These interpretations have been 
scrutinised by the media and the public without much agreement on how 
politicians best enact the ‘representative claim’ (Pitkin, 1967). Indeed, it is also 
subject to academic debate. However, as Chapter 1 has indicated, these debates 
have traditionally focused on institutional structures and procedures with less 
empirical research on how MPs interpret and perform different aspects of their 
role with reference to select committees. In this chapter, I begin to address this 
gap by looking at how MPs interpret their role on those committees. I present a 
simple argument: MPs are thrust into a chaotic and unstructured world, and, 
subsequently, they interpret their role in their own individual ways. In doing so, 
they create different parliamentary habits, routines and practices, which means  
I 
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Table 4.1. Analysing committee members 
Situated 
agency 
The first section of this chapter sets out the broad organisational structure 
in which committee members are placed, including the average length of 
service, attendance rates, etc. 
Beliefs and 
practices 
This covers the interpretations of scrutiny that MPs have about select 
committees. This finds that MPs push and pull in different directions, and 
enact their role through a range of performance styles. 
Negotiating 
dilemmas 
Here, analysis turns towards some of the key dilemmas that committee 
members face in their everyday life, including variable time commitment, 
building expertise, negotiating multiple loyalties and a desire to create a 
sense of ordinariness. 
Summary: In sum, these concepts indicate that select committee scrutiny depends not just 
on committees’ formal powers but also the everyday practices of committee members and 
how they negotiate dilemmas that they face in enacting their role. Ultimately, this reveals 
that MPs’ lifestyles are nomadic and flexible, and that they push and pull scrutiny in 
different directions. Committees fulfil a range of functions, and so, arguably, scholars must 
broaden their understanding of what it means for a committee to be ‘effective’. 
 
that members push and pull scrutiny in different directions. This supports the 
theoretical views raised in Part I that interpretations are crucial to navigate 
social and political worlds. In order to demonstrate the importance of individual 
beliefs, everyday practices, and negotiating dilemmas, this chapter is split into 
three sections (see Table 4.1 for a summary). First, I situate committee members 
in their organisational context by giving a brief, descriptive overview of the 2010 
parliament and the scale and extent of select committee work (situated agency). 
Second, I identify different ways in which MPs interpret their role (beliefs and 
practices). I argue that committee members adopt different performance styles 
to enact their committee role, including the following roles: (i) specialists and 
advocates, (ii) lone wolves, (iii) constituency champions, (iv) party helpers or 
safety nets, (v) learners, and (vi) absentees. These roles are not exhaustive, nor 
do they form a fixed typology (in contrast to the work of, for example, Searing 
(1994), I argue that performance styles can and do change on a frequent basis 
(see Chapter 2)). Rather, the aim is to demonstrate that select committees 
represent a diverse range of ideas and interpretations that push and pull 
committee scrutiny in different directions. Third and finally, the chapter 
discusses how those ‘pushes and pulls’ are affected by committee members’ 
other parliamentary roles. In short, I explore the dilemmas that MPs face in 
terms of their time commitments, the need to build expertise and professional 
competence, the multiple (and sometimes conflicting) loyalties that MPs face, 
and the broader dilemma of confronting the complexities of being an MP 
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through creating a sense of ordinariness around their lives to tame the contested 
nature of the representative role. Select committees offer an anchor to deepen 
their knowledge and understanding of policy-making, and additionally offer a 
way to reconcile the different aspects of being a Member of Parliament. In sum, 
this demonstrates that select committees offer much more than scrutiny of the 
executive. 
 
 
4.1. Situating committee members: who are the scrutinisers? 
 
Select committees exist to provide detailed scrutiny of government by backbench 
MPs in the House of Commons. Since 1979, this has developed into a range of 
joint committees, domestic or internal committees, departmental committees 
and cross-cutting committees. Though the history of committees was detailed in 
Chapter 1, it is worth re-stating the central functions of committees here with 
reference to its members. In order to scrutinise activities of government, 
committees undertake inquiries that involves (i) deciding on a topic (agenda-
setting), (ii) calling for written evidence and holding oral evidence sessions 
(evidence-gathering), and (iii) publishing committee findings through a final 
report (report-writing) (these phases are discussed in a little more detail in 
Chapter 7). Axiomatically, committee activity ranges significantly from this 
crude simplification, but in any case, committees rely on members who are 
expected to attend meetings regularly, participate in private discussions, ask 
questions in oral evidence to gather information or hold witnesses to account, 
and evaluate an inquiry’s findings in advance of publishing a committee report. 
As noted in Chapter 1, the procedures for becoming a member have changed 
since 2010. This has arguably changed the dynamic of select committees. One 
interviewee described the old system in the following way: 
 
Getting on a select committee in the first place was very difficult for me 
because, being on the left, the Blair machine, Blair regime didn’t want anybody 
who was going to stir up trouble. So they deliberately stuffed it full of, you 
know, sycophants, Blair babes, loyalists, whatever you call them, Blairites, and 
kept anybody who was trouble out of the serious select committees (Interview 
M-08). 
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The shift towards a more independent form of scrutiny has been acknowledged 
(even if only anecdotally) by a range of frontbench politicians, the media and 
scholars of legislative studies, with one MP saying that committees now work 
with ‘renewed authority and zest’ (Flynn, 2012, p.74; see also White, 2016). This 
is also supported in interviews (Interview M-12, Interview M-21). For example: 
 
In general, people who are getting elected onto them are being elected because 
they might be good at that area or interested in that area, rather than because 
they’ve been a good boy and kept their nose clean and, you know, are being put 
there by the whipping operation and so I think that’s a very positive change. It 
probably does mean that select committees are more outspoken than they used 
to be in the past … and again, I think that’s not a bad thing (Interview M-19). 
 
With this in mind, it is worth going into more detail about who served on 
committees during the 2010 parliament.  
 
Despite the well-established trend towards greater constituency activity 
(Campbell and Lovenduski, 2015), select committee work takes up a 
considerable amount of MPs’ time. Over the course of the 2010 parliament, 24 
departmental and cross-cutting committees (excluding the Liaison Committee) 
held 4,555 formal meetings and published 1,349 reports (see Appendix F). 398 
out of 650 Members of Parliament (or 61.2%) served on these committees, a 
figure that rises even higher if domestic committees, temporary committees and 
joint scrutiny committees are included. Select committee service is something 
that most MPs experience over the course of their parliamentary career, 
including those MPs that went on to serve on the frontbench or, indeed, became 
prime minister.8  Appendix F offers a more detailed summary of descriptive 
statistics associated with select committees. It shows that the average age of 
joining a committee is 49.1 years old, which is broadly in line with the age of 
MPs in the 2010 parliament more generally, which was 49.9 years old (Audickas, 
2016). Turning to the length of service, the average for an MP between 2010 and 
2015 is 32 months (or just over two and a half years). On average, 21.1 MPs 
served on each committee during that time, with the lowest turnover from the 
Energy and Climate Change Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee (15 
members), whilst the largest turnover came from the Justice Committee, Public 
Accounts Committee, and Work and Pensions Committee (28 members). 
                                                          
8 Between 2001 and 2004, for example, David Cameron served on the Home Affairs 
Committee and the Modernisation Committee. 
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Looking at gender, this reveals that the average committee would have had 15 
men and 6 women committee members over the course of the 2010 parliament. 
Over the same period, and more generally across Parliament, 22% of MPs were 
women, which indicates that committees are, on average, representative of the 
House of Commons. Finally, the average attendance rate of MPs declines 
between 2010 and 2015, from 68.9% in Session 2010-12 to 63.6% in the final 
session. However, there is variety in this: the highest average attendance rate 
comes from the Home Affairs Committee in Session 2010-12 (81.0%), and the 
lowest from the European Scrutiny Committee in Session 2013-14 (43.6%). In 
sum, these statistics reveal parliamentary committees play an important role 
simply by virtue of the demand on an MP’s time that they place and the range of 
meetings that an MP can attend. However, the statistics also only show a partial 
picture of committee members, and do not tell us very much about the 
motivations behind MPs’ service or the how MPs interpret their role. Having 
situated actors into their broad organisational context, the remainder of this 
chapter focuses on the beliefs, practices and dilemmas of committee members. 
 
 
4.2. How do committee members interpret their role? 
 
A first question to consider with regards to how MPs interpret their role is to ask 
what they mean by ‘scrutiny’, which, though familiar terrain for parliamentary 
and legislative studies, is not unambiguous (White, 2015a). Most MPs 
mentioned terms such as ‘accountability’ and ‘responsibility’ in interviews and, 
for many, parliamentary scrutiny at a broad level is a catch-all term to describe 
the detailed examination of government policy. Specifically regarding select 
committee scrutiny, this is often defined in opposition to, or contrasted against, 
debates on the floor of the main chamber: 
 
In the House of Commons you can get one or two questions, intervention in a 
debate but in a select committee you can pursue a pretty clear line of 
questioning … and you’ve got a much better chance and opportunity of both 
finding out what’s going on, finding out what the department is doing is 
consistent with the policy … and also finding out if the policy makes sense 
(Interview M-21). 
 
I think select committees are absolutely vital for the whole working of 
Parliament because for every government department there is a select 
Interpreting Parliamentary Scrutiny 
86 
committee, which is there to … hold it to account in a detailed way. Yes, we 
have Questions on the floor of the House, but they are quick fire and it’s all over 
in 30 minutes. Whereas I spent ten years or so on the [XX] Committee. We did 
some very detailed inquiries into [XX] (Interview M-15). 
 
Other MPs have noted this difference to the main chamber, too. One said that it 
provides ‘a different perspective to the … theatre of accountability in the 
chamber’ (Interview M-01), and another said (though adding this is not always 
the case): 
 
You’re away from the Punch and Judy crudities of the chamber where the 
opposition are always wrong, and your side is always right. I mean … we’re 
veering onto intelligent conversation on committees (Interview M-02). 
 
In other words, they are basing their scrutiny work on evidence gathered as part 
of committee inquiries, rather than party political arguments. This indicates that 
scrutiny is generally positively acknowledged and regarded as important. This is 
not surprising. Nevertheless, specific nuances or emphases placed on 
interpretations of scrutiny are critical because they affect MPs’ approaches to 
their role, both in terms of the questioning and conduct of inquiries, as well as 
the focus and aims of inquiries. Some MPs believed that ‘value for money’ was a 
key factor in good scrutiny (e.g. Interview C-01, Interview C-08, Interview M-15), 
while others emphasised implementation of policy more generally (e.g. 
Interview M-20, Interview M-21). One MP’s interpretation, who served on two 
committees, is a good example to demonstrate the effect of individual beliefs on 
scrutiny practices. Though she has more interest in one policy area over another, 
it is arguably her interpretation of the focus of scrutiny that serves as the real 
dividing line between her two committees. While one committee was praised as 
working as a team, and focusing on what is happening and why in policy 
implementation terms, the other committee is, ‘all about the theory and not 
about what actually happens to people’ (Interview M-10). She later added that 
the committee ignores the ‘nuts and bolts’ and the ‘real questions’: 
 
There are times that we had [XX] in and you’re asking them practical things 
about why haven’t you hit this target? What’s the matter? You don’t look at the 
staff survey that says that all staff are working there? What’s going on? What 
are you doing about [XX] and [XX]? And all those real questions that actually 
matter, it actually involves a bit of research and a bit of work. Whereas they 
[the other committee] can just go, “Well, what do you think [XX] is going to be 
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this time next year?”. It’s easy, innit? … just pondering, really, what they’re 
doing. 
 
The underlying difference between these two committees lies in her 
interpretation of scrutiny: 
 
It’s in the implementation that it matters and it’s only by scrutinising, you 
know, whether what was intended is actually happening or there’s unintended 
consequences. So I think you can dream of great ideas but it’s in practice that 
you change people’s lives, so I think you need to scrutinise the implementation 
and development of policies.  
 
Though just one example, it is instructive of other MPs and their approaches. 
Another committee member, with a background in marketing and business, 
related her assessments to how events or policies would be made in the business 
world. So for instance, in a discussion about the lack of timely responses from 
the government to a report by her committee, she comments: 
 
It’s not a way to do business. You see, it wouldn’t happen in the commercial 
world and I don’t see why you shouldn’t translate the commercial world 
across. … If there’s a criticism from a group of consumers – the company 
would respond (Interview M-04). 
 
To take a final example, another MP, who used to be a school inspector in which 
he focused on ‘evaluation and quality’, used this approach to scrutiny, i.e. 
focusing on ‘self-evaluation’ of government (‘how do various ministers who’ve 
been with us, how do they evaluate their own performance?’) (Interview M-14).   
 
The broad point of this discussion is to illustrate that scrutiny, though it has 
easily identifiable principles, is still interpreted in different ways that affect the 
way in which MPs approach their work. Furthermore, it raises the interesting 
question as to how different interpretations of their role affect their activities on 
scrutiny committees. This is important because it challenges the assumption that 
behaviour of committees is uniform in aim, focus and practice, and rather 
indicates a level of fluidity in executive-legislative relations. MPs adopt vantage 
points that affect their focus of questioning in public evidence sessions, their 
comments and discussions in considering draft committee reports, and, indeed, 
in the types of inquiry that they wish to promote for committee work. The variety 
of roles is impossible to quantify because, as Anthony King (1974, p.74) put it,  
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Table 4.2. Performance styles in select committees 
Specialists and 
advocates 
Usually adopted by ‘core’ members of a committee that regularly attend 
meetings, in this performance MPs seek to analyse the evidence pursue 
policy interests. 
Lone wolves 
Long-standing and personal interests are pursued in meetings, perhaps at 
the expense of a committee’s inquiry that is focused on other issues – as a 
result, lone wolves are not team players. 
Constituency 
champions 
In this style of scrutiny enactment, committee members represent their 
constituents in the topics they pursue or the questions they ask. 
Party helpers 
or safety nets 
A performance in which a committee member may ask questions to 
witnesses for party political reasons, either to make a partisan attack or 
protect the witness. 
Learners 
In this role, committee members attempt to learn about a policy area or to 
find out more about government activity, rather than holding it to 
account. 
Absentees  
A committee member who is conspicuous by their absence, or who has 
made a minimal contribution, perhaps by ‘dipping in and out’ of the 
meeting. 
  
there are ‘as many ways of being an MP as there are MPs’.  Nonetheless, over the 
course of my fieldwork and following many interviews and discussions with 
clerks, MPs and chairs of committees, I believe that it is possible to identify 
commonly adopted performance styles that were explained in Chapter 2. This is 
not an attempt to create a fixed typology of scrutiny roles, nor is it an attempt to 
stipulate guidelines for ideal-types of MP. Any such endeavour would be 
hopelessly rigid and inflexible, as discussion in Part I have sought to show (e.g. 
Andeweg, 2014; Searing, 1994). Rather, there are different styles or dispositions 
that MPs can choose to adopt if they wish, which changes depending on inquiry, 
witness, other committee members, the lines of questioning, the broader 
political agenda of the day, etc. Each of these are examined in a little more detail 
here, and summarised in Table 4.2.9 
 
4.2.1. Specialists and advocates 
 
Many MPs explained that their committee had particular experts for different 
areas of policy. This usually stems from their policy interest and/or previous 
professional background. It is these individuals who arguably drive forward 
                                                          
9 I was partly inspired following an interview with a particular clerk (Interview S-03), who 
believed that there were at least four different types of committee member. On the whole, my 
observations led me to different theoretical approaches (preferring styles over types) and 
empirical findings, but I am indebted to this clerk for raising some of the ideas discussed in 
this chapter. 
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committee work and assist chairs as their most vocal supporting ‘cast’ (to extend 
the performance metaphor further). As this MP explained, it means that 
members can specialise and divide up tasks between them: 
 
Within my party, there’s a recognition that anything to do with the First World 
War, that’s [AN73]’s subject, you know, because he’s always rambling on about 
it. And there’ll be other, I mean, I’m hopeless on finance, and I don’t know 
anybody on finance, but we’ve got people who are brilliant on finance. So as in, 
as with a select committee, you all know that which members will have a 
specific interest (Interview M-15). 
 
He went on to describe some of the committee-related interests of some of the 
members. Another MP: 
 
[AU61], who’s on the committee, … she did research. So she’s really, she’s really 
read a lot of stuff about what the data means. … [FW25] has done a big piece of 
work on people who [XX]. So I will know that she will do that better than me. 
[KQ91], a Conservative, he’s got an accountancy background, so he will want 
to know about the numbers (Interview M-10). 
 
This division of expertise has wider repercussions for the development of 
committee norms and values or performance teams (defined in Chapter 2, and 
examined in Chapter 7), which is significant because it indicates that effective 
committees work to each other’s strengths. This is arguably where the chair’s 
skills matter. One chair, for instance, prefers to allocate themes for inquiries to 
members who then use this theme for each witness throughout an inquiry 
(Interview C-05). Another chair gave two examples of MPs whose advice he 
would seek because they are experts in two areas of the committee’s remit 
(Interview C-09).  
 
A good indication of a specialist is the extent to which they use their expertise in 
other activities outside of committee work. To take just a single example: Paul 
Blomfield, before his election victory to represent Sheffield Central in 2010, was 
general manager of the University of Sheffield Students’ Union. His work in 
Parliament reflects this background. For most of the 2010 parliament, he served 
on the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, with an average attendance 
rate of 83.2%. Other MPs on the committee have noted his expertise in this 
policy area, particularly with regards to higher education policy (e.g. Interview 
M-18). However, he has also been involved in campaigns outside BIS Committee, 
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attending conferences, meetings and events in relation to higher and further 
education, speaking at debates on these issues regularly in Parliament, and 
participating in campaigns relating to student issues (such as payday lending, 
student visas, financial support, and so on).10 During the 2010 parliament, he 
was also chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Students, vice-
chair of the APPG on Apprenticeships, and secretary of the APPG on Universities 
(UK Parliament, 2015a).  
 
4.2.2. Lone wolves 
 
A lone wolf could be regarded as an extreme version of a specialist or advocate 
because these individuals zealously promote particular issues that they are 
interested in. However, while a specialist will provide expertise on particular 
areas for a committee’s inquiry as part of a team, a lone wolf is not usually a 
team player. As this clerk describes: 
 
It’ll vary a bit from inquiry to inquiry, but somebody will always ask about x, 
and we always know they’re going to ask about that. On [XX], they used to be 
that, they asked that, even if it wasn’t terribly relevant to the inquiry you were 
dealing with (Interview S-03). 
 
To be a lone wolf is to follow an issue or interest irrespective of the inquiry or, 
indeed, irrespective of the remit of the committee on which they are serving. One 
interviewee cited the following example: 
 
I mean, one of my, of the Conservative colleagues on the committee is a 
passionate European, Eurosceptic. Consequently, you know, at every turn, 
there is a, let’s get [XX] in, let’s get [XX] in, … whatever (Interview M-06, 
emphasis added). 
 
During my fieldwork, my committee had an MP who would often operate as a 
lone wolf. The potential problem with such a character is that it could 
disorientate witnesses, who (in one case at least) were asked about things on 
which they had no expertise or knowledge (FWD 19.4.24).  More generally, it can 
disrupt the flow of an evidence session (or indeed inquiry). One MP described 
this indulgence:  
                                                          
10 For example, see his interventions in these debates on the floor of the House of Commons: 
HC Deb 24 March 2014, c13; HC Deb 5 December 2013, c1084; and, introducing a Private 
member’s Bill on payday moneylenders, HC Deb 12 July 2013, cc659-78 and cc688-737. 
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When we interview people, from my view you’re not just finding out what they 
think, I’m trying to get across what I think. So the staff have a view and so 
sometimes the chair pulls me up and says, you know, but I want to be a witness 
rather than an interviewer and I do one way or another get my view across 
(Interview M-08). 
 
Because of their approach, their style can sometimes be combative or 
confrontational, with an eye for the headline. Consequently, lone wolves are 
prone to go ‘off-script’, and it is chairs who play a leading role in managing this. 
This could cause arguments between the MP and the chair of the committee and, 
if the relationship turns sour, it is a likely cause of divisions in reports and a 
breakdown in consensual working (as witnessed a number of times in my 
fieldwork (FWD 3.1.13, FWD 10.3.25, FWD 47.11.10)). That said, lone wolves are 
also praised because they have, as one chair put it, ‘a skill of getting to the heart 
of the issue’ (Interview C-05). Another interviewee suggested that this made an 
impact with the frontbench: ‘ministers are scared of us, and that’s quite good’ 
(Interview M-10). Examples of lone wolves could include: Paul Flynn, serving on 
the Home Affairs Committee and Public Administration Select Committee, who 
frequently spoke on issues about war; or David Tredinnick, serving on the 
Health Committee and the Science and Technology Committee, who is known 
for his strong interest in homeopathy and astrology as alternatives to 
mainstream healthcare (e.g. HC Deb 22 July 2014 cc1300-1302). 
 
4.2.3. Constituency champions 
 
Though there were some interviewees who noted the separation of their 
constituency, a large number of MPs made some link between constituency and 
scrutiny work.11 It is possible that most did so because they are used to relating 
their everyday activity to constituents’ interests. For example, the following 
comment from one MP who sat on the Business, Innovation and Skills 
Committee is arguably applicable to any other constituency: ‘… and I have quite 
an enterprising constituency with quite a lot of small businesses and SMEs …’ 
(Interview M-18). Others believed that scrutiny work is enhanced by bringing 
‘constituency colour’ into proceedings, sentiments with which most MPs could 
                                                          
11 Those that considered the constituency and select committee role as separate include: 
Interview M-01, Interview M-13, Interview M-16 and Interview C-06. Those that viewed 
them as linked include: Interview M-18, Interview M-19, and Interview M-22. 
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arguably identify (Interview M-19). Even if this link is superficial, it is still telling 
because it shows the importance of electioneering that pervades an MP’s 
thinking (Wright, 2010). That said, for some representatives, their constituency 
is the prism through which they view their parliamentary work. One MP puts 
this most starkly: ‘There is really no point on being on a committee if … it’s not 
relevant to your constituents’ (Interview M-17). He said that a two hour 
committee meeting needed to be justified to his constituents, and that if his 
constituents are not writing to him on a particular topic on which his committee 
was undertaking an inquiry, then he will not spend a lot of time reading or 
preparing for sessions about that particular topic. In taking such a view, MPs 
will add constituency views to their work in almost every conceivable way: public 
evidence sessions, in draft report consideration, linking reports to constituencies, 
press releases, and so on (FWD 47.11.10, FWD 52.12.3). One chair noted 
someone with a constituency focus on her committee: 
 
[FC06], who is one of my backbench members, she does it, everything she 
relates back to her constituency and I don’t. I tend to look at the issue and if 
there’s a constituency link I’ll use it. I think she looks at the constituency and 
sees how she can feed that into her work. So I do it the other way around 
(Interview C-08). 
 
This quote demonstrates the pervasive importance of the constituency link. 
Though it is something taken further by particular representatives in their 
service on select committees, almost all MPs (including chairs) will have the 
constituency at the back of their mind, echoing empirical analyses that show a 
growing importance to the constituency role by MPs (and, indeed, the public) 
(e.g. Campbell and Lovenduski, 2015; Crewe, 2015, pp.83-110). Though this 
doctoral research has not been able to quantify the extent to which constituency 
work takes up MPs’ time, it raises important questions about the effect of the 
growing constituency burden for other aspects of an MP’s role, such as 
commitment to scrutinising the executive. 
 
A specific example of this approach can be seen by Greg Mulholland, MP for 
Leeds North West and member of the Public Administration Select Committee. 
He used an inquiry’s evidence session to call on the director of NHS England, 
Simon Stevens, to apologise for the ‘kneejerk decision’ that resulted in the 
closure of a children’s heart surgery unit in Leeds (PASC, 2014a, Q303-Q305), 
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leaving it to the chair to tease out the wider issues relevant for the committee’s 
inquiry on arm’s-length bodies (Mulholland went on to use his exchange with 
Stevens as part of his constituency campaigning activities (Mulholland, 2014)). 
Another example could include John Woodcock’s membership of the Defence 
Committee, whose constituency, Barrow and Furness, covers the site of nuclear 
submarine shipbuilding sites that are strongly tied to the Trident nuclear 
defence programme.  
 
4.2.4. Party helpers and safety nets 
 
In one interview, a clerk referred to this as a ‘government help person’: 
 
Someone who sort of, you know, if the government’s sort of getting in trouble 
will maybe step in a little bit. … I wouldn’t call them stooges, not the right word, 
but they feel, you know, the government shouldn’t get such a kicking (Interview 
S-03). 
 
An MP similarly noted this type of behaviour, though included the opposition: 
 
There have been times when we’ve had people on the committee who’ve wanted 
to just push the, sort of, you know, the government line – and you’re not there 
to do that. You’re elected by Parliament, by the other parliamentarians, to do a 
job. You’re not there to do the government or the opposition’s job (Interview M-
10). 
 
This indicates that there are behaviours by some committee members to try to 
help their political parties. This type of performance is generally not common in 
the committee corridor because it is unlikely to receive widespread support from 
colleagues, including one’s own party, as it damages the ability of a committee to 
build consensus. However, and perhaps unsurprisingly, this mode of behaviour 
is more recurrent at ‘set-piece’ events, such as evidence sessions with a secretary 
of state or minister. Nonetheless, it can be part of scrutiny hearings more 
generally, whereby individual MPs may try to use the committee as a ‘political 
tool’, as another MP put it (Interview M-22). For example, on one particular 
issue, a committee member said: 
 
There was a mood coming mainly from government, mainly from [the 
minister], that we were going to shift, move away from [a previous policy] … 
and four out of the five interviewees [witnesses] said [XX] and they took my 
view. And so I deliberately gave them lots of easy conversation and the one 
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who was against [the previous policy] was intellectually less good (Interview 
M-08). 
 
Though this was a long-serving MP, newer members of committees (and newer 
MPs more generally) are possibly slightly more partisan in their activities on 
committee (a point made to me in Interview M-07). One MP noted that there is a 
‘cooling off’ period for representatives who had previously served on the 
frontbench (or supported it as parliamentary private secretary (PPS)), and would 
be discouraged by their colleagues to join a committee until they had sufficiently 
‘cooled off’ (Interview M-11).12 Indeed, a newly-appointed Conservative MP on 
the committee for which I worked occasionally took a view on some matters that 
would have given the government the benefit of the doubt, even though no one 
else on the committee agreed (FWD 52.12.3). This indicates the importance of 
socialisation processes – often imperceptibly informal – to ensure that MPs 
maintain a sense of cross-party working for their scrutiny work. This isn’t easy – 
politicians are elected on a partisan basis, after all, and so the adversarial 
atmosphere still pervades parliamentary work.  
 
4.2.5. Learners 
 
Related to the point about socialisation, above, is a character that might be 
referred to as the learner. This can be adopted in two ways. First, newly-
appointed MPs may take this position in private meetings. Here, they may ask 
more questions that are factual in order to familiarise themselves with 
committee work. By contrast, in public meetings, they might not want to be 
particularly vocal:  
 
I didn’t know how [TS49] was going to chair it, and I’d said to him earlier on, I 
just want to hold back in it, so I didn’t take part in the beginning part and 
waited until a bit further … you don’t know what the dynamics were (Interview 
M-04). 
 
                                                          
12 Parliamentary private secretaries may serve on select committees, but should ‘withdraw 
from any involvement with inquiries into their appointing Minister’s department, and they 
should avoid associating themselves with recommendations critical of or embarrassing to the 
Government’ (Cabinet Office, 2015, p.7). 
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A second way in which an MP adopts the role of learner is through inquisitive 
engagement more generally with committee work. One clerk believed that a 
number of MPs adopted this role in his committee: 
 
I think too many members see the committee meetings as an opportunity for a 
pleasant hour or so listening to some people talk and learning about things 
which they previously didn’t know much about and they don’t really see it as a 
really effective scrutiny opportunity. … We’ve had a number of sessions 
recently where the chair took probably 80% of the questions because 
everybody else sits back and listens. And, you know, they enjoy it, it’s very 
interesting and all the rest of it, but they’re not really scrutinising (Interview S-
05).  
 
I have observed some committees (including the one mentioned by the clerk 
above) where MPs attend but then do not ask questions in evidence sessions 
(FWD 52.10.20) Or, if they do ask questions, their approach may not be fully 
developed or thought-out, as this clerk describes:  
 
The sessions are not courtroom, they’re schoolroom for a lot of them and 
they’re finding out about the topic. So therefore, whereas I’ve read – not all the 
stuff – but I’ve read the brief and I know what it’s about, whereas quite often 
they haven’t and they’re finding out for the first time (Interview S-03). 
 
This indicates that even high attendance at committee meetings does not 
automatically translate into effective scrutiny or – perhaps alarmingly – any 
form of scrutiny at all. This has quite obvious consequences: a committee could 
be perceived as driven by the chair, or MPs on the committee do not offer critical 
and detailed oversight of a policy area, both of which detrimentally affect a 
committee’s impact on government policy. 
 
4.2.6. Absentee 
 
As the name implies, this MP is attached to a committee but does not attend. It 
can also include those committee members that appear briefly, or only for a 
small part of an evidence session, who are more interested in boosting their 
attendance rate and going through the motion of asking a question rather than 
undertaking any form of scrutiny. Absentee members are not thought to make 
much of an impact on committee work because they are not there to discuss 
proposals for inquiries, question witnesses, or offer their views in the 
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consideration of draft reports. However, non-attendance can have substantial 
consequences. By virtue of their absence, it reduces the number of opportunities 
available to scrutinise government and to use the MP’s expertise to inform 
committee work. Moreover, and possibly most important, those that do attend 
have the power and influence to push forward their views – even if this skews 
the party balance. 
 
Aside from one interview, regular absentees were largely unreachable and, 
axiomatically, they were difficult to observe in committee meetings. Thus, they 
remain elusive. The only exception came in the form of a 20 minute interview 
with an MP who attended well below half of all his committee meetings 
(Interview M-12). He described his committee work as a ‘marginal pastime’ and 
‘not particularly onerous’. He said that, although he believed MPs should spend 
80% of their time on scrutiny committees, he only spent one or two percent on 
them because of the demands placed on him by his constituents (which, he 
believed, did occupy 80% of his time).  This indicates that perhaps a reason for a 
low attendance rate for some MPs, and an absentee reputation, is explained 
through the competing pressures placed on them and the fact that they have 
prioritised other aspects of their role (to which I return below, in the third 
section).   
 
These roles do not exhaust the possibilities of the modes of behaviour that MPs 
may choose to enact on committees (e.g. there could be MPs vying for the 
limelight or others deliberately attacking the government without scrutiny in 
mind). Nor are these performance styles fixed. A performer may change their 
style depending on circumstance: an MP will not be a specialist for every area of 
policy, and so whilst another fills the gap, the aforementioned MP will be placed 
in a learning role. Another time, she may not be able to attend an evidence 
session, and the following meeting will be perceived as a lone wolf as the MP did 
not hear previous oral evidence. The role adopted may also change depending on 
the constituency, balance of power between government and opposition, the 
performance of the chair, relationships with other committee members, the 
political agenda of the day, and so on. Furthermore, these roles must be 
distinguished from individual questioning techniques and styles. No single type 
of behaviour noted above necessarily leads to particularly combative or 
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conciliatory questions, nor does it mean that one type of role is more effective at 
scrutinising than the other. Therefore, while these roles are not mutually 
exclusive or fixed identities, they are important ways of grounding the focus of 
analysis for representatives when they are approaching and undertaking scrutiny 
activity. It is worth looking at what this means in practice. 
 
4.2.7. On the frontstage: enacting scrutiny 
 
Immediately before an evidence session with a high profile witness began, an 
adviser turned to me and said, ‘this is going to be a piece of theatre’ (FWD 3.1.9). 
This reinforces other fieldwork observations and responses by interviewees that 
indicate evidence sessions are performed and enacted. Here, I want to give two 
examples of the way in which scrutiny is performed: a session from the Public 
Administration Select Committee (PASC) and another from the Work and 
Pensions Committee (WPC). Both sessions questioned their ministers on the 
same morning, but the two performances were very different in setting, speech 
and style. 
 
On 11 June 2014, Francis Maude, then minister for the Cabinet Office, was asked 
to give evidence before PASC (2014b). The evidence session took place in a 
committee room in the Palace of Westminster and, though scheduled to begin at 
9.30am, started at 9.50am. As the main minister that answers to PASC (making 
it a quasi-departmental, quasi-cross-cutting committee), the session focused not 
only on one of its inquiries regarding impartiality of the civil service, but 
additionally on other topics (regarding a late response to a report on the 
Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA) and regarding the 
delay of the Chilcot Inquiry, something that featured in the news around that 
time (Graham, 2014; Wintour, 2014)). 
 
Though calm, the session arguably did not go well. Francis Maude’s answers 
were designed to shut down discussion. Two (of many) examples: 
 
Q482 Lindsay Roy: Is it your contention that the main fault for the delay lies 
within the Civil Service?  
Mr Maude: No, I would not want to say that. I am not going to apportion 
blame. All of us should have moved more quickly on this, and I regret that we 
didn’t. 
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Q483 Lindsay Roy: So what key lessons have you learned from this? 
Mr Maude: To do things more quickly. 
 
Q487 Paul Flynn: Isn’t the likely explanation for the delay that everyone 
involved – civil servants and politicians – has a vested interest in keeping a 
watchdog like ACOBA continuing in its futile way without teeth or claws and 
with no powers to impose its views? Isn’t it that we have got the establishment 
deciding not to act, sitting on their hands for 21 months to protect their 
prospects for retirement jobs? 
Mr Maude: No. 
 
More generally, the body language adopted by the minister, and his actions on 
occasion (tapping desk, looking around the room, long intakes of breath, etc.), 
indicate resistance or boredom to answering questions. The session was not 
helped by the approach or performance style taken by some members. Paul 
Flynn, in particular, adopted the role of ‘lone wolf’: an ardent anti-war 
campaigner, his questioning focused on the Chilcot Inquiry beyond the wishes of 
the chair; furthermore, his questions (i) were adversarial in tone, (ii) acted as 
disguised speeches and (iii) were closed rather than open (particularly Q497, 
Q498, and Q499). 
 
By contrast, on the very same day and at the very same time, the Work and 
Pensions Committee questioned the minister of state for disabled people, Mike 
Penning, and three civil servants, on the operation of Employment and Support 
Allowance and Work Capability Assessments (Work and Pensions Committee, 
2014b). This session took place in a very different setting: the Grimond Room of 
Portcullis House. While the session with Francis Maude above started over 20 
minutes behind schedule, this one began on time and lasted much longer. I bring 
attention to this session because MPs adopted a range of styles, including a 
specialist or expert role (Debbie Abrahams drew on her record in public health 
research), constituency champion role (Sheila Gilmore identified constituency 
issues on two occasions), and absentees (in that Kwasi Kwarteng, though present, 
only asked one minor question (Q487)). This session was also party-political, 
given the news coverage around welfare reforms (and especially regarding the 
role of Atos, a public service provider (BBC News, 2014a)). For example, after 
Glenda Jackson describes the need for specialist examiners as part of contractual 
agreements for a new public service provider to replace Atos, she asks (and then 
interrupts): 
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Q469 Glenda Jackson: […] How are you going to ensure – I presume this is 
going to be a requirement of the new contract – that these promises will, in fact, 
be met and monitored? 
Mike Penning: Yes, it will be. 
Q470 Glenda Jackson: How? 
Mike Penning: If I can just explain- 
Glenda Jackson: Good. 
Mike Penning: I do not speak quite as fast as some of you. 
Q471 Glenda Jackson: It is not a question of speed of word; it is a question of 
speed of thought, but please do go on. 
Mike Penning: It may be, but if you are not willing to listen to the answer, it is 
a bit difficult. 
Glenda Jackson: Well let us hear it. 
Chair: Minister, the floor is yours. 
 
Or more generally regarding welfare reforms: 
 
Q418 Sheila Gilmore: I am sure that organisations like Parkinson’s will be 
very pleased to find that in June 2014, you are now discussing the question of 
whether these people are in the appropriate place, given that this is a matter that 
was raised, I think, with you when you first came into office – which is now a 
matter of some eight or nine months ago – with your predecessor, and with her 
predecessor. 
Mike Penning: And the predecessors before the last election as well. 
Sheila Gilmore: This has been specifically raised and not dealt with over the 
last few years … 
 
Unsurprisingly, there are occasions when the government side felt that they 
needed to protect the minister, and so some committee members adopted the 
role of ‘party helper’ or safety net: 
 
Q442 Graham Evans: Can I just give an example to the Minister of a 
constituent who is paraplegic? The changes that this Government introduced 
have enabled her to get a job in my constituency working for the public authority, 
so there are examples other than those the ones my colleagues on this 
Committee have given, which always seem to give the negative rather than the 
positive. Some of the changes that have been put forward do help people into 
work. 
 
And later: 
 
Q479 Graham Evans: In the evidence from Atos on Monday, they were saying 
that Dr Litchfield’s recommendation regarding the introduction of the mental 
function champions was introduced in January and it had a positive effect. 
Whoever takes up the contracts in future, will those lessons be learned – that 
mental function champions can make a positive difference? 
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James Bolton: Yes, absolutely. Mental function champions have been in place 
since July 2011; as you highlight, Dr Litchfield pointed to the very positive 
contribution they make, and that will form an integral part of the contract. 
Graham Evans: Thank you. 
 
Whilst this does not comprehensively evaluate the way this impacts the 
effectiveness of committee inquiries and reports, the key point of these two 
example evidence sessions is to demonstrate the wider issue about how different 
conceptualisations of scrutiny and its enactment directly affect the way in which 
scrutiny processes play against one another and affect the overall evidence-
gathering process. In other words, committee work is impacted in a direct, 
substantive way through actors’ interpretations of the idea of scrutiny. It 
additionally raises issues about questioning techniques, the effectiveness of 
which by MPs is clearly mixed. Though this cannot be explored in detail here, 
there are particular questions about the role of training for members, on which 
there is no consensus (some MPs refuse to attend training because of their own 
self-belief, for example) (for a discussion, see Coghill et. al., 2008; Coghill et. al., 
2012). Moreover, it raises questions more generally about relationships between 
committee members and performance ‘teams’. This is something that we return 
to in Chapter 7, and it is sufficient to note here that: first, clearly good working 
relationships are necessary to prevent the persistence of partisan questioning, or, 
put more simply, everyone has their own role to play, but these roles must work 
in harmony; and, second, the role of chair is key in shaping working 
relationships between committee members, which also affects the approach that 
MPs take (see Chapter 5). These two points seek to show that roles develop not 
only through individual beliefs but through actions and practices of others. This 
leads to us to a wider discussion about how individual beliefs about the role of 
MP, and everyday practices in the House of Commons, affect approaches to 
scrutiny. 
 
 
4.3. Negotiating dilemmas 
 
In order to better understand the role that MPs adopt in select committees, four 
dilemmas deserve detailed attention: time commitment, building expertise and 
becoming an effective representative, multiple loyalties, and the formation of a 
willed ordinariness to tame the storm of being an MP. These are dilemmas that 
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MPs face not only in select committees, but broadly as part of their 
representative role. However, they make an impact on committees, and so each 
of these deserves attention. While this PhD is not a diachronic analysis and 
therefore unable to indicate how these dilemmas affect MPs over time (see 
Chapter 2), committee members make choices about their roles more generally 
through considering these perennial or everyday dilemmas. 
 
4.3.1. Time commitment 
 
The variety of roles that MPs perform are shaped in part by their priorities as 
representatives as a whole, and, consequently, means that the commitment 
between MPs to their committee work varies substantially. Committees usually 
rely on a ‘core’ band of members (in addition to the chair) to participate and 
drive forward committee work (Interview M-01). At a private meeting of my 
committee, for instance, this numbered four to five MPs who were involved in 
discussions with the chair about all issues regarding committee work, while the 
remaining members (that attended) chipped in only on occasion (FWD 57.13.7). 
Staff have pointed this out, too: 
 
I think committees always, you know, rely on a sort of central core of members 
who are the most engaged, the most knowledgeable and you always have, in 
my experience, a few who don’t turn up that or much, you know, turn up but 
don’t engage or whatever (Interview S-11). 
 
As pointed out earlier, the average attendance rate for MPs was 65.9% over the 
2010 parliament. For some committees, the average attendance fell far below the 
minimum attendance rate of 60% passed through a resolution of the House (see 
Appendix F). However, the aforementioned core members tend to have an 
attendance rate that exceeds 75%, of which there are usually four to five. Other 
than this broad brush attendance figure, quantification of the level of 
commitment for committee work is very difficult, for at least two reasons. First, 
attendance at meetings does not indicate commitment to scrutiny, and therefore 
represents only a coarse proxy for commitment. It does not, for instance, tell us 
how long an MP attended a meeting or how many questions they asked (and 
fieldwork observations indicate that MPs drop in and out of meetings rather 
frequently) or if they understand the topic; moreover, some MPs may well be in 
attendance at meetings but not enjoy their time there, use that time to answer 
Interpreting Parliamentary Scrutiny 
102 
emails or, as in the infamous case of Nigel Mills, to play games on a tablet (BBC 
News, 2014b).13 Second (and in contrast), attending meetings is not the only way 
that MPs contribute to committee scrutiny. An MP may raise committee-related 
issues through Parliamentary Questions (both written and orally) or conduct 
meetings with stakeholders to understand a policy area a little better. In order to 
get a sense of the level of commitment for committee work, I asked interviewees 
about the way that they allocate time and how much of their role is occupied by 
select committee work. Though responses should not be taken at face value 
because they are self-evaluations and likely to be over-estimates, MPs generally 
believed to be spending between one fifth and one quarter of their time working 
towards committee scrutiny (e.g. Interview M-14, Interview M-19). That said, a 
number of MPs also responded that they find it difficult to isolate their select 
committee work, and their scrutiny work of government more generally, from 
other activities that they do (e.g. Interview M-06, Interview M-10). For example, 
one MP serving on the Defence Committee: 
 
I probably spend about 80% of my time looking at defence issues and engage 
with defence. At lots of different levels, whether it’s going to meetings … going 
over to Chatham House, meeting people who are coming to speak in 
Parliament about defence issues and defence-related issues. Probably about  
80% of my time (Interview M-09). 
 
When I asked about the constituency, the MP responded: 
 
I’ll go into schools and they’ll ask me about climate change and I’ll talk about 
defence, and the importance of climate change from looking at the defence of 
the UK, the importance of being able to generate our own electricity and that’s 
why wind is important, that’s why waves are important … going to have to 
look at whether or not fracking is feasible (Interview M-09). 
 
This tells us that MPs’ interpretations of what is important make an impact. This 
can also be regarded as a dilemma in that MPs’ time commitments vary because 
of conflicting choices over time commitments, especially given that MPs’ time is 
at a premium. 
 
 
                                                          
13 For example, one MP spent part of an evidence session inspecting the paintings around 
him (FWD 58.13.17), whilst another (in a separate session) spent the majority of the meeting 
on his iPad and not paying attention to others (FWD 47.11.10). 
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4.3.2. Building expertise 
 
Despite the competing demands placed on MPs, many of them enjoy their time 
on committees. Policy interest is an obvious underpinning that explains why 
MPs serve on committees. As one MP put it: ‘it was a way of really immersing 
myself in an area that I was interested in’ (Interview M-04). In some cases, this 
stems from professional experience before becoming an MP (e.g. Interview M-19, 
Interview C-07). Indeed, one chair noted that the ability to have an effect on 
policy through select committee scrutiny is important to a lot of MPs (Interview 
C-01). One MP noted that it is the ability to set the agenda through a good report 
that is most rewarding for her: ‘wanting to try and make sure we’re not just 
commenting in a vague [way] but trying to actually say something that might 
actually, genuinely make an improvement’ (Interview M-18).  
 
Interest in policy and making a policy difference are often linked to a wider 
ability to build expertise and further the skills of an MP. One MP said that 
consistent involvement in her committee meant that she could be better 
prepared than a newly appointed minister of state before their appearance in 
front of the respective committee, for example (Interview M-10). This feeds into 
a broader point about professional development and continued learning. One 
MP, for instance, explained the move from a regional or territorial committee to 
a departmental committee in order ‘to do something more stretching’ (Interview 
M-09).  
 
This is especially important in the absence of systematic and professional 
training for representatives (Coghill et. al., 2012; Cooper-Thomas and Silvester, 
2014). To overcome this dilemma, MPs use select committees to practise 
scrutiny activity at private and public sessions to pick up effective questioning 
skills, develop different arguments, test ideas on others. During fieldwork, it was 
noticeable that some MPs were practising a point they would want to make later, 
in the chamber or elsewhere (FWD 3.1.12, FWD 52.12.3). This may explain why 
some committee members adopt a more partisan role (to test the weaknesses of 
their opponents) or a learning role (to understand a policy area for other 
parliamentary work). In recent years, select committees have given training to 
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their committee members, usually by experienced QCs or journalists (Interview 
S-08). This seems to indicate a growing awareness of the need for further 
professional training. MPs, on the whole, did not phrase committee service in 
terms of fulfilling a training or rehearsal space. However, it arguably does play a 
role, which would reinforce arguments made by Michael Rush and Philip 
Giddings (2011) in their work that committee service plays a part of socialising 
MPs into parliamentary roles. Both dilemmas covered so far, time commitment 
and building expertise, are significantly affected by the third dilemma, to which 
we now turn. 
 
4.3.3. Multiple loyalties 
 
Irrespective of the proportion of time that MPs say they devote to committee 
(and other) work, and contrary to popular belief and wilful media 
misconceptions, the House of Commons is underpinned by a culture of long 
hours, as evidenced by fieldwork observations, interviews and other research 
(e.g. Weinberg and Cooper, 2003; Weinberg, 2015). One MP said, for instance, 
that she would occasionally be forced to read committee papers at 1.00am 
(Interview M-19); another admitted to having done parliamentary work in 
hospital (Interview M-04). Another MP said that, because a debate finished too 
late one evening and another meeting the next day started too early, he stayed 
overnight in the Palace (FWD 10.3.3). Perhaps unsurprisingly, one MP said that 
he wished for a 30-hour day to help juggle with the work (Interview M-22). 
These things were generally not said to me to impress me; they were passing 
topics as we discussed other issues. Such long hours (and associated stress that 
may result) are driven by the competing pressures or multiple loyalties placed on 
Members, who face a daily dilemma in how they choose to enact their 
representative role. This could include, to name just a few examples: speaking on 
the floor of the House, scrutinising legislation on bill committees, involvement 
with interest groups and non-governmental organisations, addressing 
constituency concerns, participating in All-Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs), 
following campaigns and policy interests, campaigning in their local 
constituency for re-election (or supporting the local association or party more 
generally), hosting visitors and guests at the House, and more. The competing 
demands and fluidity of their role explains, in part, the variable attendance of 
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some committee members. It is not that MPs are not doing work, but rather that 
they are enacted in different ways. In relation to the modes of behaviour 
identified above, it should therefore not come as a surprise that MPs who view 
their constituency as crucial will make sure that this feeds into other work. 
Different MPs will take their cue from their party, though this does not need to 
be conscious. For example, one clerk noted that differing world views mean that 
Conservatives usually voiced a greater role for the market and private sector in 
committee deliberations, while Labour MPs frequently believed that regulators 
need to play a greater role in public service delivery (Interview S-05). Politicians 
remain party animals. It should not be too surprising if some MPs on 
committees adopt the role of party helper or safety net on occasion.  
 
A consequence of multiple loyalties is that MPs tend to get involved in only 
particular inquiries and not all of them. So while chairs keep oversight on the 
committee’s work as a whole, a single MP will get more involved with only some 
inquiries and not others. For example, one MP noted that if it is an inquiry he 
suggested or helped develop, then it would not be uncommon for him to speak to 
the committee’s clerk about the inquiry, help with its general focus and arrive 
early to discuss questioning. In contrast: ‘if it’s an inquiry I’m not particularly 
bothered about, I just arrive and, you know, pitch with whatever. And I think 
that’s the approach that most people adopt’ (Interview M-01).  Indeed, this was 
echoed in other interviews, such as: ‘sometimes one [inquiry] comes through … 
actually, I’m not that interested in this, I’m not that fussed, then I probably 
won’t do very much of any of that’ (Interview M-05).  Some MPs admitted that 
they sometimes did not have the time to prepare for meetings and at other times 
it will happen at the last minute (e.g. Interview M-17, Interview M-23). This 
explains why some MPs adopt a specialist or advocate role in select committees 
(and, indeed, why some take this even further and become a lone wolf). They are 
keen to develop specific interests within a policy area, something caused in part 
through multiple pressures from elsewhere. 
 
A further factor that is often overlooked concerns the social and personal lives of 
representatives, which are frequently perceived to bear little on decision-making. 
The families of MPs matter, though, and so some MPs will prioritise taking their 
children to school on some days, or want to look after their small child but 
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therefore be unable to travel with a committee on field visits (e.g. FWD 12.3.20, 
Interview M-18). The effect of this in terms of stress and strain has been 
documented elsewhere (Weinberg, 2014), yet deserves a comment here because 
it is a further pressure that MPs face in terms of how and with whom they spend 
their time. In addition to family relationships are the social ones between friends, 
who MPs are likely to want to support in Parliament. Some MPs joined a 
committee in part because they are friends with other serving committee 
members (e.g. Interview M-10, Interview M-12). In another case, an MP was 
willing to see past a colleague’s frustrating behaviour at meetings because of the 
bond of friendship between them (Interview M-08). Indeed, some MPs noted 
that friendships and personal relationships are what makes committee work 
rewarding: 
 
The committees can be a lot of fun, you know? The work is very serious, but in 
terms of the personal relationships and the banter, it can be quite fun. And it’s 
the characters. You get to know people in greater depth. This place can be a 
very lonely place. And the people you’re on committee with, because you’ve 
gone away together, you’ve done things together… (Interview M-09). 
 
A chair, similarly, noted friendships he has made out of the process (Interview 
C-04). These personal and social factors are important because they, too, affect 
representatives’ choices (for a discussion on parliamentary friendships, see 
Childs, 2014). It is additionally a factor to consider when thinking about 
relationships between committee members and the sense of performance ‘teams’ 
(see Chapter 7). More generally, this dilemma feeds into a broader point about 
parliamentary life and the motivation on the part of representatives to establish 
a sense of ordinariness. 
 
4.3.4. Willed ordinariness 
 
The choices that MPs make over their commitment to scrutiny is made more 
difficult because, as one MP explained, parliamentary timetables are 
increasingly ‘crashing into one another’ (Interview M-07). One member 
explained that, because of these difficulties, she left one committee and joined a 
different one (Interview M-03). More broadly, given executive control of the 
parliamentary timetable, MPs’ everyday behaviour and their commitments are 
governed by factors outside their control that can make their role unpredictable 
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at times, possibly chaotic. This dilemma was noticeable during fieldwork, where 
a range of MPs changed their interview time and location with me, sometimes on 
more than one occasion and only with very little notice (FWD 36.9.6, FWD 
31.8.5, and FWD 51.12.11, FWD 56.13.9). Others were rushed or busy throughout 
the interview.14 One chair noted that regular committee meetings are a ‘constant’ 
on an otherwise fragmented parliamentary agenda (Interview C-02). Another 
chair commented: 
 
As an MP you are subject to a blizzard of information, questions, interactions, 
of every sort and the, being on a select committee allows you to … focus on an 
area of policy and within that area of policy on specific strands for a sustained 
period in-depth and, so, there’s a certain joy in being able to do something 
which isn’t passing and … is in fact, you know, allows for a sort of deep 
reflection and continued learning. So, from a personal point of view, being on a 
select committee offers a real opportunity to feel that you’re getting to grips 
with some of the big issues in an area and by dint of the position we hold, 
influence policy (Interview C-06). 
 
This quote demonstrates a theme of not only gratification and policy interest, 
but the fact that it is part of a long-term routine. Other MPs have pointed 
towards something similar. For instance: ‘for me, select committee stuff 
provides a kind of structure of parliamentary life’ (Interview M-01), and, ‘the 
vast bulk of my work is through the [XX] Committee and things that flow from 
that’ (Interview M-06). Both MPs have a strong interest in their respective policy 
areas, and use committee work as a basis to work from. This goes on to feed into 
other work that they conduct, both of which are also woven into their 
professional experiences before becoming MPs. Another former committee 
member contrasted his role with PPS work: 
 
The main difference, I would say, between the two is that the select committee 
work was a bit more structured. You knew when the meetings were coming up, 
or the trips, and you knew the process of … we always [met] on a Monday. So 
you would get the papers for the following meeting normally on the Thursday 
before it. So I knew I had the weekend to read through it and, you know, edit 
draft reports … the PPS role is, you know, more variable and less structured 
than the select committee (Interview M-22). 
 
                                                          
14 Examples of this: Interview M-05, Interview M-10, Interview M-17, Interview C-06, and 
Interview C-08 (see also: FWD 52.12.15 and FWD 52.12.15). Some also forgot who I was 
almost immediately after the interview took place (see FWD 53.12.5, FWD 56.13.24, and 
FWD 58.13.8). 
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This factor is often overlooked, yet arguably important because of the complexity 
of the role of being a representative and the many competing demands that MPs 
face. It gives MPs the opportunity to have a sense of focus and expertise that 
they would otherwise not have. Moreover, it is a way to overcome a loneliness 
that some MPs have noted in interviews (e.g. Interview M-10, Interview M-12; 
see also FWD 53.12.9, FWD 57.13.20, FWD 57.13.21). To put it into the language 
of Chapter 2, it is a way to ‘willed ordinariness’. Whilst it could easily be argued 
that due to the time pressure, MPs would benefit from not attending committee 
meetings, most nonetheless believe that committee commitments actually help 
to manage their time better. 
 
MPs face other dilemmas that could not be examined in detail here (including 
harassment by the public and security concerns (James, Farnham, et. al., 2016; 
James, Sukhwal, et. al., 2016), and, more generally, their demonisation by the 
media (Flinders, 2012b)). The four factors of time commitment, building 
expertise, multiple loyalties and willed ordinariness seek to show the fluidity of 
being a representative in the House of Commons. In making choices about these 
dilemmas, some committee members emphasise their constituency role, others 
are likely to adopt more specialist roles. The key point is that these are everyday 
or perennial dilemmas that affect MPs’ choices about their role. Frequently, 
being an active member of a select committee is only one way to enact their 
scrutiny role, and in any case makes up only one element of the wider role in 
Parliament (no matter how central). The variable commitment by members 
means that MPs often rely on parliamentary staff for briefing material and other 
committee support. 15  As Chapter 6 reveals, staff are all too aware of the 
competing demands on MPs’ time, who consequently seek to support MPs as 
rigorously as possible (e.g. Interview S-04, Interview S-10). However, one of the 
consequences for the variance is that staff tend to focus more energy on their 
chair’s priorities. Indeed, the chair’s involvement in committee work is pervasive. 
They are, as the subsequent chapter will demonstrate, likely to prepare for every 
meeting and evidence session, which MPs – by and large – do not do (e.g. 
Interview C-08). That isn’t to say that committee members play a lesser role on 
committees, but rather that they play a different role. 
 
                                                          
15 MPs, on the whole, do not employ staff to support their select committee (two exceptions: 
Interview M-08 and Interview M-20). 
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Concluding remarks 
 
Being an MP is complex and contested, with no right answer. This is arguably 
linked to the idea, raised by others, that Parliament rarely acts as a collective 
entity (Power, 2007; Wright, 2004). One MP summarised the role through the 
metaphor of a jigsaw, worth quoting at length: 
 
The role of a Member of Parliament is like a jigsaw. Okay? And there are many 
pieces of the jigsaw and … now, is the [XX] Committee, is it the corner of the 
jigsaw? Is it the edge of the jigsaw? Is it the heart of the jigsaw? I don’t know, 
because everything is jumbled up. … They are pieces of the jigsaw, of the 
totality of being a Member of Parliament on a select committee, constituency 
MP, a parliamentarian, that … the great joy of this job is that it’s not a factory 
production line where 9 o’clock on Mondays is the same as 2 o’clock on 
Mondays is the same as 9 o’clock on Tuesday, et cetera, et cetera (Interview M-
15, emphasis added). 
 
This quote encapsulates many themes of this chapter. The chapter shows that 
being a Member of Parliament is an interpretive endeavour, and that their 
diverse individual beliefs push and pull committees in different directions. 
Crucially, select committees are not single-purpose institutional entities that 
allows the House of Commons to scrutinise the activities of the executive. The 
role of committees is far broader: they can act as rehearsal spaces for party 
politics in the main chamber; a tool to build expertise and learn about policy 
areas; as a mechanism to represent and serve the interests of constituents; a way 
by which MPs escape the tumult of adversarial politics; and, indeed, to scrutinise 
government policy and hold ministers to account. This chapter has focused 
precisely on this diversity, and in doing so indicated that individual beliefs of 
committee members matters to scrutiny. Furthermore, committee members do 
not just interpret their role in different ways but also enact or perform their role 
through everyday practices in select committees. Their performance styles are 
not fixed or total, but I would suggest that they are recurring and recognisable 
dispositions. The performer and the performance may differ from session to 
session (or from stage to stage), but the elements seem present frequently on 
many occasions in committee rooms. It is likely that MPs adapt performance 
styles and tailor them, perhaps even enmeshing different styles together.  
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MPs’ everyday practices and individual beliefs are also shaped in response to 
dilemmas that they face in enacting their scrutiny roles. These tensions reveal 
issues regarding committee members’ time commitments, professional 
development and skills, multiple (and sometimes dividing) loyalties, and a 
desire to tame their unstructured world through willed ordinariness. This has 
shown that, for some, the scrutiny role is the centre-piece for MPs’ work in 
Parliament, yet for many others there are an abundance of other ways to piece 
together the role. This, then, opens further questions about select committees 
that go beyond this chapter, including the extent to which we can identify or 
generalise the findings presented here, or if there are other styles that deserve 
further attention. More generally, this chapter also questions what the current 
scholarship on Parliament might otherwise regard as an ‘effective committee’. 
Clearly this must go beyond the policy impact because committees do not serve 
only as accountability mechanisms. This chapter contributes to the debate and 
literature in parliamentary studies through opening up new ways of thinking 
about select committees as sites of performing politics. This perspective is 
arguably not something that the current literature has often taken into account 
and therefore indicates a distinctive and original contribution to debates within 
and beyond parliamentary studies. This has been done by focusing on the 
individual beliefs of MPs, their everyday practices or performance styles, and 
how they negotiate dilemmas that they face in enacting their role. In arguing 
that MPs push and pull parliamentary scrutiny in a variety of different directions, 
it seems that other actors have to try to bring coherence to their performances. 
There is no single more important actor able to do this than the chair, and it is to 
this specific role that the thesis now turns. 
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Chapter 5: Chairs 
 
 
 
 
lthough the last chapter has given a broad overview of how committee 
members interpret their role, it has only touched briefly on the 
importance of the role of the chairing MP, and it is to those 
parliamentary actors that our analysis shifts. The reputation of chairs of 
committees has noticeably changed over the course of the last five years (as this 
chapter will  show). Increasingly, they are perceived to be carving out a 
distinctive role in parliamentary politics and, perhaps, in British politics more 
widely. However, despite high profile media performances and speeches, chairs 
have arguably remained somewhat understudied, with only anecdotal references 
to the importance of chairs in analyses of select committees in academic work 
(exceptions include Kelso, 2016; White, 2015b, 2015c). In an attempt to shed 
further light on chairs, this chapter asks how chairs interpret their role and what 
this means for everyday parliamentary scrutiny by select committees. The 
chapter is divided into three sections (summarised in Table 5.1). First, I explore 
the institutional and historical context, or situated agency, of chairs. Though 
this was partly covered in Chapter 1, here I focus specifically on the role of chair 
and how chairs themselves have assessed recent changes to their role 
(particularly since 2010). It reveals that chairs have a renewed sense of authority 
through the introduction of direct elections, which indicates that the belief in an 
alternative career in the House of Commons away from a traditional ministerial 
route has been strengthened and may be consolidated further over the course of 
the 2015 parliament. Second, I turn to the different ways by which chairs 
interpret their role on committees and, as a result, how they seek to enact or 
perform this scrutiny role (beliefs and practices). Here, I identify two  
A 
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Table 5.1. Analysing committee chairs 
Situated 
agency 
Here, analysis begins by locating the role of chair in its historical and 
institutional context, including the importance of direct election since 
2010 and how this has given chairs a renewed sense of authority and 
independence. 
Beliefs and 
practices 
In this second section, analytical focus shifts to how chairs interpret their 
role. This identifies a spectrum on which chairs are placed, with 
committee-orientated catalysts at one end and leadership-orientated 
chieftains at the other end. 
Negotiating 
dilemmas 
This covers some of the key dilemmas that chairs face in enacting their 
role. These dilemmas, including leading committees, developing norms 
and values, and representing Parliament, dispose chairs to become 
catalysts or chieftains. 
Summary: In sum, and echoing the previous chapter, these concepts show that committee 
scrutiny depends not on committees’ formal powers but also the everyday practices and 
interpretations of its members. This is especially pronounced for the chair of a committee, 
who will have to make choices about their committee or leadership orientation, their ability 
to develop performance teams or a group ethos, and their ability to represent Parliament in 
different ways. In order to fulfil their role, chairs often adopt either adopt the role of 
catalyst, which is more orientated towards the committee and its members, or the role of 
chieftain, in which the chair’s strategic priorities prevail. 
 
performance styles at opposing ends of a spectrum along which chairs enact 
their role. This introduces committee-orientated catalysts, on the one hand, and 
leadership-orientated chieftains, on the other. These two roles have become 
especially important because of the influence that chairs have over committee 
proceedings more generally. In order to understand these two roles, I examine 
(in the third section) how chairs negotiate their beliefs about their role with 
reference to dilemmas they face in enacting their role. Here, I focus on three 
particular challenges: (i) chairs’ approaches to leading committees; (ii) their role 
in building norms and values or performance ‘teams’; and (iii) the choices that 
chairs make to represent their committee beyond the committee corridor. In 
negotiating these three factors, chairs have to make choices about the kind of 
chair that they would like to be, which usually involves being pushed either 
towards a committee-orientated approach (catalysts) or a leadership-orientated 
approach (chieftains). In sum, this reveals that, just like committee members, 
chairs push and pull committees in different directions. However, and crucially, 
chairs have significantly more influence than committee members (as we will see 
below), and so how they push and pull matters for scrutiny processes as a whole. 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Chairs 
113 
5.1. Situating chairs: from selection to election 
 
This first section echoes some issues raised in Chapter 1, but here, specifically, 
presents an opportunity to reflect on the historical development of the role or 
position of chair. In order to do this, this section is split into three further sub-
sections: first, a brief overview of the development of committees with reference 
to chairs; second, a summary of the 2010 elections; and, third, an assessment of 
the changes introduced since 2010. 
 
5.1.1. The introduction and development of committees 
 
The system of committees introduced in 1979 was the culmination of debates 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s (and, indeed, longer into the past). One of the 
aims of creating the system of select committees was not only to enhance the 
scrutiny of government, but additionally to introduce a greater range of 
parliamentary roles in British politics and, ultimately, allow for alternative 
parliamentary careers to develop. The Procedure Committee’s report of 1978, on 
which the current committee system is based, recommended: 
 
Although it may be premature to regard select committees as providing an 
alternative ‘career structure’ for Members there are indications that some 
Members do regard select committee work in this light, and our structural 
proposals, if implemented, are likely to further that tendency. We regard this as 
wholly desirable, and believe that the work and responsibilities of select 
committees, and in particular of the chairmen [sic], should be recognised by the 
House. We recommend that consideration should be given to the payment of a 
modest additional salary to the chairmen of select committees, perhaps on the 
same level as the salaries of parliamentary undersecretaries in the 
Government… We believe that the extension of this principle to the chairmen of 
select committees would be both desirable for its own sake, and could also 
provide some element of a career opportunity in the House not wholly in the gift 
of party leaders (quoted in Maer et. al., 2009). 
 
Neither of the two proposals – an increased salary or an independent method of 
appointing chairs – were implemented the following year, which, though it made 
the introduction of committees more palatable to the government (arguably 
reinforcing a broader political tradition of executive dominance in British 
politics), meant that the incentives for an alternative career path were watered 
down. Though the system of committees was warmly received when it was 
introduced, some had reservations. For example, Nevil Johnson (1988, pp.181-2) 
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concluded that – though positive of the development of committee scrutiny 
overall – committees have not provided an alternative career structure for 
parliamentarians, and that chairs ‘have not generally become dominating figures 
in Parliament, shadow ministers, or anything like that’. This may, in part, be due 
to the weakness in how chairs were selected. As Chapter 1 summarised, this was 
arranged through the whips, who were not afraid to remove critics from chairing 
committees (as happened, for example, when Conservative Party whips 
prohibited an MP from continuing to chair the Health Committee following the 
1992 general election (Davies, 1992)).  
 
Pressure to reform select committees increased after New Labour’s election 
victory in 1997, and especially when backbench MPs believed whips were 
overreaching themselves (e.g. in 2001, whips were forced to reinstate two chairs 
after the House voted down proposals to reconvene committees without 
including two vocal critics of government (Kelso, 2003)). Eventually, one of the 
Procedure Committee’s proposals from 1978 was introduced: an additional 
salary for chairs. These changes were agreed by the House in May 2002 and 
implemented in time for the 2003-04 session, which gave MPs an additional 
£12,500 for their work as chairs of committees (which increased annually in line 
with MPs’ salaries), amounting to an increase of 20% in an MP’s income. By 
2015, a chair would receive £15,025 in addition to an MP’s basic salary of 
£74,000 (Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, 2013, Annex B). This, 
in addition to other changes (introduction of core tasks and Liaison Committee 
evidence sessions with the prime minister, for example), arguably strengthened 
the select committee system (for a discussion, see Flinders, 2007). However, 
these changes were not universally welcomed by some MPs, including some 
chairs of committees. Gwyneth Dunwoody (chair of the Transport Committee 
between 1997 and 2008), for instance, feared that an increased salary would 
make chairships another ‘office of patronage’ given that whips still appointed 
committee members (HC Deb 14 May 2002, c662). This finally changed in 2010 
following the introduction of the Wright reforms (see Chapter 1 for a summary 
and Russell (2011) for a discussion). These reforms introduced direct elections 
for select committee chairs by the whole House for the first time. 
 
  
Table 5.2. Select committee chairs, 2010-15 
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What happened in 2015? 
Business, Innovation and Skills Adrian Bailey L M 64 2000 10      Lost chair election 
Communities and Local Government Clive Betts L M 60 1992 18      Re-elected as chair 
Culture, Media and Sport John Whittingdale C M 50 1992 13      Became secretary of state 
Defence (2010-14) James Arbuthnot C M 57 1987 18      Stood down 
Defence (2014-15) Rory Stewart C M 41 2010 4      Became junior minister 
Education Graham Stuart C M 48 2005 5      Lost (different) chair election 
Energy and Climate Change Tim Yeo C M 65 1983 27      Deselected 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Anne McIntosh C F 60 1997 13      Deselected 
Environmental Audit  Joan Walley L F 61 1987 23      Stood down 
European Scrutiny Committee William Cash C M 70 1984 26      Re-selected 
Foreign Affairs Richard Ottaway C M 64 1983* 23      Stood down 
Health (2010-14) Stephen Dorrell C M 58 1979 31      Stood down 
Health (2014-15) Sarah Wollaston C F 52 2010 4      Re-elected as chair 
Home Affairs Keith Vaz L M 54 1987 20      Re-elected as chair 
International Development Malcolm Bruce LD M 65 1983 22      Stood down 
Justice Alan Beith LD M 67 1973 37      Stood down 
Northern Ireland Affairs Laurence Robertson C M 52 1997 13      Re-elected as chair 
Political and Constitutional Reform Graham Allen L M 57 1987 23      Committee not re-constituted 
Public Accounts Margaret Hodge L M 65 1994 16      Chose not to run for chair 
Public Administration Bernard Jenkin C M 51 1992 18      Re-elected as chair 
Science and Technology Andrew Miller L M 61 1992 17      Stood down 
Scottish Affairs Ian Davidson L M 59 1992 18      Lost seat 
Transport Louise Ellman L F 64 1997 13      Re-elected as chair 
Treasury Andrew Tyrie C M 53 1997 13      Re-elected as chair 
Welsh Affairs David TC Davies C M 40 2005 5      Re-elected as chair 
Work and Pensions Anne Begg L F 54 1997 13      Lost seat 
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5.1.2. Trends in electing chairs 
 
The process of directly electing chairs in 2010 was conducted swiftly. Chairs 
were allocated to parties on 23 May 2010 (this allocation is informally decided 
by the usual channels but approved by the whole House (see HC SO No. 
122B(2)-(5)), and nominations closed two weeks later, on 08 June. Voting took 
place the next day. This arguably limited the opportunities for debates between 
candidates or to conduct committee-specific hustings. The results were 
announced on 10 June (see Table 5.2). Of 23 positions, seven of these were 
uncontested. 16  Propensity to stand for election may be reduced by an 
incumbency factor – of these seven cases, four were contested by a chair seeking 
re-election (just over half). Indeed, though this particular election was contested, 
one interviewee told me that he did not stand for election as chair of the Defence 
Committee because James Arbuthnot was ‘entitled’ to a second term and, ‘I 
didn’t feel it would be justified my opposing him’ (Interview C-04). Elections in 
the 2015 parliament seem to reinforce this view, in which eight incumbents were 
seeking re-election for 12 unopposed posts (two thirds). In 2010, two 
incumbents faced challengers: James Arbuthnot for Defence (three challengers); 
and Keith Vaz for Home Affairs (one challenger). Both incumbents were re-
elected. In 2015, three incumbents faced challengers: Adrian Bailey for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (two challengers); Keith Vaz for Home Affairs (one 
challenger); and, Sarah Wollaston for Health (one challenger). In this case, 
Adrian Bailey lost to Iain Wright, while the others won re-election. In 2010, 56 
candidates put themselves forward for 23 chairships (or 49 MPs for 16 contested 
posts), while 57 stood in 2015 for an equivalent number of chairships (or 47 MPs 
for 13 contested posts). In 2014, there were also two by-elections: for Defence, in 
which eight candidates stood; and for Health, in which five candidates stood. 
The election of chairs of committees in 2015 had a small change in that there 
was a week between the close of nominations and election day, which formalised 
a period in which candidates were able to gather support, campaign amongst 
their colleagues, and even circulate election literature. Though unsuccessful in 
                                                          
16 24 chairs were elected on 10 June 2010 but, as pointed out in Chapter 3, the focus of this 
thesis excludes domestic and internal committees (thereby excluding the twenty-fourth chair 
elected, i.e. the chair of the Procedure Committee). The chair of the European Scrutiny 
Committee is not elected by the House, and the chair of the Liaison Committee is chosen 
after these elections take place. 
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his bid, Barry Gardiner’s leaflet seems the most memorable, where he circulated 
tree leaves with ‘Leave Environmental Audit For Barry Gardiner’ written on 
them (other literature, written on standard paper, was distributed by Huw 
Irranca-Davies, Bob Neill and Phillip Lee). The UK Parliament website also 
published a statement for each candidate that sought a chairship (UK 
Parliament, 2015b). These trends in 2015 indicate that the system introduced in 
2010 has been consolidated and is possibly becoming more established and 
sophisticated.17 The competition for positions also demonstrates that these are 
sought-after positons that increasingly carry respect and influence amongst MPs 
and possibly by the media (e.g. White, 2016). In order to assess this, it is worth 
reflecting on chairs’ own assessments of directly electing chairs. 
 
5.1.3. Assessing the impact of electing chairs 
 
Every chair that I interviewed welcomed the Wright reforms, particularly with 
regards to their election. One interviewee, who had been chair of a departmental 
select committee both before and after the Wright reforms noted that it has 
‘raised the status of committees very significantly and given them more 
autonomy and independence’ (Interview C-01; see also Interview C-07). This 
was echoed by another chair, who described the change as ‘huge’ (Interview C-
04).18 Indeed, wider assessments by the Institute for Government (White, 2015c), 
the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (PCRC, 2013) and the 
Liaison Committee (Liaison Committee, 2012a) conclude that elections to 
committees have had an important impact in this respect. In particular, the 
election of chairs seems to have increased respect and prestige not only amongst 
fellow backbench MPs, but also among government ministers and, perhaps most 
importantly, outside Parliament through increased coverage of committees in 
the media (Dunleavy and Muir, 2013).19 The conception of greater independence, 
mixed with an electoral process that reaches all sides of the House, means that, 
                                                          
17 Most recently, there was a by-election for the chair of the Environmental Audit Committee 
after Irranca-Davies stepped down in January 2016. Four contenders put themselves 
forward, and Mary Creagh was elected to chair the committee the following month. 
18 That said, another interviewee thought that ‘huge’ was a bit of an overstatement (Interview 
C-10).  
19 Initially, I was of the view that elections gave committee chairs a sense of ‘legitimacy’, but 
this was rebuked by chairs themselves who said that they hoped they had been legitimate in 
their role before 2010, despite interference from whips (e.g. Interview C-05). 
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increasingly, chairs conceive of themselves as playing a ‘House role’. One clerk 
noted: 
 
The chair, if he’s giving a talk to outside groups, will start with, “The big 
change in 2010 was: I am elected by the whole House, I represent he whole 
House…”. They all do this (Interview S-03). 
 
This was reinforced through interviews with chairs themselves. One chair: 
 
I just get the sense that all of the elected committee chairs have been 
empowered by that [being elected]. That they feel they’ve got a House role. 
That they’ve been endorsed by people across the House, not just from their own 
side. And I think that’s given us greater licence to speak up and out (Interview 
C-05). 
 
It was echoed by another chair who said that being elected by peers means that it 
‘enhances their status in Parliament’ (Interview C-07). A further chair noted 
that he is obliged to the House as a whole for his election, and not his committee, 
as he would have been previously. In his view, this has strengthened the 
leadership role of chairs vis-à-vis committee members (Interview C-04). Indeed, 
the election of chairs has arguably had an unforeseen effect on their 
relationships with MPs in that it has changed the lines of accountability. Chairs 
are now in theory, if not in practice, accountable to their committee colleagues in 
a different way because their source of legitimacy comes from the whole House, 
who will have campaigned on specific platforms and been elected before the rest 
of the membership is known. Even if a committee did not like its chair and 
sought to remove them through a vote of no confidence, this would arguably 
override the legitimacy of the House (though this has not been put to the test yet) 
(Interview S-05). This is a key difference to the old system of appointing the 
select committee membership, from which the chair is subsequently chosen. 
While this does not necessarily reduce the accountability of the chair to the 
committee, it does change its nature.20 Ultimately, it means that committee 
chairs are more likely to be able to ‘follow their own agenda without much 
reference back to the committee’ (Interview S-04, FWD 36.9.9). This allows 
chairs to take the initiative, such as calling for evidence or inquiries without 
                                                          
20 This is particularly the case for opposition chairs, who do not have a majority on their 
committee but who do have the endorsement of the House. The full effects of this deserves 
much further scholarly attention, but unfortunately reaches beyond the scope of this 
doctoral thesis. 
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necessarily getting approval from the committee. This has arguably been 
accentuated because, in 2010, the large turnover in MPs meant that there were 
far higher numbers of inexperienced members serving on committees. This is 
likely to have had an impact on the ability of chairs to lead committee 
proceedings, especially because committee members were also elected much 
later than chairs. 
 
In one important respect with regards to chairs, however, the Wright Committee 
did not succeed in changing the balance of power: the allocation of chairs, which 
remains in the hands of party whips. A number of MPs pointed out that this is 
something that still needs to be addressed (e.g. Interview M-02). One chair 
believed that if whips did not like someone’s chairship of a particular committee, 
they could offer that committee to the opposing party (Interview C-06). This 
horse-trading by the usual channels could have significant consequences. Paul 
Flynn, MP for Newport West (in South Wales), explained that this remaining 
power affected the chairship elections of the Welsh Affairs Committee, in which 
32 of 40 Welsh representatives were denied the chance to lead the committee 
because it was allocated to the Conservative Party (Flynn, 2012, p.34). While 
interviewees gossiped about whips a little, ultimately none of us knew the secret 
of how whips allocated chairs or how to fairly resolve the issues (e.g. Interview S-
09). This opens a question about the role of the whips more widely, and we can 
only say at this stage that the lid on the black box of the whips remains closed. 
 
This section reveals that, since 1979, the role of chairs has changed. Over time, 
chairs have become more respected figures in the House of Commons. This was 
accentuated in the early 2000s through reforms to chairships and the role of 
committees more generally. However, the election of chairs in 2010 changed the 
dynamic and appeal of committees, who are now perceived as more independent 
from partisan influences than at any point in the past (though, clearly, the usual 
channels are still influential). This gives chairs, as an above interviewee put it, a 
greater licence to speak freely and adopt a wider ‘House role’ to represent 
Parliament (an underlying theme for this chapter). This touches on how 
individual chairs interpret their role on select committees, to which discussion 
now turns. 
 
Interpreting Parliamentary Scrutiny 
120 
 
5.2. How do chairs interpret their role? 
 
As with ordinary committee members, a starting point in my interviews with 
chairs was to ask them to identify how they would interpret parliamentary 
scrutiny and why it was an important part of their role more generally as an MP. 
There is broad agreement by chairs across parties that effective scrutiny is 
important to ensure that governments are held to account and their policies 
made more robust. One chair noted that it was about making sure that ‘the 
government is getting it right’ by offering them information and evidence from 
a different perspective (Interview C-05). Another chair argued that ‘the country 
is better governed if effective scrutiny takes place’ (Interview C-01), echoing 
Robin Cook’s comment in 2001 that ‘good scrutiny makes for good government’ 
(Modernisation Committee, 2001, para 2). Andrew Tyrie, chair of the Treasury 
Committee since 2010 (and Liaison Committee since 2015), calls it ‘government 
by explanation’ (Tyrie, 2011, 2015). These are widely shared and unsurprising 
beliefs and, in that sense, do not offer anything distinctively new to how we 
understand select committees. However, our knowledge beyond this, and 
understanding precisely how chairs contribute to sentiments of ‘good’ scrutiny, 
is less well known. This was a focus for both my interviews with chairs and my 
observations during fieldwork, and forms the central focus of this chapter. 
Before examining how chairs interpret and enact their role, it is worth briefly 
summarising why MPs chose to run for chair in the first place. 
 
5.2.1. Becoming chair 
 
Most chairs – similarly to many committee members (see Chapter 4) – were 
extremely interested in their policy area. This often sparked their involvement in 
select committee work. One chair, for instance, explained: ‘I’ve always loved 
select committee work because I think you can really get your teeth into 
something’ (Interview C-05). Policy interest, and the added hope of making a 
policy difference, drove MPs to aim for a chairship. One chair commented that: 
 
Well, I’ve been interested, obviously, in [XX] policy for the best part of a 
quarter of a century now, so … I knew that in the parliament that was going to 
be elected in 2010, I wanted to be active outside the Commons as well as inside 
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it. So, I wasn’t likely to be … so I wasn’t wanting to be a minister. But I wanted 
to play a part in policy development and the select committee chair provided 
an opportunity to do that (Interview C-10).  
 
Another chair said:  
 
As soon as I saw the Coalition chose not to go for [the committee], whoosh, I’m 
in and made it, nominated myself. There was no, you know, dream job for me. 
Thoroughly enjoyed it (Interview C-03).  
 
Both quotes reveal not only the interest of the chair in a policy area, but also 
allude to the lingering effects of the usual channels in allocating chairs and the 
partisan nature of politics, which has prevented some MPs from becoming chairs 
earlier in their career. Two further chairs (one Labour and one Conservative) 
expressed this explicitly: 
 
I’ve never really particularly been interested in being a minister and I, you 
know, as I said, I loved the select committee work and I’ve really enjoyed it and 
I had dropped a hint to the whips in previous parliaments and – because it was 
in the gift of the whips. So when it wasn’t in the gift of the whips and even 
before the [general] election as I knew it was going to be elected, well, if I get 
through then that’s what I want to do. And I was lucky enough to win. … So, 
yeah, taken out of the hands of the whips, I suspect I might not have got it … 
had it not been for the open election (Interview C-05). 
 
MG: Do you think you would have become chair if the whips still had control of 
committees? 
I: No. 
MG: No, okay. That’s interesting. 
I: I’m pretty well certain! [laughter] 
MG: Just thought I’d ask. 
I: Well, if I was the whips, I wouldn’t have made me chair. … More because 
they have their own, they might have done it for the fairest reasons, but more 
likely, they would have chosen someone who had served in shadow ministerial 
office and they felt, you know, deserved something … (Interview C-06). 
 
Taken together with the previous section, this indicates quite strongly that 
becoming a chair of a select committee can be a route to an alternative 
parliamentary career, something which only became possible because it was no 
longer determined by the usual channels (interviewees echoed this: Interview C-
07, Interview C-06). Once elected as chair, MPs have the opportunity to fashion 
their role as they wish, which has a considerable impact on the committee’s work 
as a whole.  
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Being chair has an impact on other parliamentary activity. Indeed, as earlier 
discussions about assessments of the Wright reforms and the motivations to 
become a chair have both shown, the role of chair has become increasingly 
representative and outward-facing. It has also increased the workload for chairs, 
who have fundamentally changed their parliamentary role. One high-profile 
chair remarked: 
 
It’s my role in Parliament. It’s completely my role in Parliament. Sadly. I mean 
the thing I miss is I don’t have time to spend in the chamber and where I would 
like (Interview C-08). 
 
Another chair echoed that he spent far less time in the chamber because of the 
amount of work that chairs have to do (Interview C-03). A further chair put it 
like this: 
 
Today I’ve had a select committee meeting. I’ve had lunch with [a] journalist 
talking about the select committee. I’ve got you talking about the select 
committee. I’ve got somebody coming in from a [charity] talking about the 
select committee, and I’ve got something else on, after that. I’ve got Liaison 
Committee, which I’m only on because I’m chair of the select committee 
(Interview C-05). 
 
She accepted that this had an impact on her other roles: ‘something’s had to give 
and I don’t do nearly as much in the constituency because I, you know, even at 
weekends I’ve got so much reading to do’ (this was also echoed in Interview C-
02). However, other chairs played down the extent to which the role of being 
chair had an impact on their constituency role. Some acknowledged that there 
has been an impact, but the trade-off has not been between their select 
committee and their constituency, but between the committee and other 
engagements in Westminster (such as speaking in debates, all-party 
parliamentary groups, etc.) (Interview C-09, Interview C-07). It may also be 
affected if the chair’s seat is regarded as ‘safe’ or ‘marginal’ by their party. One 
chair, who did not believe that his constituency work was affected, said that: ‘I 
work, pretty much, what most people would consider a normal working week 
on my [committee] role’, and his other activities are on top of that (Interview C-
06). This shows that even if chairs separate their activities or seek to balance 
them in some way, the effect is a greater commitment to a specific policy area 
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(Interview C-07). It raises questions about the pressures that chairs, and MPs 
more generally, may have to overcome in order to be able to commit to their role 
(as discussed in Chapter 4). For one chair, this involved three breakfast meetings 
in a single week, for example (Interview C-05). That is not to suggest that chairs 
do not find their work rewarding. One chair, for example, remarked that her 
position is a privileged one, and that the most rewarding part of her job is being 
able to contribute to better policy-making in her field (Interview C-02).  
 
As a consequence of the changing role of chair, there have been debates about 
committee resources. One chair said that, ‘some additional resources are 
needed to assist chairs because the demands placed upon them now, because 
they are elected, are much, much greater’ (Interview C-01). He went on to 
describe his outward-facing role and that the House of Commons Service is 
currently stretched in this area. This is a view that has been echoed by other 
interviewees, as well as the Liaison Committee more generally (Liaison 
Committee, 2012a). It indicates a wider shift in attitude and purpose of 
committees and their work. My committee’s chair, for instance, has been 
frustrated through the lack of resources, and wished to see the role of the 
committee expand further to allow it to commission and undertake its own 
primary research, and possibly work more closely with think tanks and 
professional groups to undertake and commission more original research (FWD 
21.5.8). Another clerk noted how his chair wanted to be able to consult a panel of 
experts on a range of issues relevant to his policy area (Interview S-03). The key 
point to take from this is that, for most MPs that take on this position, the role of 
chair encapsulates their wider role in Parliament. However, this still leaves us 
with questions as to how chairs interpret their role and what chairs actually do 
with their role. 
 
5.2.2. Identifying performance styles: catalysts versus chieftains 
 
With the exception of best practice guidelines published by the Liaison 
Committee (2012a, paras 94-100), there is no job specification for the role of 
chair, nor any written set of criteria that chairs should exhibit. This means that 
the position of chair is, at least in theory, very much open to interpretation for 
the office-holder. One chair explained that, as a result, he learnt about his role 
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by reflecting on how other chairs, including his predecessor, behaved. He saw 
what worked and what did not work for them, and changed his role accordingly 
(his comments were made after the audio recorder was turned off – comments 
noted in FWD 53.12.14). A committee member similarly noted that his chair had 
changed over time (becoming less dismissive and more respectful of 
parliamentary processes) (Interview M-08). This indicates that socialisation 
processes do play a role in how chairs (indeed, parliamentary actors more widely) 
interpret their role (Rush and Giddings, 2011). Similar to the previous chapter, I 
weave together individual beliefs and everyday practices to identify performance 
styles that chairs adopt. However, different to the previous chapter, I do not 
examine a number of discrete performance styles, but rather indicate that there 
is a spectrum along which chairs choose to sit, ranging from committee-
orientated catalysts, on the one hand, and leadership-orientated chieftains, on 
the other. In this sub-section, I very briefly summarise the two ends of the 
spectrum. In the next section, I examine the consequences of adopting those 
roles in negotiating dilemmas. 
 
Turning first to committee-orientated interpretations, one chair explained his 
role as a ‘catalyst’ (Interview C-10). By this, he meant that he was to act as a 
facilitator for discussions within the committee and to steer the committee to 
find cross-party agreement. This interpretation arguably maintains a traditional, 
committee-orientated view of the role of chair, in which they approach their role 
in tandem with the wider interests of the committee and make sure that other 
members of the committee play a key role in scrutinising the government. One 
chair, for instance, said that it is part of her role to ‘spot the different skills that 
people have and allow them to flourish’ (Interview C-05). Thus, chairs lead 
inquiries by allowing committee members to develop lines of questioning and 
fostering a group ethos throughout agenda-setting, evidence-gathering and 
report-writing stages of inquiries. This gives committee members a sense of 
ownership over the committee’s agenda. This type of performance style was 
arguably often adopted by the chair of the Business, Innovation and Skills 
Committee, Adrian Bailey; Work and Pensions Committee, Dame Anne Begg; 
and Health Committee, Stephen Dorrell.  
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On the other side of the spectrum, other chairs adopt a more leadership-focused 
approach to their role, such as this one: 
 
I see myself as in a guardianship role on behalf of the committee as a whole 
and on behalf of Parliament, and it’s very important that what I do is on behalf 
of the whole committee and on behalf of Parliament and can be, and I’m 
accountable to them. Within that, however, it’s, there is a strong leadership 
role to be a source of ideas and to stimulate thinking about what the 
committee’s programme should be … And within that framework, it is 
occasionally right for the select committee chairman [sic] to use that position 
to say, you know, to … raise the profile of a particular issue or events as part of 
the accountability process (Interview C-04). 
 
These are – to caricature – select committee chieftains, in that they believe more 
strongly in their own strategic priorities, as the above quote seeks to illustrate. A 
strong leadership-orientated chair does not necessarily lead to a less inclusive 
committee or more divisions over committee reports. This was noticeable on the 
committee for which I worked, for example, where the chair and some members 
– who had very particular and fundamental disagreements – were able to carry 
on working with one another (humour acted as an important social lubricant), 
even though the chair often exhibited a chieftain performance style. Chieftains 
are more likely to be interested in setting their committee agenda, leading 
evidence sessions and ensuring their perspective in committee reports. Contra 
catalysts, chieftains do not give committee members ownership over the 
committee, but input to the committee agenda. This type of performance was 
arguably often adopted by the chair of the Home Affairs Committee, Keith Vaz; 
Public Administration Select Committee, Bernard Jenkin; and Political and 
Constitutional Reform Committee, Graham Allen. 
 
These two performance styles – catalyst and chieftain – are not fixed, monolithic 
or even ideal-types. Given that each chair has their own individual beliefs and 
ways of working, it is impossible to reduce all 24 to these two overarching 
choices. Most chairs probably exhibit a range of qualities among both types of 
chair. The distinction between catalysts and chieftains serves as a crude, 
heuristic device in order to render explicit some of the ways in which chairs can 
interpret their role along a broader spectrum. They may do so for the duration of 
a parliament, or chairs may operate as a chieftain in relation to one inquiry but 
as a catalyst in relation to a different inquiry. Neither choice is right or wrong,  
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Table 5.3. Catalysts and chieftains 
 Catalysts Chieftains 
Leading inquiries 
Ideas about inquiries nestled 
within an agenda that is more 
likely to be driven by MPs 
Strong ideas about inquiries and 
is likely to fit MPs’ views within 
strategic priorities of chair 
 
More likely to allow Members to 
develop lines of questioning 
More likely to be interested in 
leading questions put to 
witnesses 
 
More likely to foster cross-party 
consensus throughout all stages of 
an inquiry  
More likely to seek trade-offs 
within and between inquiries to 
ensure consensus 
Norms and values Committee-orientated view Leadership-orientated view 
Representing 
Parliament 
More likely to seek to develop the 
policy-influencing role of the 
committee 
More likely to seek to develop 
the media-influencing role of the 
committee 
Possible examples 
Adrian Bailey (BIS), Anne Begg 
(WPC), Stephen Dorrell (Health) 
Keith Vaz (HAC), Bernard 
Jenkin (PASC), Graham Allen 
(PCRC) 
   
though they may lead to a different focus of scrutiny, and will make an impact in 
agenda-setting, evidence-gathering and report-writing. This reinforces the 
central argument of this thesis that scrutiny is fragile and dependent on 
everyday behaviour of MPs and other parliamentary actors. It also indicates that 
chairs face a number of choices in enacting their role. We can think of these as a 
distinct set of dilemmas that chairs face, which goes beyond those that were 
covered in Chapter 4. These are summarised in Table 5.3. It is worth examining  
these in detail because it is in adjudicating or negotiating these dilemmas that 
chairs shape their approach to the role.  
 
 
5.3. Negotiating dilemmas 
 
The previous section alluded to a tension between adopting a leadership role 
versus promoting the interests of individual MPs on their respective committee. 
These choices are perennial dilemmas that chairs face when they interpret and 
enact their scrutiny role. Here, I consider three dilemmas. First, the extent of 
involvement in leading inquiries, whilst simultaneously allowing individual 
committee members to flourish. Committee inquiries form the bulk of a 
committee’s day-to-day work (what one clerk called ‘the bread and butter’ of 
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committees (FWD 45.10.3)). Second, the role of chair in setting the tone of a 
committee as either committee- or leadership-orientated. This feeds into 
questions over a committee to be able to develop a performance team (covered 
in detail in Chapter 7). And third, looking beyond the committee corridor, the 
level of attention paid to either the media or the policy network within which 
committees are situated. These aspects of the role, when taken together, give us 
a clear picture of what chairs do on an everyday basis, and crucially the 
dilemmas they face in enacting those interpretations. Each of these tensions do 
not represent direct or exclusive choices, in that chairs will attempt to overcome 
each tension through a combination of leadership and inclusivity (a sense of 
inclusive or broad-tent leadership). But everyday behaviour can be telling in that, 
ultimately, they still have to make choices about the types of inquiry that a 
committee pursues, the way that questions are allocated before evidence 
sessions, and the nature of the committee ethos fostered over five years. In 
negotiating these dilemmas, chairs develop dispositions about the kind of 
performance style on which they come to rely in future (though this possibly 
depends on political issues of the day, the standing of the committee generally, 
or the focus and topic of the inquiry). This indicates, then, that responses to 
these dilemmas are fundamental to understanding how MPs interpret their role 
as either a catalyst or a chieftain. 
 
5.3.1. Leading inquiries 
 
Discussions with interviewees, observations from fieldwork and analysis above 
show that the chair is key in forming and promoting the agenda of the 
committee’s work and the wider policy area. There are three specific ways in 
which chairs have a role to play when it comes to undertaking committee 
inquiries. 
 
First, chairs play a key role in deciding the focus of inquiries. Few chairs would 
admit that they are overly controlling or dominating in terms of setting the 
agenda (knowingly or unknowingly) but, and perhaps unavoidably, most chairs 
were clearly leading committees in one way or another. Chairs are in daily 
contact with the policy area associated with their role, which means that they are 
more likely to be knowledgeable about their policy area and are instinctively able 
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to see the strategic and political implications of the key issues within it. While 
committee members have specific interests that they wish to pursue (especially 
given the variety of performance styles that they have), chairs keep an eye on the 
overall picture. For example, the weekly agenda for committee meetings will be 
drafted by clerks in consultation with the chair (and only minimal involvement 
from MPs). On my committee, it was not uncommon for staff to ask the chair 
about his aims and objectives for a particular inquiry in a more informal setting, 
before asking the committee more widely at a formal meeting (FWD 2.1.16). As 
one clerk put it, while MPs can dip in and out of committee work depending on 
their interests, ‘it’s only the chair that is interested in everything we do’ 
(Interview S-02; see also Interview S-05). This is reinforced through frequent 
contact between the chair and committee staff. While only some will meet 
weekly to discuss the agenda or more widely the committee’s work, almost every 
chair and clerk explained that email or telephone contact with their counterpart 
is daily (e.g. Interview S-11, FWD 6.2.23, FWD 12.3.7). In any case, discussions 
are not limited to specific inquiries, but can also include – to give examples from 
my fieldwork – briefing over how to handle certain witnesses (FWD 54.12.7), a 
Freedom of Information request (FWD 39.9.15), and potential committee visits 
and their remit (FWD 9.3.10). These are small, quotidian examples, but they are 
important because such everyday meetings demonstrate that, first, chairs 
become immersed in their work and, second, that clerks’ first port of call 
regarding work is the chair (see next chapter for more on the role of staff) and 
therefore a key gatekeeper. The extent to which the chair is seen to dominate an 
inquiry programme varies greatly and depends on the chair’s interpretation as a 
catalyst or chieftain. While a catalyst is likely to seek a wide discussion about 
possible inquiries, chieftains are likely to, at best, place members’ ideas in wider 
context of the chair’s priorities or, at worst, drop the idea unceremoniously 
(FWD 10.3.9). 
 
A second element of the chair’s role with regards to inquiries is their role in 
conducting meetings and leading evidence sessions, which are possibly most 
visibly associated not only with chairs but a committee’s work more widely. 
Chairs will frame oral evidence sessions in a particular way in order to place the 
event in a larger context of the inquiry. During this ‘back stage’ planning period, 
usually in the form of a private meeting of the committee before a public 
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evidence session, the chair will establish the strategic priorities for the 
committee. For example, I observed my chair begin by saying, ‘What I want to 
establish from these witnesses…’ (or variations thereupon) on frequent 
occasions (e.g. FWD 19.5.20, FWD 42.10.6). Additionally, the chair will allocate 
themes for questioning. Based on observations from the 2010 parliament (and 
followed-up in interviews), chairs do this in one of at least three ways. In some 
committees, questions are distributed according to themes, with one or two MPs 
leading on these. In others, the chair allocates a certain amount of time to 
individuals to allow committee members to pursue lines of questioning. And 
finally, in a minority of other cases, the chair does not allocate questions and 
members can freely ‘jump in’. In all three cases, the aim is to allow both chair 
and individual members to pursue issues that interest them while also robustly 
scrutinising the witnesses in front of them in line with the committee’s inquiry. 
Irrespective of how this happens, the chair plays a vital role in managing the 
process and is therefore more prepared than individual members. One chair 
explained: ‘I prepare for every hearing. They [committee members] prepare for 
some. I get my brain round everything just in case because I feel as chair I’ve 
got to’ (Interview C-08). This indicates the strong position of the chair vis-à-vis 
members. In one committee meeting I observed, the chair allocated themes for 
questions and added, ‘I can just chip in and do whatever … ‘cos I’m chairman’, 
followed by a light chuckle from another member. It was a joke, but more than a 
hint of truth lay behind it (FWD 10.3.15). Chairs frequently get involved and ask 
follow-up questions, in part because members’ skill in questioning (or even 
paying attention) cannot always be guaranteed (FWD 2.1.14, FWD 46.1.19, FWD 
58.13.17). One clerk explained that occasionally an MP may ask a question with 
an interesting reply or an evasive answer from a witness, but will do nothing to 
follow things up. This raises a dilemma for chairs because, if the chair intervenes 
too often, this could consequently alienate members, who are seen to be 
undermined (Interview S-03). Once again, this depends on the role 
interpretation from chairs as either catalysts or chieftains.  
 
A third and final element in leading inquiries involves bringing the evidence 
together and building cross-party support for the inquiry’s conclusions (this 
topic is considered in detail in Chapter 7). A number of interviewees have 
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pointed out that split reports have far less impact or resonance with the House of 
Commons (e.g. Interview S-03). One chair pointed out:  
 
The … added value of a select committee, really, is its cross-party nature. And 
so, there’s not much point in seeking to align a committee for a point of view 
that leads to a split or an argument within the committee. The whole point of 
being chair of a committee is to try to … steer the committee in a way that you 
as chair think is right but reflects a cross-party view within the committee 
(Interview C-10). 
 
This indicates, once again, the balancing role of chair, who will have to both 
attempt to promote the values of the chair but also to do it in such a way as to 
ensure cross-party support. There are three specific phases over the course of an 
inquiry during which a chair can make a choice as to whether they wish to adopt 
a catalyst or chieftain role. First, chairs are influential in setting the agenda and 
focus of an inquiry (and, indeed, through deciding which inquiries to hold (or 
not hold) in the first place). They can choose to either include committee 
members in this process and give them ownership over the agenda (catalysts), 
or reflect the strategic priorities of chairs themselves and give committee 
members input into the agenda (chieftains). Second, during evidence-gathering, 
chairs can choose how to enact a scrutiny performance as one where members 
are proactively involved (catalysts) or, as one committee member put it, the 
chair is ‘the star with a few supporters’ (Interview M-06) (chieftains). Third, 
chairs are crucial to develop consensus on committees, and, once again, chairs 
may choose to build consensus over the course of an inquiry (catalysts) or 
compromise towards the end to ensure a unanimous report (chieftains). These 
three phases are discussed in detail in Chapter 7. This dilemma of leading an 
inquiry is in part shaped by wider committee norms and values that emerge over 
time, or the sense of a group ethos or performance team that the committee is 
able to establish. This leads us to consider the next dilemma. 
 
5.3.2. Developing norms and values 
 
Most interviewees agreed that the chair’s individual approach to committee 
work is a crucial ingredient to setting the tone of a committee, as these two 
quotes show: 
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I think the ethos kind of reflects, you know, the ethos of these committees kind 
of reflects now, for better or for worse, it reflects the chair’s method of working 
(Interview S-04). 
 
I think the chair sets the tone and that’s true of most committees (Interview S-
11). 
 
One MP who has served on the same select committee for three parliaments 
noted the wide-ranging impact of chairs: 
 
Well, [DB72] as chair was a very aggressive, theatrical person and we ended 
up, I think, choosing more controversial areas because [DB72] liked 
controversy. Whereas [NU52] is a kind of technocrat. … She’d hate me for 
saying that because that’s unfair, but there isn’t, if you wanted to separate out 
why they were different, that would be … So it, that’s what’s difficult to convey, 
really, about committees (Interview M-21). 
 
This quote makes three important points: first, it links the chair’s approach and 
style to the priorities of a committee’s inquiries; second, it illustrates that the 
style and tone of committees is shaped by chairs; and, third, these styles cannot 
be easily pinned down, in part because each chair develops their own particular 
way of working that makes generalisation difficult. Chairs are particularly 
important in developing these styles or ways of working because they are the 
most permanent actor on a select committee. While chairs are usually in post for 
the duration of a parliament, or up to two parliaments if they are re-elected for a 
second term, staff move to different positions more often for career development 
reasons. Similarly, members’ commitment to their committees can vary (as 
Chapter 4 indicated). The general stability of the chair thereby means their 
particular style of working is most likely to become instilled over time through 
the committee’s everyday behaviour and forms the biggest influence in 
sustaining a committee tradition (see Chapter 7). This is important here because 
it suggests that the choice made by the chair to adopt either a catalyst position or 
chieftain perspective is significant. 
 
While the approach taken by the chair will have wide-ranging impacts for the 
rest of the committee, they also remain a single MP amongst usually ten further 
colleagues and six members of staff. Relationships between MPs, staff and chair 
are an important aspect to understanding a committee ethos or practice. Some 
committees have adopted or elected a vice chair, usually a senior or respected 
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backbencher of the opposing party to the chair, to help build cross-party support. 
However, interviewees regarded the effectiveness of committee relationships as 
the chair’s responsibility (e.g. Interview M-16). Indeed, when I asked one chair 
to interpret her role, this is one of the first things she mentioned: 
 
[Being chair] means taking a leadership role in respect of committee members 
and for me that means helping to actually build an inclusive committee, one 
where we look at things in an informed, non-tribal basis, where every 
member’s able to be, or feel fully part of the scrutiny process that we’re doing  
(Interview C-02). 
 
Another chair explained that relationships matter because this will enable the 
committee to ‘hunt as a pack’, and therefore strengthen the ability of the 
committee to scrutinise government (Interview C-05). These sentiments are 
widely shared among chairs. However, the extent to which chairs are able to 
foster this depends in some part on the performance style that chairs wish to 
adopt. On my committee, this has occasionally caused a clash between the chair 
– in chieftain mode – and committee members, particularly ones that adopted a 
lone wolf performance during questioning (e.g. FWD 15.4.1, FWD 16.4.28).   
 
The significant point to take from this discussion is that select committees are 
strongly influenced by personalities, and this often throws up a dilemma for 
chairs in how they enact their role and, more widely, how to undertake scrutiny. 
This is arguably not acknowledged in academic research very often, as Chapter 1 
has identified. Committees are shaped by the personal approach of each chair 
and the relationship that they have with their members. With scrutiny of 
government dependent on this factor, it indicates that there is potential for 
volatility in the effectiveness of scrutiny and undertaking inquiries. The extent to 
which this is overcome, and an effective committee performance team is 
established, depends in part on the chair’s role as either catalyst or chieftain and 
what they perceive to be an effective committee team (I also examine norms and 
values more closely in Chapter 7). 
 
5.2.3. Representing Parliament 
 
The previous two sub-sections have revealed that the chair is a crucial and 
pervasive actor in select committee inquiries and, indeed, developing the wider 
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committee approach to scrutiny. However, the breadth and depth of the 
knowledge that most chairs gain as a result of their daily and often intense 
involvement in their policy area, as well as the unique position of influence that 
they find themselves (in terms of access to ministers, civil servants and policy 
advocates), means that chairs are increasingly in demand beyond the committee 
corridor, by stakeholders, professional groups and the media. One chair named 
this the ‘representative role’, in which he has ‘a relentless round of meetings’ 
with charities, trade unions, relevant consumer groups, and associated arm’s-
length bodies, as well as a perceived duty to attend public engagement events 
and conferences (Interview C-06). Another chair: ‘what I discovered when I 
became chair is, everybody and their dog wants to meet you. So every 
organisation that’s within your sphere of influence’ (Interview C-05). This was 
similarly noticeable during my fieldwork, in which my chair was constantly in 
touch with other interested bodies to discuss issues relevant to the committee 
whether this was in terms of advice to stakeholders (FWD 9.3.10), writing an 
essay to a think tank (FWD 16.4.13), or commenting on a report published by an 
executive agency (FWD 11.3.10). This can create a dilemma because chairs are 
faced with two choices: adopting a media focus or a policy focus.  
 
In terms of a media role, one chair noted that: ‘in the eyes of the media, you’re … 
a media expert and go-to person of everything that happens in this area’ 
(Interview C-09). Chairs are usually in control of press notices or press releases, 
allowing them to stamp their perspective on an issue within the committee’s 
remit. Whilst some MPs have voiced their discontent over this (Interview M-02), 
other interviewees have pointed out the difficulties in trying to manage a media 
strategy by committee (Interview S-05). This is becoming increasingly important 
because of the growing demand placed on chairs to respond quickly to issues as 
they arise on a more frequent basis (e.g. Interview C-03). Particularly since 2010, 
journalists have taken a greater interest in the work of select committees, as 
Patrick Dunleavy and Dominic Muir (2013) have pointed out in their research 
(see also Kubala, 2011). Hannah White (2015b, pp.14-22), in her study of select 
committees, points towards the chair of the Home Affairs Committee, Keith Vaz, 
as an example of a committee focused more on the media (with the chair playing 
a vocal role). In part, MPs believed that government would not be influenced by 
the committee’s work unless pressure was exerted by media coverage, but in part 
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it was also about maximising media coverage so that the public are aware of the 
committee’s activities. Whilst not every committee adopted such a strategy 
between 2010 and 2015 (at least not explicitly), the importance of a media role 
cannot be understated and seems to be changing the focus of attention for some 
committees since their independence has been strengthened in 2010. Indeed, it 
is part of received wisdom that greater media coverage is axiomatically a good 
thing to ensure that a committee has influence on the policy process (and 
deserves further scholarly attention). 
 
However, and by contrast, the representative role can be thought of in a different 
way, namely through building and maintaining policy connections that situate 
the committee in a wider policy network. One MP commented in my interview 
that his chair had an extensive and ‘excellent network’ in the relevant policy area, 
which allowed the committee to undertake more high-profile evidence sessions 
with witnesses that would otherwise have been difficult to persuade to appear in 
front of the select committee (Interview M-11). In this way, the activity of the 
chair in relation to the policy network in which they find themselves plays an 
important role in inquiries, which may have an effect on who gives evidence to a 
committee (both in written submissions and oral evidence) (see Chapter 8), who 
might assist the committee as a specialist adviser, or, indeed, who might read the 
final report. One committee member noted that this approach is equally effective 
(if not more so) than a media-focused role (Interview M-01) in ensuring that a 
committee has influence with key stakeholders. The contrast between the two 
approaches is not clear-cut. For example, some chieftains (such as Andrew Tyrie) 
adopt that role precisely because of their knowledge and involvement with a 
policy network. However, there does seem to be a link because media-focused 
chairs (such as Margaret Hodge or Keith Vaz) are, according to clerks, making it 
more difficult for some committees to persuade policy experts to give oral 
evidence (e.g. Interview S-04), or indeed to provide written evidence in some 
cases. This indicates that there may be a trade-off between a media-focused role 
and a policy-focused role. 
 
These three dilemmas, once negotiated, indicate that chairs are pervasive actors 
in many processes of select committee work, but crucially also develop 
dispositions as to a committee-orientated approach or a leadership-orientated 
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approach. Catalysts are more likely to lead committees by trying to involve the 
committee, fostering a group ethos, and making policy influence a priority; 
chieftains, meanwhile, are more interested in their strategic priorities as chairs, 
inculcate a more compromise-based ethos amongst members, and believe media 
influence to be more important. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has not been revolutionary in the sense that it has not made a 
comprehensive assessment of each chair and labelled them as a catalyst or a 
chieftain. Nor has it sought to demonstrate the chair’s policy impact on the 
executive. Rather, this chapter has been more modest in identifying and giving a 
general overview of the role of chairs, using insights from fieldwork and 
interviews with just under half of select committee chairs. Looking at the issue 
through the prism of individual beliefs, everyday practices and dilemmas has 
been a useful analytical framework to gauge how chairs have interpreted the 
broad contours of their role and sought to react to a distinct set of problems and 
day-to-day issues that they face in enacting their role. The first section looked at 
the situated agency of chairs, and demonstrated that the idea of select 
committee services is increasingly viewed as an alternative career route in the 
House of Commons with growing prestige. The second section has focused on 
the individual beliefs of committee chairs to identify and summarise how these 
parliamentary actors interpret their role and seek to enact it. This indicated that 
there are a spectrum of roles, with two ends: on one side, catalysts, or 
committee-orientated chairs; on the other side, chieftains, or leadership-
orientated chairs. This is not to argue that there are only two distinct types, but 
rather that there is a spectrum along which most chairs sit. This reinforces the 
view, set out in the previous chapter, that to be an MP is an interpretive 
endeavour, and that there is no single role that chairs can adopt when pursuing 
scrutiny through select committee work. The third and final section has shifted 
focus to how chairs enact those interpretations by looking at how they respond 
to dilemmas. These dilemmas, which included how to conduct inquiries, how to 
build effective performance teams or committee relationships, and how to enact 
the representative role, create dispositions that reinforce chairs as either 
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adopting a more committee-orientated approach or a more leadership-
orientated approach. As discussed in earlier chapters, this focus on dilemmas 
has been less to show the distinct effect of a dilemma on webs of beliefs over 
time, but rather to illustrate the perennial or continuous dilemmas that chairs 
face and how this affects their interpretations. 
 
At its broadest level, this chapter has sought to open a debate about leadership 
in the House of Commons, generally, and select committees, specifically. This is 
important because the literature on select committees has generally not focused 
on the input side of committee work (but as noted, with notable exceptions). As 
such, this chapter been able to offer a novel way to conceive of chairs’ roles in 
committees. That said, there are many further fruitful avenues of research that 
need to be explored. This includes the leadership skills of committee chairs, the 
extent of training that they receive, the policy impact of different interpretations 
of their role, an empirical analysis of where different chairs sit along the 
spectrum identified here, and so on. It is arguably difficult to pin down the role 
of chair specifically in this chapter and doctoral research project because they 
play such a significant role in many areas of scrutiny and therefore feature 
prominently in all chapters. Indeed, this wider and perhaps simplest of all 
conclusions indicates that the process of scrutiny is heavily influenced and 
perhaps even determined by the chair. This makes a significant and original 
contribution to the literature on select committees, and indicates that the role of 
chair is crucial to better understanding the policy impact of committees.  
 
Scrutiny in the House depends on the chair in many respects. However, that is 
not to say that other actors do not have a role to play – as Chapter 4 clearly 
demonstrates. Indeed, another actor also deserves detailed attention: the role of 
staff to support committees.  
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embers of staff in the House of Commons Service number 
approximately 2,000, who considerably outnumber the elected 
representatives that they exist to serve (House of Commons 
Commission, 2015).21 Of those, there are roughly 200 or so House staff in the 
Committee Office that provide permanent select committee support. Yet, our 
knowledge of their role in supporting Members of Parliament is remarkably thin 
(Rogers and Walters, 2015, pp.56-62, pp.318-19; Ryle, 1981). That is despite the 
fact that clerks play a crucial role in scrutiny of the House of Commons, who 
help to identify and invite witnesses for select committee inquiries, who are 
present at every evidence session to take notes and analyse information that the 
witnesses are giving committees, and who write briefing material and draft 
reports for members and chairs of committees. Thus, they deserve our attention, 
and so in this chapter I turn my attention to how they interpret their role and, in 
doing so, support elected representatives in scrutinising the executive. As with 
the previous two chapters, this analysis is borne out in three parts (summarised 
in Table 6.1). First, I situate select committee staff in their administrative setting 
or environment (i.e. the Committee Office). This reveals a sense of 
organisational complexity and a persistence of silos. This hints at some 
dilemmas that the organisation faces, which subsequent sections summarise in 
more detail. Second, I explore how staff interpret their role as clerks by turning 
to their individual beliefs and everyday practices. Unlike the previous two 
chapters, I do not identify more than one performance style. In part this is  
                                                          
21 For the purposes of this thesis, I use ‘staff’ and ‘clerks’ interchangeably. 
M 
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Table 6.1. Analysing committee staff 
Situated 
agency 
In the first section, committee staff are placed in their organisational 
context by briefly examining the landscape of the House of Commons 
administration. This indicates organisational complexity and hints that 
staff face a range of pressures. 
Beliefs and 
practices 
Here, analysis focuses on how staff interpret their role. This identifies a 
predominant performance style of ‘clerkliness’, characterised by being 
hidden, unparalleled service and passionate impartiality. 
Negotiating 
dilemmas 
This covers some of the key dilemmas that staff face in enacting their role. 
These dilemmas include the level of inquiry support that staff can give, the 
type of advice they can offer, and how to manage relationships between 
Members. 
Summary: In sum, these concepts indicate that staff play a key role in supporting 
committees to develop effective scrutiny of the executive. Staff are more restricted in being 
able to perform their role in the sense that there is, arguably, less of a diversity in 
performance styles available to them. This chapter attempts to open the debate on staff by 
examining some of the things that staff do to support committee members and their chairs. 
This reveals that staff are faced with a perennial dilemma: supporting a specific group of 
MPs, on the one hand, while also supporting the institution of Parliament in broader terms, 
on the other. 
 
 because, whilst MPs have the freedom to interpret their role as they wish, clerks 
do not have similar levels of luxury. Though meanings may be contested, staff 
have stricter guidelines in terms of how they ought to behave and relate to 
elected representatives. This means that their performance styles are limited, 
and often interpreted within three predominant everyday practices in the House, 
including: (i) a sense of being hidden, (ii) a desire to offer unparalleled service to 
Parliament, and (iii) a commitment to passionate impartiality. These weave 
together what may be termed a performance style of ‘clerkliness’, which, though 
arguably ephemeral and difficult to pin down, explains the behaviour of staff in 
committees and their relationships to MPs.22 This then turns our attention to the 
third section, in which I examine how staff negotiate dilemmas in a wider 
context of serving committee members and chairs. This shows that clerks 
undertake the majority of inquiry work but, in doing so, they face a number of 
dilemmas in the sense that: first, staff resources are limited, so clerks cannot 
offer unlimited support; second, committee members and chairs want frank and 
candid advice, yet clerks have to act politically impartial; and third, staff seek to 
ensure that MPs build effective relationships with one another, but they are 
occasionally seen as ‘the chair’s creature’, which creates a tension with members. 
These everyday dilemmas must be couched within a larger dilemma that staff 
                                                          
22 Staff may have more performance styles than this. However, and with regret, my original 
research project did not focus on an analysis of the diverse roles that staff play. 
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face, between serving a particular committee of MPs, on the one hand, whilst 
serving the institution of Parliament as a whole, on the other. In order to 
overcome this, clerks aim to act as amplifiers for MPs’ interests and develop 
nuanced political antennae. Staff play a crucial role in committee scrutiny, which 
is not often acknowledged; this chapter seeks to acknowledge their contribution 
to scrutiny. 
 
 
6.1. Situating staff: the House of Commons administration 
 
Figure 6.1 (taken from the UK Parliament website) illustrates the complexity of 
the organisation in which staff and MPs operated during the 2010 parliament.23 
The House of Commons Commission is at the centre of the administration, 
responsible for the House’s finances and its principal employer. It was 
established in 1978, following a review from the Comptroller and Auditor 
General, Sir Edmund Compton, and a report from a committee of MPs under the 
chairmanship of Sir Arthur Bottomley (Ryle, 1981, pp.508-9). The Commission a 
cross-party committee of MPs (including the Speaker, leader of the House, 
shadow leader of the House (or another MP appointed by the official opposition), 
and three backbench MPs). Though they are formally in control of the House of 
Commons Service, its delivery was delegated to a Management Board, which is 
made up of five heads of department and three external advisers. Though 
reforms have taken place since fieldwork was conducted, between 2010 and 2015 
these departments included: the Department of Chamber and Committee 
Services (DCCS), Information Services, Facilities, Human Resources and Change, 
and Finance. The Committee Office lies within the DCCS, which ‘provides 
secretariat, advice, research and administrative services for each of the House’s 
Departmental Select Committees and most other Select Committees’, as well as 
support for the House’s governance bodies (including the Commission) (House 
of Commons Management Board, 2014). To fulfil those functions, small teams of 
parliamentary staff serve specific select committees (with some pooled resources 
through a Scrutiny Unit and a Web and Publications Unit). These staff teams  
                                                          
23 This discussion refers to arrangements during the period of fieldwork, i.e. between 2010 
and 2015. Since then, administrative reforms have been made which may affect the validity 
of this section in the post-2015 environment – but something which goes beyond this study. 
This section describes the House of Commons administration as accurate during fieldwork 
only. 
Interpreting Parliamentary Scrutiny 
140 
Figure 6.1. The House of Commons administration 
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usually include: a clerk of the committee, responsible for the committee overall; 
a second clerk, who will lead on some inquiries and provide support to the clerk 
of the committee; one or two committee specialists, who are usually subject-
specific experts with one- to two-year contracts (sometimes committees employ 
inquiry managers as well as or instead of specialists); one or two committee 
assistants to provide predominantly administrative support; and finally, a media 
officer, shared between usually three or four committees. This is a typical 
structure that can be found across most committees, though there are some 
variations. For example, the Justice Committee usually has one or more legal 
specialists, and the Treasury Committee has senior economists and a range of 
secondees from other economic or financial organisations (Tyrie, 2015). 
Additionally, committees can appoint specialist advisers from outside the House 
of Commons to provide expertise and advice to committees on an ad hoc basis.  
 
Select committee teams are grouped together as part of ‘colour groups’ or units 
to coordinate and share practices between committees, which in turn are 
governed through the DCCS. Working for a particular select committee, however, 
can feel far removed from overarching governance structures (they made little 
impact to a lowly research assistant in any case). For example, though colour 
group meetings offer an opportunity for feedback through regular meetings and 
monthly summary reports, they have not broken down an impression amongst 
some staff that each committee is its own independent (and possibly remote) 
island, particularly because participation in these meetings is limited to first and 
second clerks. Consequently, each committee works in a perceptively siloed 
atmosphere. One interviewee lamented that committees ‘don’t really talk’ 
(Interview S-02). A new member of staff was disappointed that she had not been 
introduced to staff in neighbouring offices, something with which I could 
identify over the course of fieldwork (FWD 41.10.4). The consequences of this 
‘siloed mentality’ is that it can prevent the sharing of ideas, resources and 
expertise. One clerk acknowledged that there is a wide range of expertise in the 
Commons, and to draw on it for a particular inquiry, he sought the advice of the 
House of Commons Library, staff at the Science and Technology Committee, the 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) and a number of others 
(Interview S-10). But creating a permanent network where these different 
elements work together on a more consistent basis has been difficult. There are a 
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range of reasons for this, but it brings out the importance of the pressures of 
everyday practices and the role of competing beliefs. First, staff face the issue of 
managing short time scales from week to week. For example, if committee 
members request an inquiry on Tuesday, they will expect briefings by the 
following week; but, to allow members to read these briefings in time, they must 
be completed well in advance of the next meeting. Consequently, clerks usually 
only have two to three days to research and write terms of reference or scoping 
notes (Interview S-10). Furthermore, each committee has their own ‘circulation 
day’ to which staff and committee members are committed, which arguably 
reinforces the focus on short-term deadlines. Staff need to be juggling diverse 
priorities all of the time, demonstrating the important role that the everyday 
plays in committee work. Second, staff need to adjudicate between competing 
beliefs and interpretations of scrutiny (as discussed in Chapter 4). All 
committees are run by their committee members, and particularly the chairing 
MP, which often means that there are not only 24 chairs with 24 different views 
on how to run their committee, but also a plethora of interpretations from 
serving committee members. One clerk argued that this diversity is a good thing 
because ‘you want a thousand flowers to bloom’, especially as the basic 
principles of the administrative system are the same for all committees 
(Interview S-09). Irrespective of the normative value of the diversity, it certainly 
has an effect in terms of the support that staff can offer because it, once again, 
indicates a need to juggle competing views. A third possible factor that has an 
effect on the environment of staff is a cultural legacy that one clerk described in 
the following way: ‘there are people who are in senior management positions 
but they’re not your boss, they’re your colleague and you have a huge amount 
of autonomy to run your show the way that you want to run it’ (Interview S-10), 
which he argues contributes to a ‘leadership problem’. This implies that there is 
a dilemma that the Committee Office faces: how can the Office offer leadership 
to staff and expertise and support to members without damaging the autonomy 
of clerks or the principle that committees must be member-driven, especially in 
the context of growing demands for resources from MPs at a time of budget 
restraints? This is, arguably, an unresolved tension exacerbated not only by 
austerity, but also because of a wider agenda of managerial reform supported by 
the Speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow (illustrated most clearly by 
the 2014 disagreements to appoint a new Clerk of the House of Commons) 
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(Governance Committee, 2014). Though these issues are arguably far removed 
from select committee clerks and their everyday work, this tension or dilemma 
has a practical effect on clerks in that they have to negotiate similar tensions 
when advising chairs on procedure and when allocating team resources in their 
daily working environment. Additionally, it implies that traditional 
interpretations of the role of staff in the House of Commons are arguably being 
challenged, whilst also raising questions about the training and socialisation of 
staff (though these latter questions go goes beyond the purview of this 
chapter).24  
 
This section shows that the situated agency of clerks has a direct impact on their 
everyday work, and consequently on scrutiny. In drawing out this setting or 
environment in which staff work, it reinforces the role of ideas and beliefs at the 
micro-level of parliamentary scrutiny. In order to tease out some of the 
underlying issues mentioned above, the remainder of this chapter considers how 
staff interpret their role by looking at their individual beliefs and performance 
styles or practices (second section) and how they subsequently negotiate 
everyday dilemmas in enacting their role (third section). 
 
 
6.2. How do staff interpret their role? 
 
In a guide to MPs that serve on select committees, it is described that the clerk of 
a committee is ‘to make committees as effective as they can be in performing the 
tasks given to committees by the House’ (DCCS, 2015, p.3). Their responsibilities 
are summarised in the following way by DCCS: organise oral evidence sessions; 
provide briefing and suggested questions; issue calls for written evidence; draft 
final inquiry reports; draft amendments where desired; draft press notices; 
maintain the committee’s webpages; and make travel and accommodation 
arrangements (ibid., 2015, p.10). This is arguably only the tip of the iceberg as to 
what it means to be a clerk and how staff themselves interpret and highlight 
different aspects of their role. While in previous chapters it has been possible to 
                                                          
24 As noted earlier, some changes have occurred since fieldwork has taken place. One specific 
example is the introduction of co-location or shared office space, which has arguably 
overcome some of the problems regarding committee silos and inter-institutional 
boundaries. 
Interpreting Parliamentary Scrutiny 
144 
identify different performance styles that committee members or chairs adopt to 
enact their role, this does not quite work as well with regards to select committee 
staff (perhaps clerks more widely) because, though staff still interpret their role 
in different ways, clerks are arguably restricted in how they perform their role. 
This is because staff have been given a far clearer role specification than either 
committee members or committee chairs. So, unlike members and chairs, staff 
predominantly behave through the prism of a predominant performance style 
(in the singular), which pervades clerkly support to elected representatives. I 
tentatively term this ‘clerkliness’ as an overarching performance style, and it is 
made up of three aspects that are explored in turn: being hidden, unparalleled 
service, and passionate impartiality.  
 
6.2.1. Being hidden 
 
The guarded or cautious culture in the House of Commons administration was 
striking from the beginning of fieldwork and noticeable throughout my studies. 
This was made clear to me, as Chapter 3 indicated, by the careful type of access I 
was able to attain in undertaking research, and the cautious approach necessary 
to draw on my observations (both of which are fully justified). To work in 
Parliament, every member of staff must sign a confidentiality agreement, which 
immediately establishes the importance attached to privacy or confidentiality in 
the Palace of Westminster. It is perhaps for this reason that so little has been 
written about the administration of the House of Commons, as one respondent 
pointed out at the end of his interview with me: 
 
I’ve always thought there’s a lot of scope for people to look on the inside and try 
and think about what’s going on. We obviously don’t like to lift the lid very 
often, but you know … the cat’s out of the bag! (Interview S-05) 
 
This refers to a wider tradition in the Committee Office of being hidden, 
something which others also implied. For instance, when I commented on the 
lack of research on staff in the House of Commons, one clerk replied that, ‘that’s 
as it should be. … we’re not the main show’. He went on: 
 
Even if we do the heavy lifting behind the scenes, there is that sense that this is 
a member-led endeavour, not one that is driven by the staff and so it’s only 
right that when you ask that question, the staff are not visible. There’d be 
something wrong if we were visible (Interview S-10). 
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All my interviewees demonstrated this commitment to hiddenness by the mere 
fact that they insisted (justifiably, of course) on anonymity in their interview 
responses. Almost all other informal conversations with clerks were off-the-
record and not to be cited. 
 
This culture is not something that is unique to Parliament’s relationship to 
outsiders, but something that characterises everyday life for staff in the Palace of 
Westminster. With regards to clerks’ relationship to MPs in committees, this 
manifests itself in a range of ways. The most discernible sign of their invisibility 
is physically in committee meetings. At this front stage performance of scrutiny, 
the leading clerk assigned to a particular inquiry will usually sit to the left of the 
chair in meetings in order to provide administrative support during private or 
public hearings. But other staff will sit at the side of the room, almost out of view. 
They are, literally, at the edges of a select committee performance. Additionally, 
clerks do not often have microphones in these large committee spaces, nor name 
cards to identify them (each MP has one for their seat). Though there are clear 
reasons for this when public sessions are underway (clerks are forbidden to 
speak), it is curious that in private meetings members can be heard through 
microphones, but clerks face a greater difficulty (FWD 38.9.12). 
 
The most interesting facet of being hidden, however, is the way in which clerks 
enact their role to ensure that their own preconceptions or beliefs do not become 
visible. Some clerks in the Committee Office referred to this as their ‘clerkly 
poker face’ (FWD 10.3.36). It is noticeable whenever a clerk is in the presence of 
an MP. In meetings with the chair, for instance, political assessments are often 
met with polite smiles or neutral looks (FWD 49.11.11). On one occasion, a clerk 
described to me how, after briefing a new member of a committee, she sat 
through the MP giving her political opinions on a range of matters about which 
the clerk couldn’t do anything but nod politely (even though she privately agreed 
with a number of those assessments) (FWD 26.6.3). Clerks joked when they 
accidentally dropped their clerkly poker face (FWD 14.4.37), which often made 
me feel slightly guilty as I failed to do so on a regular basis (FWD 38.9.10). This 
does not mean, of course, that clerks are, therefore, some sort of empty vessels 
without their own assessments of situations. Their views are more frank ‘back 
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stage’, in the privacy of the office. Indeed, this space is crucial. Staff are able to 
relieve their frustrations from a highly pressured and fast-paced working 
environment, whether this is a committee member not submitting amendments 
in advance of considering a draft report (FWD 2.1.29) or the chair asking for 
advice on matters that had nothing to do with the committee’s remit (FWD 
33.8.12) (to name just two examples). It is also a place where, as Erving Goffman 
(1990, pp.114-5) pointed out, performances are rehearsed. In the case of the 
office, this meant that weekly team meetings allowed clerks to touch base and 
discuss issues concerning the committee in frank and open terms. It would give 
clerks an opportunity to de-brief after an evidence session: What worked? What 
do committee members think? In what direction is an inquiry going? In this way, 
though committee offices are still a stage, they offer very different kinds of 
performance, in which clerks use their office as a setting in which to rehearse 
their roles and an opportunity to improve future evidence sessions. 
 
The key point of this discussion is to demonstrate that there is a front stage and 
a back stage for clerks, as there is for other actors and, importantly, that clerks 
adopt a particular types of performance in different settings. This is 
characterised by a sense of ambiguity or secrecy through their clerkly poker face 
within a wider tradition of hiddenness. Being hidden is important for clerks 
because even a minor discrepancy in their performance, especially when in the 
company of MPs (but more generally on the front stage), could damage their 
equitable and impartial service that the House of Commons administration 
seeks to provide. Clerks rely on being trusted by MPs, and giving overt political 
opinions would otherwise damage their credibility. Thus, this facet of the clerkly 
tradition, and its enactment through everyday practices, is pivotal in order to 
explain how the scrutiny process in the House of Commons remains largely 
member-driven, despite the fact that there are opportunities for the process to 
become staff-driven (which does sometimes happen). They seek to offer 
unswerving support to committee members, to which we now turn. 
 
6.2.2. Unparalleled service 
 
After a particularly difficult day, where the chair had made a complete volte face 
over an inquiry, the clerk sighed and said: ‘We live to serve’ (FWD 37.9.6). The 
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timetable needed to be redrawn, new witnesses potentially invited, and other 
work put on hold. That moment arguably encapsulates what it means to be a 
clerk in the House of Commons. To ensure that members remain in the driving 
seat of inquiries, clerks need to be willing to accept that they are at the mercy of 
their elected masters, who are prone to change their minds on a frequent basis. 
One clerk accepted that when MPs ‘change their minds and muck about’, it is 
staff who will ‘take some of the brunt if things go wrong’ (Interview S-03). 
Clerks have got used to volatile behaviour. For example, during another 
interview, a clerk noted that our meeting may be cut short because the chair had 
emailed earlier that day to request a meeting ‘mid-morning’ (Interview S-07).  
 
Clerks’ working environments are unpredictable, yet they try to be as responsive 
to the wishes of their elected masters as they can. One MP called it a ‘largely 
unspoken’ symbiotic relationship, in that she felt clerks picked up the norms, 
values, ways of working, approaches and nuances of members without needing 
to be told about them (Interview M-23). In that sense, the support that clerks 
offer goes beyond administrative or procedural advice. It is about, ‘making 
members feel like they’re getting what they wanted and making them 
understand the services that are available to them and the value that we can 
add’ (Interview S-10). I encountered many examples of this in my fieldwork 
observations, from administrative preferences (preparing written briefings and 
knowing which of their members wanted to use electronic versions (i.e. iPads) or 
which preferred paper copies) (FWD 21.5.35) to the way briefings and reports 
were written (on my committee, two MPs noted their dislike of Americanisms, 
and another hated adverbs) (FWD 51.12.13). One clerk, who recently moved 
from one committee to another, explained that she had to learn to write draft 
reports in the ‘chair’s voice’: 
 
I’ve got to get used to a new chair’s voice … you slip into their voice in a way. … 
You know, that, it’s not … what you hear, it’s just you are supposed to, you’re 
writing a chair’s draft, so you are supposed to write in their voice (Interview S-
08). 
 
This attentiveness to members is found in other examples: staff will note 
appearances of ‘their’ MPs on the floor of debates (FWD 58.13.17); they are there 
at committee sponsored debates, assiduously taking notes and helping the chair 
with their closing remarks (FWD 49.11.18, FWD 49.11.33); or they will watch 
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‘their’ Question Time to flag up any issues raised in the chamber that’s relevant 
for the committee (FWD 11.3.6). Without such levels of commitment, the 
member-driven process in select committees would not be maintained. That said, 
one of the reasons that this symbiotic or largely unspoken relationship remains 
‘unspoken’ has practical causes: there is simply a lack of contact with committee 
members, often due to their competing diary pressures (see Chapter 4). This is 
additionally compounded by the fact that membership of committees, and 
attendance at meetings, can be sporadic. Even though the role of chair is pivotal 
to ensure that the committee maintains strategic and stable in the face of these 
challenges, the role of staff in providing a sense of continuity and, consequently, 
an institutional memory cannot be understated. 
 
This persistence of the public service ethos is illustrated in another way, namely 
through career development. Axiomatically, clerks wish to develop their own 
careers, but this is part of a wider tradition in which clerks frequently adapt to 
different subjects and build up a knowledge base fairly quickly (Interview S-07, 
Interview S-11). I noticed, for example, that clerks on my committee would 
specifically ask to write certain briefing material for members or lead certain 
inquiries in part to develop their own expertise or knowledge in a particular area 
(FWD 19.5.30). More generally staff commented that they enjoyed working on 
multiple work streams (FWD 24.6.21). Staff were regularly involved in other 
parts of the House of Commons Service, working for the Library, clerking 
Westminster Hall debates, or going on division duty (counting votes in the 
division lobbies when the House is sitting). Though all this is part of the job of 
clerk (indeed, a possible motivation to become a clerk in the first place), this 
needs to be placed in a wider context of administrative structures that emphasise 
a culture in which staff can turn their hand to different parts of the House of 
Commons Service to ensure a seamless service to Members. Through a policy of 
circulation, clerks shift in their job in order to understand and experience all 
aspects of their work in Parliament. As clerk of a committee, they would usually 
remain in post for up to five years. In this way, clerks become deep sources of an 
institutional memory of Parliament as a whole, sustaining many of its traditions. 
This is embedded further with a commitment to serve through things like a 
regular and voluntary ‘Monday seminar’, in which early career clerks get 
together to share best practices in handling certain types of events or situations, 
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find out about different topics (e.g., clerking at the Table Office or the effect of 
the Wright reforms), and test one another on their procedural knowledge (FWD 
1.1.12, FWD 18.5.21, FWD 36.9.9, FWD 41.10.6). Some clerks also attend 
conferences and lectures (for example, the Study of Parliament Group is a joint 
academic-practitioner endeavour with an annual two day conference) to learn 
about their workplace, something which is arguably not generalisable to many 
other professions. Clerks aim to build a generalist knowledge of Parliament and 
serve in a variety of capacities. This is sustained by a belief in loyalty to the 
institution of Parliament. One member of staff, for example, commented that 
she could not work for the government or the state (i.e. as civil servant) because 
she loved the impartiality of her current job (FWD 33.8.9). 
 
6.2.3. Passionate impartiality 
 
The two sub-sections above are closely interwoven and may come into tension 
with one another, which arguably plays out in this third aspect of clerkliness. 
The Committee Office is committed to a passionate sense of impartiality (i.e. 
linking a sense of unparalleled service to being hidden), which is not about 
neutrality or indifference, but a conscious attempt to sustain the member-driven 
process (by acting, for example, as amplifiers for MPs’ interests) and to ensure 
that parliamentary scrutiny of the executive is as effective as possible. For 
example, during my fieldwork one clerk was worried about the limited direction 
of an inquiry, but acknowledged that the chair is not concerned by this and 
therefore the inquiry must be made as effective as possible within the 
parameters that the chair had set (FWD 8.2.3). Amplifying MPs’ work is not 
necessarily specific to select committee work: a clerk at the Table Office joked 
that supporting backbench MPs is the ‘most entertaining bit’ of being a clerk, 
especially if it causes a debate or discussion in the main chamber (FWD 1.1.18). 
This indicates that there is a wider sense of trying to create a level playing field. 
In interviews, clerks would appeal to a sense of fairness in adjudicating 
competing ideas and interests of members: 
 
I think you’ve got to have a good sense of fairness between the different 
members, so that the minority get their say as well as the majority … 
Judgement and balance. I mean you’ve got to be very, all fair to all sides and 
appear not to be too partisan (Interview S-09). 
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There can be occasions when … political inclinations of members of the 
committee can conflict with principles of trying to give everybody a fair 
hearing. … and that can apply to all members of the committee across the 
political spectrum (Interview S-04). 
 
This sense of fairness is very important for clerks because it helps to build 
cordial and effective working relationships to members (see Chapter 7). As noted 
in earlier chapters, during my fieldwork, one member would disagree with the 
chair on a frequent basis (often passionately). Usually disagreements were in 
private, but occasionally this would spill over into public evidence sessions, 
which worried clerks because it breached a ‘fundamental principle’ not to 
disagree in public. This had consequences for the committee’s ability to work 
effectively, and clerks suggested that the chair work harder to rebuild bridges 
(FWD 14.4.7-14.4.10, FWD 16.4.5, FWD 2.1.16). It is important for clerks that 
MPs work well together because it helps to ensure that there is ample 
opportunity for consensus to develop, something that clerks believe is key to 
ensure that committees are effective in their scrutiny of government (e.g. 
Interview S-04, Interview S-05, Interview S-07). In that sense, clerks are not 
indifferent about what happens in Parliament; they are passionate defenders of 
the institution, and believe that they play a role in scrutinising the executive by 
offering equitable and fair service to all committee members irrespective of the 
political views that MPs wish to push forward. This point is crucial: staff retain 
the confidence and trust of elected Members through their impartial service and 
refusal to give overt political advice (a point to which we return in the next 
section). Clerks aim to build consensus on committees through ensuring a 
seamless service irrespective of political views (Chapter 7 covers committee 
relationships in more detail). 
 
It is rare that the impartiality of clerks has been questioned in my interviews 
with MPs or during fieldwork. When it does happen, it is met with dismay on the 
part of clerks. On one occasion, for example, an MP was upset that his questions 
in a public evidence session were not publicised using the committee’s Twitter 
account, while other MPs’ questions had been explicitly referenced. The cause of 
this was that the MP had adopted a performance of scrutiny that resembled that 
of a constituency champion and party helper by asking explicitly party political 
questions that the clerk did not judge to be part of the committee’s inquiry. 
However, the clerk was horrified when the MP believed that this was a concerted  
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Table 6.2. Clerkliness 
Being hidden 
Parliament remains a secretive place because staff are only able to carry 
out their role if they are trusted by Members. This means that staff adopt 
a clerkly poker face to hide their views and ensure impartial service. 
Unparalleled 
service 
The public service ethos amongst select committee staff is total and 
unswerving. Clerks are willing to go to great lengths to support Members 
in all sorts of ways, while also trying to constantly learn and improve 
their role. 
Passionate 
impartiality 
Clerks combine their impartiality with their public service ethos to 
promote a sense of passionate impartiality. Staff are not indifferent about 
their role, but passionate defenders of the institution of Parliament. 
  
attempt to limit his contribution to the committee, leading to re-evaluation to 
the way that staff manage the committee’s Twitter profile (FWD 47.11.12, FWD 
47.11.21). This hints at some of the dilemmas staff face in enacting their role. 
 
Being hidden, unparalleled service and passionate impartiality are crucial beliefs 
that inform clerks’ behaviour and, when taken together, indicate the existence of 
a wider performance style of clerkliness within the Committee Office 
(summarised in Table 6.2). MPs need to be able to trust clerks to offer high 
quality and impartial support, which is only made possible through this 
approach of clerkliness. This matters because it indicates that staff and MPs, 
though they have similar aims in furthering the scrutiny capacity of Parliament, 
do so in contrasting ways. These point towards a tension that is at the heart of 
what it means to being a clerk. They are asked to passionately serve a committee 
whilst also, simultaneously, act impartially in accordance with parliamentary 
procedure to ensure service to the House of Commons overall. This tension is a 
recurring theme in this chapter, and it is played out in the Palace on a daily basis. 
 
 
6.3. Negotiating dilemmas 
 
When I asked one clerk what he considered his most important role, he said that 
this was ‘nebulous’ but broadly identified it with ‘meeting the requirements of 
the committee and balancing, keeping the members happy, doing what they 
want’ (Interview S-03). This immediately suggests a sense of flexibility for staff, 
but it also presents clerks with perennial dilemmas in ensuring effective scrutiny 
in the House of Commons because staff attempt to both serve an individual 
group of MPs as well as the institution of Parliament more generally. In order to 
Interpreting Parliamentary Scrutiny 
152 
demonstrate this, I examine three dilemmas that clerks negotiate in order to 
undertake their role: offering adequate inquiry support; giving committee 
members and chairs advice that is impartial; and, managing relationships 
between Members more generally. 
 
6.3.1. Inquiry support 
 
Clerks are arguably placed in a position of leadership because they are in charge 
of a small team of permanent staff to help support a select committee. Most 
interviewees acknowledged this. One clerk identified two key parts in his 
interpretation of his role: 
 
I think … managing the team is extremely important, and carrying out the 
wishes of the committee and trying to make sure that the briefing of the reports 
that are produced reflect their wishes is the second main part of the job 
(Interview S-04). 
 
Another clerk believed the management role was as important, if not more so, 
than the advisory role (below) commonly associated with House of Commons 
staff: 
 
I think it’s essentially manager of the staff team and it’s the primary, the 
official role is the primary procedural adviser to the committee but that, I think, 
understates it to a large extent. It’s the manager of the team and the sort of 
prime interface between the team and the committee so the prime mediator 
between [what] the committee wants and the team is able to provide (Interview 
S-06). 
 
He went on to say that this means managing the demands placed on the team, 
and the nature of their work.25 This is important in order to manage expectations 
as to what the committee can and can’t do, revealing a potentially difficult 
balancing act (Interview S-06). It means that responsibility for committee 
support rests with the clerk: 
 
I was the, you know, ultimately, on the staff side, the buck stops with the 
clerk. … Nothing should happen in the committee that the clerk isn’t aware of, 
                                                          
25 To give one minor example: over the course of fieldwork, clerks in my committee tried to 
encourage the pooling of our collective expertise by ‘asking the room’ about problems/issues 
that we faced, instead of emailing one another. This will grow the institutional memory, and 
help to develop the knowledge of the group (FWD 24.6.16). 
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hasn’t authorised in some way or isn’t part of, even if you’re not directly 
responsible for it. There should be nothing happening which you haven’t had 
sight of or thought about or done yourself (Interview S-05). 
 
For instance, over the course of my stay in Parliament, there was one occasion 
where briefing material in advance of an evidence session was labelled too 
sparse by the chair of my committee. It was the clerk that took responsibility, 
even though a different member of staff had written the brief; it was part of the 
clerk’s role to make sure that everything was of a consistently high quality (FWD 
47.11.20). This means that the clerk of a committee is often playing a ‘quality 
assurance role’ (Interview S-11). For example, the clerk would read briefing 
material and comment on the suggested lines for questioning, often with a view 
of cutting these down because otherwise, ‘staff will want to bring everything in’, 
which might affect committee members’ ability to question (Interview S-03). 
This is a proactive attempt to make sure that the process of questioning remains 
member-driven, not staff-driven. On a daily basis, members of the team would 
discuss their progress with the clerk to make sure they were on track. Questions 
that began, ‘Where are we with…?’, or discussions that closed with, ‘Going 
forward…’, were pervasive in my office (FWD 18.5.6). These were important and 
useful tools to make sure that the unpredictability of the team’s tasks were 
manageable, especially given the wide range of tasks that might be involved.  
 
This management role has consequences for the committee’s inquiries, as one 
clerk pointed out: 
 
If we don’t get things right at the beginning, if we don’t identify what the key 
political choices that face the government are on any particular issue, we very 
often head off in the wrong direction and by the time you’ve taken the wrong 
oral evidence and asked the wrong questions, you can’t get it back. So I think 
that provision of leadership to the team and helping to shape and helping to 
draw out of the team what the issues are and what the narrative around an 
inquiry is is really quite important (Interview S-10). 
 
Of course, responsibility for inquiries rests with members that populate 
committees, not support staff. However, as detailed in previous chapters, the 
multiple pressures that MPs face on a daily basis means that they become 
somewhat reliant on staff to ensure that the specific details in scoping notes, 
witness lists and briefing material are appropriate for them. MPs need to place 
significant trust in clerks, which they can only do due to the good reputation of 
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clerks (in part sustained by the performance style of clerkliness (see above)) 
(Interview S-06). Mistakes in briefings are rare, but when they do happen, MPs 
have called these ‘absolutely unforgivable’ (Interview M-23). Staff need to know 
the subject area incredibly well, but crucially, they also need to understand what 
it is that members want from their committee. This highlights a potential 
dilemma for staff in that they need to balance what a committee can and cannot 
do. In that sense, staff must have well-developed and highly nuanced political 
antennae to ensure that they can be responsive to the wishes of their political 
masters and set the right priorities. One clerk said that he is most likely to ‘take 
on the more complex bits of work or the things that are politically more 
sensitive’ (Interview S-05). Most MPs take briefing material seriously, and 
generally praise them, which is a testament to the high quality and general 
thoroughness of clerks. One MP said that he will always cover his section of the 
brief before ‘doing my own thing’ because ‘clearly the clerks put a lot of effort 
into figuring out how we’re going to get a report that covers the areas that are 
needed’ (Interview M-17, echoed in Interview C-06). Clerks usually write the first 
draft of a report. They will need to consider the evidence brought before them, 
and additionally consider a possible way in which the report will get consensus 
amongst members. This, too, requires astute political antennae. As one MP 
noted: 
 
I mean a good committee clerk will also understand the politics in the team 
and will, in the drafting of reports need to know what the committee is likely to 
find acceptable in a way that it’s working and … not seek to introduce elements 
in there which might upset the chair or might be okay to the chair but upset 
members and get them to turn on the chair. So a degree of political sensitivity 
is necessary (Interview C-09). 
 
This discussion shows that clerks offer foundational support for select 
committees, and they themselves acknowledge that they do the vast majority of 
work. They provide MPs with oral and written briefings to allow elected 
representatives to fulfil their work as scrutinisers, act as access points to identify 
and invite witnesses to give evidence, and act as team leaders for inquiries. 
Though some may interpret a clerk’s role in terms of gate-keeping or agenda-
setting, this would imply something too influential, and which most clerks would 
seek to prevent. Rather, clerks attempt to act as amplifiers for MPs’ interests 
(even if they disagree with MPs’ assessments). If clerks played a more leading or 
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veto-playing role, it would be more likely that MPs would ignore briefing 
material in questioning witnesses and may not agree to a report or ask for 
significant re-drafting. In order to make these judgements, the individual beliefs 
of clerks are of paramount importance, as well as the specific situation they find 
themselves. This illustrates the dilemma between supporting committee 
members and their wishes, while also keeping an eye on the inquiry as a whole 
and, indeed, keeping in mind their service to the House as a whole. To manage 
this, clerks rely on their political antennae. These develop over time, and are 
played out in the type and extent of advice that clerks give to Members. 
 
6.3.2. Advisory role of clerks 
 
The clerk of a committee acts as its principal adviser on procedure, something 
which most clerks mentioned in their interpretation of the role either explicitly 
or implicitly. Clerks are generally not subject specialists (with some exceptions), 
but typically get appointed to committees for four to five years, though this 
ranges. This makes them generalists on subjects, but specialists in running 
committees; their advice predominantly focuses on procedural matters, or 
ostensibly more general matters of concern for the committee. This is not a 
criticism and, in any case, arguably important because it means that clerks are 
focused on ensuring that subject areas are clearly and effectively communicated 
to committee members and the chairs, who are also unlikely to be subject-
specialists. Nonetheless, one clerk noted: ‘you can only do the job well if you get 
up to speed on the subject area very quickly’ (Interview S-11). During my 
fieldwork, to take just a few examples, advice ranged from how to make a formal 
amendment in considering a draft report (FWD 53.12.5), to whether a secretary 
of state has behaved unconstitutionally (and what the committee could do as a 
result) (FWD 52.12.3), to discussing the central conclusion of an inquiry’s report 
(FWD 49.11.11), and to making a point of order in the main chamber regarding 
the committee’s work (FWD 19.5.30). This makes the advisory role quite broad 
and arguably difficult to pin down. As one clerk put it: 
 
I will be the committee’s chief adviser on what they could and couldn’t do and 
what they should and shouldn’t do. I was the chair’s chief, sort of, go to person 
for anything that she wanted done (Interview S-05). 
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However, he also noted that he is not ‘there just to facilitate any sort of conduct’, 
in the sense that there are rules of the House that should not be contravened. 
This demonstrates that there are limits to the advice that clerks are prepared to 
give, creating a ‘tricky’ balancing act or dilemma. This tension is implicit in the 
following quote, where I asked a clerk to interpret his role: 
 
The job of the clerks of all select committees is essentially similar. It is to try to 
carry out the wishes of the committee in terms of the work that it wants to 
undertake within the committee’s terms of reference and in accordance with the 
procedures and practices of the House (Interview S-04, emphasis added). 
 
I asked clerks if this consequently meant that they see themselves as stewards of 
a committee, rather than servants. Most clerks did not think so (e.g. Interview S-
02). The quoted clerk, above, accepted this distinction could be made in the 
abstract, but did not believe it was applicable in practice: 
 
We can think of ourselves, I suppose, as stewards of the continuing or Platonic 
ideal of each committee but in fact, in practice we are largely the servants of 
committees, of actual committees as they are operating on a day-to-day basis 
(Interview S-04). 
 
Because of this, giving advice is far from easy, which is felt most acutely on an 
everyday level. On one occasion, this was borne out on my committee. It came in 
the form of social media (specifically Twitter). A committee member had tweeted 
that his committee would be agreeing a report later that day. Though seemingly 
harmless, the clerks alerted the chair that this disclosed private business, 
something that breached the principle that deliberations amongst committee 
members should remain private. When the chair brought up this contravention 
of parliamentary procedure at an otherwise uneventful committee meeting, the 
member in question refused to accept that he had breached procedure, looking 
directly at the clerk. Staff remained silent – it was not their place to confront or 
respond to the MP. The chair followed the MP’s line of sight, and realised that 
the member was confronting the clerk, not the chair. At this point he intervened, 
saying that ‘it is the duty of clerks to remind us of the rules’ and that it is an 
‘absolute requirement’ to follow them. The MP reneged, but noted that he would 
ask the Speaker to look into the matter (FWD 2.1.9). Later that day, at a staff 
meeting, clerks concluded that a guidance note about the use of Twitter was 
needed (FWD 2.1.19). This particular case demonstrates that the role of staff is 
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advisory only – they could not enforce the rule by reprimanding the committee 
member or imposing sanctions. They looked to the chair to speak to and deal 
with the matter; staff themselves did not get involved. 26 A wider observation is 
that, in committee meetings, clerks try not get involved when MPs are in 
discussion; they limit themselves to outlining possible options that the 
committee could (not should) follow in line with procedure (FWD 52.12.3). This 
reinforces the member-driven nature of the select committee system, and a 
conscious attempt by staff to limit their influence. In a similar vein, clerks rarely 
give political advice, unless it directly impacts on the work of the committee. On 
a few occasions, my chair would go on a tangent in a team meeting with staff to 
give his view of a political situation, possibly part of a sense-making process for 
him, but which was often met with a cautious response from staff who would 
direct him back to the agenda (FWD 49.11.11). Though just one example (of 
many more), this Twitter exchange also reveals the extent to which a tension 
between loyalty to the House and to MPs is played out in the everyday life of the 
House of Commons. In general, MPs accept that clerks’ loyalty is to the House 
(e.g. Interview M-09). They also accept and follow their advice on most 
occasions, but this does not guarantee that they always will do so (Interview S-
05). This creates a difficult balancing act for clerks, who need to act as a buckle 
between MPs’ wishes, on the one hand, and parliamentary procedure, on the 
other. 
 
Because of the effect of everyday events, one clerk found it difficult to summarise 
her role. She noted: ‘A lot of the time it feels like I am dealing with stuff as it 
happens’, and went on to say that, ‘there’s an awful lot of spontaneous stuff that 
you can’t plan for that seem to make up large chunks of your day’ (Interview S-
07). This unpredictability manifests itself in many ways. The chair could ask for 
advice at a moment’s notice, which consequently would require staff to drop 
everything else they had planned to get the advice to the chair in time (FWD 
11.3.10). This feeds into a wider point about the unpredictability of the role of 
clerk and that staff are frequently at the mercy of their elected masters. This 
brings us to the relationship between clerks and MPs. 
 
                                                          
26 Another factor, though beyond the remit of this chapter, is that there is a wider tension 
between new technology and the way that this affects Parliament, something which the 
Speaker of the House sought to investigate (see Digital Democracy Commission, 2015). 
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6.3.3. Managing relationships 
 
It will have become clear by this point that disentangling the role of clerks and 
their everyday practices from their relationship to and demands placed on them 
by MPs is a difficult one.27 As Chapter 5 sought to demonstrate, the tone of a 
committee is set by the chair, something with which most staff (and indeed 
committee members themselves) agreed. This indicates that the relationship 
between clerks and chairs is crucial, specific arrangements of which are defined 
by the chair. One clerk noted that he met with a chair every week without fail, 
irrespective of how long or short the agenda; but, when placed with another 
committee, the chair did not wish to meet with the clerk at all (the clerk had to 
guess what the chair wanted on the committee agenda) (Interview S-10). On my 
committee, we had meetings on a weekly basis. These meetings serve the 
important purpose of touching base and understanding the wishes of the chair. 
He would indicate these in general terms, and staff would go on to implement 
those where possible. It was not uncommon for the chair to close meetings by 
commenting things like, ‘you’ve got the gist’ (FWD 9.3.10), or, ‘can you flesh out 
what we’ve discussed?’ (FWD 16.4.18). This indicates that chairs often set out a 
general direction, and leave it to clerks to implement their wishes. This is a vital 
opportunity for clerks, who will be able to ask him about the direction of a report 
(FWD 34.8.7), the central themes that they noticed in the evidence hearings 
(FWD 39.9.3-39.9.17), or to give advice on handling certain witnesses (FWD 
54.12.7). Even if clerks and chairs did not meet formally, all clerks I spoke to 
mentioned that they were in contact with the chair – through email, telephone 
calls or text messages – most days a week (including out-of-hours). This 
relationship matters, as one chair commented: 
 
The ability of the clerks to develop a strong personable relationship with the 
chairman is absolutely vital. The relationship is so much more productive if it’s 
enjoyable, open, trusting and, you know, a degree of full and free exchange of 
views and ideas about, without fear or favour (Interview C-04). 
 
                                                          
27 There is a lot to be said about different the relationships between clerks and ministerial 
departments, different sections of the House of Commons Service, and between clerks and 
‘outside’ actors (such as witnesses and specialist advisers). Though these will be discussed in 
a little more depth in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, far more empirical research is possible on 
this topic. 
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Generally, staff work towards the chair, reinforced by the increasingly proactive 
role that chairs play in committee work compared to members. Clerks 
commented that this has increased since the election of chairs in 2010 following 
the Wright reforms because of a rise in their confidence (FWD 6.2.19, FWD 
36.9.9). Though this is arguably anecdotal evidence, this perception 
demonstrates the importance of beliefs in shaping clerks’ relationship to MPs in 
Parliament, irrespective of quantitative evaluations of chairs’ time commitments 
to their role (see also: Monk, 2010). One clerk noted: 
 
Increasingly chairs are seen as people who comment on issues around the 
committees remit, not just on current inquiries and are often in demand to talk 
at conferences and do media appearances and things (Interview S-09).  
 
In other words, the demand on the Committee Office and on clerks has grown. 
Clerks need to be on hand to support their chair with writing speeches and 
giving briefings to on topics in advance of not only committee activity, but of 
committee-related activity (Interview S-03). One chair expected staff to be 
available at all times (Interview C-09). Not only has this increased the demand 
of advice, but also affected the type of advice that they may, at times, be asked 
for. One clerk noted that his chair is keen on a panel of external advisers to 
which he could turn for policy advice (Interview S-03). This was echoed by 
chairs: one interviewee mentioned the need for an adviser for writing and 
reflecting on reports (Interview C-04); another that she needed a researcher to 
support her as chair but was ‘peeved’ that this was not possible (Interview C-08). 
 
Some clerks are worried about the consequent perception with their relationship 
to the other members, creating a dilemma. One clerk said that MPs, ‘don’t quite 
appreciate the role of the clerk and they see the clerk as maybe being the chair’s 
creature’ (Interview S-03). Clerks see themselves, something made very clear 
throughout interviews and fieldwork observations, as servants of the committee 
(and the House) as a whole. However, one clerk acknowledged that an equal 
level of service is not possible in practice: ‘I’m working for them [committee 
members] as much as for the chair, in theory, but in practice that’s not really 
how it works’ (Interview S-07). Clerks mentioned in interviews that they would 
like to work more closely with members, but accepted that this was made 
difficult due to the competing demands on an MP’s time (Interview S-10, 
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Interview S-04). The level of contact and involvement between members and 
chairs is so different on an everyday level that there are only limited 
opportunities for a closer relationship to develop with members (Interview S-07). 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, a chair is involved in almost all aspects of 
their committee’s work; a committee member is usually (though not always) 
interested in only specific inquiries or projects. That said, this tension or 
dilemma is rarely stress-tested because most MPs accept that chairs and clerks 
are likely to have a close working relationship (e.g. Interview M-17, Interview C-
07). 
 
This discussion has revealed that the typical role that staff play in supporting 
MPs goes far beyond the formal idea of providing procedural advice with which 
clerks are commonly associated. They play a key managerial role in order to 
sustain the work of a select committee and to push forward multiple inquiries; 
they are the bedrock for an inquiry’s work. In order to make sure that staff 
perform this role effectively, they build a significant skill in identifying the needs 
and wishes of members. They develop political antennae, something which is 
crucial in an environment where MPs disagree with one another on a regular 
basis and often in fervent terms. Without these antennae, committee work 
would be impossible because members would not be able to carry out inquiry 
work or support an inquiry’s conclusions. In other words, staff try to limit any 
staff-driven aspect of their work to keep scrutiny member-driven. Part of this 
requires staff to act as amplifiers for members’ interests, which has been 
demonstrated above through scoping inquiries according to members’ interests, 
identifying and inviting witnesses from which MPs want to hear, and drafting 
reports in a way that will build a sense of consensus. These are no easy tasks, 
and often throw up dilemmas for staff. This is something that this section has 
sought to explore by showing that inquiry support is often a balancing act 
between different committee interests; that giving advice to members requires 
political antennae, deftness and tact, as well as impartiality; and that ensuring 
effective working relationships between committee members, chairs and staff 
relies on being able to support members in a range of ways. These three 
dilemmas are ultimately part of a perennial issue that staff face over supporting 
an individual group of MPs whilst similarly offering service to the institution of 
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Parliament as a whole. This leads us to a wider discussion about the role of staff 
in select committees. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Clerks are the hidden servants of scrutiny in the House of Commons; they exist 
to give unwavering support to select committees behind the scenes. The first 
section has, importantly, indicated the broad setting or situated agency in which 
clerks operate. This has revealed a shortcoming in that the House of Commons 
Service appears siloed by some staff and possibly without clear managerial 
leadership that would inculcate systematic and effective scrutiny envisaged by 
parliamentary reformers (though this deserves far more scholarly attention). 
The second section of this chapter explored how staff themselves interpret their 
role, and identified a performance style of clerkliness. This is made up of three 
facets: being hidden, unparalleled service and passionate impartiality. In doing 
so, this has indicated that there are a number of dilemmas that staff face, which 
were then explored in the third section. Staff exist both to serve Members of 
Parliament and to safeguard the reputation of the House of Commons by 
following parliamentary procedure. This dilemma is played out in the Palace of 
Westminster on a daily basis, in which staff have to use their beliefs and 
practices to adjudicate between service to a particular group of MPs and to the 
institution as a whole. Alongside formal roles that staff play, they also act as 
amplifiers for MPs’ interests, develop astute political antennae, and manage 
relationships on committees to foster consensus.  
 
This chapter has sought to open a perspective on scrutiny by a group of actors 
from which we know very little. In part, it is a testament of their success at ‘being 
hidden’ that ensured that staff are not centre-stage actors in scrutiny processes. 
And yet, this chapter has sought to indicate that we can learn a lot about scrutiny 
from understanding the role that staff play in that process because of the crucial 
things that they do as part of the scrutiny process in the House of Commons. In 
this sense, this chapter seeks to open a debate about the role of clerks in 
ensuring effective scrutiny and clearly, overall, this chapter indicates that clerks 
do play a pivotal role with which the literature on Parliament and parliamentary 
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studies has arguably not engaged in great depth. However, it also reveals the 
complexity of developing systematic scrutiny in the House of Commons, which is 
affected by other actors in significant ways. As revealed in Chapter 4, MPs adopt 
a variety of roles, whose commitment to scrutiny is consequently unpredictable, 
and, as discussed in Chapter 5, it is chairs that bring coherent to this system by 
developing a role of catalyst or chieftain in scrutiny activity. This chapter brings 
Part II to a close by showing how committee staff supplement the work of 
elected representatives and the crucial role they play behind the scenes. To do so, 
each chapter has explored the three parliamentary actors in isolation from one 
another. It falls to Part III to shed light on how these three actors enable select 
committees to enact or perform their scrutiny role by looking in more detail at, 
first, how these actors create performance teams and work together to create 
consensual committee reports, second, how committee members, chairs and 
staff contribute to the evidence-gathering process before, finally, placing the 
findings from this thesis in their wider context of parliamentary studies. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part III: Scrutiny Landscapes 
 
 
I always say: never run away with the idea that the House of Commons is an 
organisation because it isn’t. It’s an organism and organisms are reactive, 
cussed, unpredictable. 
 
– Sir Robert Rogers (now Lord Lisvane)28 
 
 
Having identified the beliefs that guide committee members, chairs and staff in 
their scrutiny activity, and located these in wider performance styles, this section 
of the analysis focuses more broadly on scrutiny practices to bring together 
aforementioned insights. To do so, the first chapter of Part III identifies the 
importance of the relationships between parliamentary actors and the wider 
‘webs’ of scrutiny that emerge at the Palace of Westminster. The second chapter 
then covers a specific ‘scene’ or ‘performance’ of scrutiny, namely the evidence-
gathering process. The final chapter – or ‘curtain call’ – summarises the insights 
gained from this research and places this thesis in the wider context of 
parliamentary studies. 
  
                                                          
28 Quoted in Civil Service World (2015).  
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Chapter 7: Relationships 
 
 
 
 
arlier chapters have examined the importance of the contested nature 
of the term ‘scrutiny’ – a central thread of this PhD – by looking at how 
committee members, chairs and staff interpret this concept and how 
they enact their role associated with it. However, each of these chapters has 
looked at those interpretations in isolation from one another. Here, I build on 
preceding chapters by turning from individual interpretations of scrutiny to the 
way in which these affect the development of relationships within and between 
select committees to inform the wider scrutiny landscape and create what 
Goffman (1990, pp.83-108) referred to as ‘performance teams’ (see also Chapter 
2). Relationships are fundamental to understanding scrutiny, if only to better 
appreciate how, in our adversarial system of politics where government and 
opposition offer diametrically contrasting world views, it is possible for select 
committees to write and agree consensual reports between backbench MPs of 
both sides of the House. In order to examine this issue, this chapter proceeds in 
three sections. First, at the micro-level, I examine why relationships matter to 
MPs and what factors affect their individual relationships. In simple terms, 
committee scrutiny cannot be undertaken in isolation, and requires members 
from across the party spectrum to work together. Relationships are affected by 
MPs’ philosophical outlooks, their personalities, how they approach scrutiny, 
and through daily interactions (everyday practices). Second, I broaden out to the 
meso-level to explore how interactions between committee members instil 
committee norms and values (which I term committee traditions). This 
examines not the importance of individual beliefs and practices but the 
importance of individual beliefs in relation to others’ beliefs and practices. This 
E 
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focuses on the concept of performance teams, and considers how norms and 
values help committees create collective scrutiny performances and, in doing so, 
construct consensus over the course of an inquiry. Third, the chapter broadens 
out yet further to the macro-level, where I consider relationships between and 
beyond committees. Formally, relationships are institutionalised through the 
Liaison Committee, but informally there is both collaboration and competition 
that affects the wider scrutiny landscape. Indeed, these wider informal dynamics 
and everyday practices affect the ideal of systematic and coherent scrutiny in the 
House of Commons. This brings us to the central argument of this chapter: 
ultimately, the idea of systematic scrutiny depends on a fragile, though 
sometimes also very dense and effective, web of scrutiny in the House of 
Commons. As earlier chapters have demonstrated, each parliamentary actor, 
and therefore each committee, pushes and pulls scrutiny in different directions. 
So while the select committee system is placed on a formal footing through 
Standing Orders, much of their work depends on informal dynamics: how 
scrutiny is interpreted by committees, relationships between committee 
members, and committee ‘customs and practices’ or ‘norms and values’ (or, 
indeed, committee traditions). This creates a web of scrutiny, something which 
ties together many elements from previous empirical chapters on individual 
beliefs and everyday practices. To understand this better, it is worth starting at a 
more basic level by explaining the importance of relationships in the first place. 
 
 
7.1. The importance of relationships: making scrutiny work 
 
In this section, I begin with a discussion on why relationships matter, before 
then looking at how individual relationships are affected by MPs’ approaches to 
scrutiny, their philosophical outlooks and personalities, and everyday 
interaction across the parliamentary estate. 
 
7.1.1. Why do relationships matter? 
 
As previous chapters have already indicated, interviewees believed that one of 
the real positives of select committee work is the ability to overcome partisan 
considerations to establish cross-party agreement on issues of policy concern. 
Chapter 7: Relationships 
167 
For example, one chair noted that the ‘added value of a select committee, really, 
is its cross-party nature’ (Interview C-10). A committee member, similarly, 
noted that without cross-party consensus, you ‘create a potential for a partisan 
minority’ and are consequently denied the label of ‘the powerful all-party 
parliamentary … select committee’ (Interview M-06). Thus, consensus is a 
foundational element of committee work, with some arguing that those ‘that 
split on party political lines are a waste of time’ because ‘the government can 
ignore them’ (Interview M-21). In order to achieve consensus, committees 
depend on good working relationships between Members of Parliament. 
Generally, most MPs noted the pivotal importance of this to making scrutiny 
happen and to achieve a consensual report. For example: 
 
Having a good personal relationship with members is very important insofar, 
shall we say, it acts as a way of restraining any sort of excesses in debate in 
committee, yeah, if you genuinely get on fairly well as a group of people 
(Interview C-09). 
 
If you’re not collegiate, this doesn’t work. This place doesn’t work. … A lot of 
this place works on: you support your colleagues (Interview M-09).  
 
The key component within the committees is actually having that degree of 
common working together and understand the respect for each other … 
(Interview M-20) 
 
They [relationships] are quite important that you feel some, kind of, 
comfortable with each other and there’s sort of trust and it’s, you know, it’s all 
private … (Interview M-18) 
 
As the latter two quotes show, MPs rely on a sense of trust and respect for one 
another as they conduct committee inquiries (things like leaking information is 
considered ‘poisonous’ for committee relationships (Interview M-16, Interview 
M-17, Interview M-21)). Another MP thought of relationships in rational choice 
terms, using the concept of logrolling (Butler, 2012, pp.66-74) to explain why 
relationships matter: 
 
Because you’ve helped somebody out, they’ll help you out later. And most of the 
time, most of us don’t have very strong views on subjects where we’re not 
specialists, you know? So if you do something on one area for a person, they’ll 
usually help you out on another area where they don’t have especially strong 
views (Interview M-17). 
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These comments do not, by and large, refer to formal relationships between 
committee members (or between members and their chair) but informal 
interactions which are often more fluid. This matters particularly in select 
committee work because of the lack of formal rules, accepted or widely known 
conventions, or a guidance role from party whips (in contrast to public bill 
committees or, indeed, the main chamber).29 Therefore, relationships between 
committee members are more organic and arguably affected not by conventions 
set by Erskine May, but by (i) their interpretation of scrutiny, (ii) the 
philosophical outlooks of members, and (iii) the personalities of MPs. The first 
of these was covered in Chapter 4; the latter two warrant brief comment.  
 
7.1.2. Members and their outlooks 
 
One MP told me with pride that he told the whips to ‘sod off’ (Interview M-14) 
when they asked him about committee work, which broadly feeds into the belief 
among committee members that partisan influences should not, where possible, 
affect committee scrutiny.30 This is necessary to establish cross-party agreement. 
One MP, for example, believed that committees are at their most effective ‘when 
most members are prepared to leave party badges at the door’ (Interview M-
22). Though this may well be true in theory, this is not entirely possible in 
practice all of the time. This is because elected representatives remain deeply 
political people. During fieldwork, my clerk occasionally commented that 
representatives often behave in a ‘politician mode’ (FWD 20.5.12), and once 
questioned whether they were ever able to think outside of this frame (FWD 
26.6.3). Though this clearly echoes the role of a party helper identified in 
Chapter 4, this is a little different in that it refers more broadly to the 
philosophical outlook of MPs. It is summarised best in the following quote:  
 
They’re political people and they have deeply-held views about the world which 
aren’t left at the door. … Some of my Tory members of my committee were very 
partisan, Conservative, quite right-wing and their view was the free market 
should be left to it, in all sorts of areas, and any smack of regulation was 
wrong in principle. And the Labour people generally have the opposite view 
                                                          
29 In the main chamber, there are a range of widely accepted courtesies and conventions, 
which are very well-understood by elected Members, but less often in committee rooms.  
30 The role of whips remains elusive, however, and something to which I return in Chapter 9. 
Andrew Tyrie has pointed out, for example, that they still play a role (Tyrie, 2015, p.14). 
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and I think … it’d be naïve to think … that as politicians they would suddenly 
just abandon that. That is their mind set (Interview S-05). 
 
It was similarly acknowledged by MPs: ‘our viewpoint on an issue is coveted by 
our view on, you know, the world rather than anything that’s strictly party 
political’ (Interview M-18; echoed also in Interview M-10). Their outlooks can 
affect committee work. One clerk noted, for example, that the addition of a very 
left-wing MP to his committee, someone ‘very assiduous and quite clear in his 
line’, has ‘ruffled a few feathers’ and possibly made the committee ‘less 
consensual’ (Interview S-04). It is not necessarily specific party political issues 
that lead to acrimony, but the underlying philosophy and approach to political 
issues. For example, on my committee, two MPs would bitterly disagree over a 
range of issues as a result of their diametrically opposing belief about the 
purpose of politics (FWD 15.4.1, FWD 16.4.28). The effects of different 
philosophical outlooks does not need to be negative, though, because – to take a 
final example – one clerk explained how two MPs who were on opposing wings 
of their respective parties (one being a right-wing Conservative MP and the other 
being a left-wing Labour MP) got on very well because they, first, both had 
traditional ideas about their particular policy issue, and second, found common 
ground over their desire to leave the European Union (Interview S-02, FWD 
42.10.4).  
 
Linked to the philosophical outlook of MPs are their personalities more 
generally, which have been rarely acknowledged in the literature on select 
committees (perhaps due to the traditionally institutionalist approach that most 
scholars adopt). They are an important additional factor to building consensus, 
as these interviewees point out: 
 
The committee’s work depends very much on the personality of the chairs. And 
we have brilliant chairs and we have disastrous chairs (Interview M-02). 
 
MG: … I’ve been trying to work out what drives the relationships in Parliament 
between MPs on committees. 
I: Oh, very complicated. Very personal. I mean … I suspect it’s the leadership, 
it’s the chairman that determines how a committee functions. The chairman – 
and I hope I am – is open and reasonable and places his trust or her trust in 
members of the committee and the staff … (Interview C-04). 
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Over the top of it [political relationships], you have to also layer a healthy dose 
of personality. And some of them, no matter how ideologically barking they 
might be, are really lovable people who just get on with everybody and others 
have plenty of decent and intelligent things to say but are such awfully horrible 
people to deal with that nobody likes them … and so … you have to look at all of 
these other things. And it does contribute to, you know, what makes a 
committee successful (Interview S-10). 
 
This point is crucial, not least because of its implication about the success of a 
committee, but also because it goes to the heart of explaining the way in which 
simple, everyday relationships affect scrutiny. One chair argued that 
relationships are not built from a shared political philosophy or being in the 
same political party, but: ‘in reality, most of it’s down to personality and how 
people treat each other’ (Interview C-01). To take a specific example, one chair 
noted his positive relationship to the vice chair of his committee, which was 
fostered through a shared interest in football (though, as in politics, they support 
different teams) (Interview C-09). More generally, a committee member noted: 
 
You can have friends in other political parties and people in your own party 
you barely say hello to and that’s the nature of the way this place is. So you 
have personal friendships and you have political acquaintances. I have 
exceptionally good friends in the Liberal Democrats as well as them being 
party colleagues. I have friends in the Conservative Party and the Labour 
Party who I’m not politically in tune with at all (Interview M-15). 
 
This feeds more widely into the concept of friendship. Though easily dismissed 
as non-political or unimportant, this can make an impact. It is something that 
was discussed in terms of dilemmas in Chapter 4, such as seeing past a friend’s 
antagonistic behaviour (e.g. FWD 42.10.4) or willing to join a committee because 
of friendship with other serving MPs (e.g. Interview M-12). Friendships can, 
therefore, have real effects in motivating scrutiny behaviour or, as the following 
quote shows, to overcome stereotypes of their political adversaries: 
 
I mean I’m really impressed with [SB16]. I thought he was a, you know, a sort 
of Scottish fossil to start with, and worried where he’s coming from, but he’s 
really, really … and he is also very supportive. He’s always been loyal and 
supportive (Interview C-04). 
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Friendships act as ways to build greater solidarity and enhance the cross-party 
scrutiny conducted by committees – indeed, it is dependent on this respect, trust 
and support for one another.31 
 
This discussion reveals that personal dynamics and philosophical outlooks affect 
relationships, which, in turn, affect inquiry processes. They may or may not lead 
to a consensual report, something which is fundamental for effective scrutiny. 
These relationships are also affected through other routine, quotidian and 
everyday behaviour in the House of Commons, which deserves attention. 
 
7.1.3. Building relationships in the everyday 
 
Relationships are shaped not only by the approach to scrutiny, philosophical 
outlooks and personalities of members (individual beliefs) but also through 
daily interaction in the House of Commons. Some of these practices were 
explored in earlier chapters, but it is worth directly focusing on their 
manifestation here. It happens most clearly in the margins of meetings: before 
an evidence-session begins, MPs will chat and gossip; afterwards, it is possible to 
overhear Members (and staff) say things like, ‘can I grab you for a moment?’, 
which will lead to impromptu discussions and decision-making (e.g. FWD 1.1.20, 
FWD 2.1.2, FWD 2.1.16, FWD 2.1.17). Not just meeting spaces, but also division 
lobbies: ‘I had a meeting in the margins of a vote with two other members of 
the [XX] Committee where we decided on the morning’s work and how we 
should take it forward’ (Interview M-06).32 This ‘rubbing shoulders’ between 
committee members happens throughout the parliamentary estate: 
 
I … will bump into [JC06] when we’re both buying a coffee and I’ll say, you 
know, “What do you think of that? I think we ought to be doing more or less”, 
or “Why the hell are we doing this?”. And we’ll spend 15 minutes with a coffee 
                                                          
31 Unfortunately, it goes beyond the reach of this doctoral thesis to offer a more detailed 
analysis of friendships in Parliament, but this clearly deserves further attention in future 
research. There are few studies that have attempted to explore friendships in British politics 
(with one recent notable exception by Sarah Childs (2014)). 
32 Division lobbies are not only a useful space to speak with committee colleagues, but allows 
backbench MPs an opportunity to speak with their frontbench counterparts, something 
which happened regularly during my fieldwork between my chair and frontbench politicians 
(FWD 59.13.4, FWD 19.5.10, FWD 49.11.11, FWD 57.13.7). It is perhaps for this reason that 
there has been significant resistance amongst so many Members of Parliament to change the 
way that voting takes place in the main chamber. 
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at Portcullis just nattering about it. You know, that kind of thing (Interview M-
06). 
 
If we bump into each [other] we’ll say, “What did you think about what so-and-
so said?” and “Could you believe this?” or I might ask, I might say, “I really 
want to get this witness in, is that something that you think that’s a good idea 
or would you support me in that” (Interview M-23). 
 
Similarly, a committee chair remarked that he would ‘bump into them 
[committee members] all the time’, and would make sure he used those 
opportunities to share concerns and discuss the committee’s work in advance of 
meetings (Interview C-04). It may not seem significant, but this raises 
interesting questions about the nature of space and spatial arrangements for the 
Palace of Westminster. The organisation of space, whether the design and layout 
of meeting rooms, debating chambers or the Palace as a whole, affects the 
everyday nature of scrutiny. One clerk captured this extremely well: 
 
The changes in the geography of the estate have reduced the opportunities for 
us to come across Members. So Millbank used to be a shared space between 
Members and staff. So we were falling over them in the canteen and, you know, 
you were rubbing shoulders with them all. If you go back far enough, we were 
dining in the dining rooms in the evening because the House sat late and 
everybody was there and you were rubbing shoulders with them. … there was 
just more opportunity for those sorts of contacts to happen.  
 
He added: ‘I think unless we find ways of developing those relationships then 
that whole dynamic starts to change and change in a way that’s possibly 
unhelpful’, by which he meant that just looking at formal processes ignores ‘the 
organic thing that is going on and those relationships that actually go towards 
making the whole thing successful as an endeavour’ (Interview S-10). Indeed, 
this is especially important given the pressure on time that both staff and MPs 
face. 33  ‘Rubbing shoulders’ allows parliamentary actors to understand one 
another better, build relationships and therefore improve their ability to 
scrutinise the executive. This also returns us to the theoretical precepts outlined 
in Chapter 2, and especially the importance of space to enact parliamentary 
performances. It is in different settings that actors enact their role, and these 
different stages or settings are crucial aspects to better understand not only the 
                                                          
33 This feeds into a broader debate about the restoration and renewal of the Palace of 
Westminster, currently being considered by the Joint Committee on the Palace of 
Westminster in Parliament. 
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performance of individual actors but the broader performance of a ‘team’ of 
performers (Goffman, 1990, pp.83-108). Indeed, it is through these informal 
relationships and everyday practices that MPs build webs of scrutiny at the 
meso-level (within committees) and at the macro-level (between and beyond 
committees), to which discussion now turns.  
 
 
7.2. Developing committee traditions 
 
During an interview, a committee member remarked: 
 
The chair of the select committee gets a great deal of status but as with any 
committee, the chair is only as good as the committee that they have working 
with them (Interview M-09).  
 
This quote indicates the important and admittedly quite basic fact that a select 
committee is made up of (usually) 11 Members of Parliament, each of whom will 
have interpreted their scrutiny role in a different (perhaps competing) way, but 
who nonetheless make a distinctive contribution to inquiry work. Additionally, 
committee members bring with them their philosophical outlooks and 
personalities, as covered above. When this is taken into account and placed in 
the context of an adversarial British political culture, it seems quite remarkable 
that MPs are able to come together as committees and produce reports with 
unanimous agreement.34 This section explores this issue in detail by looking 
precisely at how committee members relate to one another to develop committee 
traditions, build performance teams and to construct consensus. This requires: 
(i) summarising the norms and values in committees; (ii) examining the 
development of relationships over the course of an inquiry to construct 
consensus; and (iii) analysing some of the key factors that affect a committee’s 
ability to build effective working relationships. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 This was echoed by both newly-appointed (Interview M-01) and long-serving (Interview 
M-07) committee members. 
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7.2.1. Norms and values 
 
One interviewee believed that ‘norms of civility’ govern not only select 
committee behaviour but all of Parliament (e.g. courtesies and conventions in 
the main chamber, etc.). He believed that these norms and values are all around 
Parliament and a key factor in sustaining partnership and collaboration. Though 
he noted quite simple examples – politeness in opening and closing doors for 
one another, or passing water to one another during meetings – these micro-
practices foster an atmosphere of collegiality that overcomes the harsh realities 
of adversarial politics (Interview M-11). Another interviewee noted similar 
dynamics by calling evidence sessions ‘a kind of dance which is imperceptible’ 
(also noting that this process is ‘very difficult’ to describe, much to my dismay) 
(Interview M-16). Some of these norms of civility are broadly shared by 
committee members, such as a general agreement (or ‘good manners’) not to 
‘steal somebody else’s thunder’ (Interview M-15) nor ‘wanting to pinch 
somebody else’s question so they don’t have anything credible to say’ during an 
evidence session (Interview M-18) (echoing the importance of ownership over 
committee work, noted in Chapter 5 (see also below)). Another value, often used 
to carry committees over subjects where there is disagreement between 
committee members, is the use of humour – particularly during private sessions 
(e.g. FWD 3.1.12). It means that members can discuss difficult subjects without 
letting this affect them personally whilst simultaneously keeping the committee 
collegiate. Taken together, norms and values (or beliefs and practices) come 
together to create what might be termed a ‘committee tradition’ of ideas and 
values (a web of beliefs). In terms of everyday behaviour, it also creates a 
‘working consensus’, in that all participants agree to honour the performance of 
others and what others regard as important (Goffman, 1990, pp.20-1), which 
ultimately leads to an overall performance by a performance team (see also 
Chapter 2). 
 
Beyond these ‘norms of civility’, each committee arguably has their own ‘feel’ to 
it (Interview S-02, FWD 29.7.8), which reinforces a committee’s distinct 
tradition or web of beliefs. Three examples suffice to make the point. First, on 
my committee, MPs would not generally interrupt one another during evidence 
sessions; on other committees, I noticed that there was a lot more free-flow or 
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jumping in to ask follow-up questions (irrespective of whether the chair had 
asked the individual to come in or not). Second, the physical movement of 
members and staff. On some committees, members will not move from their seat 
during public evidence sessions, but instead pass notes to one another or send 
emails to confer about what a witness had said or to negotiate the next line of 
inquiry; in other committees, members would freely move to sit next each other 
in order to discuss a point as a session is underway (indicating ownership of 
space). A third and final example, seating arrangements. On some committees, 
members sit according to party line; in others they do not. In one particular 
committee, a clerk told me that if an MP’s seat is taken by someone else, then 
‘things are said’ (Interview S-03). This may seem inconsequential, but the use of 
space has physical and symbolic effects. Physically, it means that members from 
different parties quite literally contact one another and talk directly to each 
other (or, if they sit along party lines, they do not). Symbolically, it reveals the 
extent to which a committee is cross-party in its process of undertaking 
committee work. One chair, for example, noted that he tries to make sure the 
committee doesn’t sit by party in order to ‘act as one’ (Interview C-06). 
 
These three everyday behaviours are routine and quotidian in every sense of the 
word and, though they may appear mundane or insignificant, they matter in 
developing an overall relationship of trust, respect and sense of team amongst 
the committee. Committees themselves are conscious of this. One member, for 
example, described how getting to know one another and going to training 
sessions allows committees to overcome an otherwise adversarial spirit: 
 
I mean that’s useful sometimes to … just to get to know each other a bit better 
because there’s a danger of becoming quite competitive … in terms of, “I’m 
going to get my say” and “I’ve got this brilliant question I want to ask and I’m 
going to get it in regardless” … (Interview M-03). 
 
As noted in other chapters, there is an active attempt, particularly by chairs, to 
‘hunt as a pack’: 
 
I think it’s really important that select committees hunt as a pack. … I think the 
most effective [questioning] is when you use the talents that different people 
have and I’ve also – to try and get the committee to gel – we had an away day. 
We only went across the river, but we still had an away day and that was to 
try and get them hunting and thinking together (Interview C-05). 
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Another chair spoke of a ‘common sense of moral purpose’ (Interview C-06). 
The extent of this team spirit amongst the group and the wider committee 
traditions that underpin them will have practical effects on scrutiny. For 
example, a number of MPs said that they would be far less willing to attend 
meetings without a sense of partnership amongst them (e.g. Interview M-01, 
Interview M-10; for information on attendance between 2010 and 2015, see 
Appendix F). It is worth quoting the following exchange from an interview 
between myself and a newly-appointed MP to a select committee with 
comparatively fairly low attendance over the 2010 parliament: 
 
MG: What were your expectations when you first joined? 
I: Well I thought we’d have a full committee for a start. I mean, I can’t believe 
we only had four people there. I mean that really shocked me. … I don’t know 
whether this happens with other select committees? 
MG: As far as I know, some have higher attendance. I think it depends, though, 
on who the witnesses and- 
I: Yeah, I don’t think that’s right. I mean, you know, there may be times when I 
can’t attend the select committee. I’ve now got the idea in my head that you 
don’t have to turn up – which is not a good thing. I personally think you should 
make every effort to attend every single session … (Interview M-04). 
 
This quote illustrates the importance of committee norms and values, not only in 
fostering a sense of common purpose, but also of the role of socialisation to 
which we return later. A committee needs a sense of belonging, and this culture 
is built up through everyday actions – including the basic act of attending 
evidence sessions. So, without full committee backing and support, inquiries 
may lose attendance, have poor preparation and questioning, or even break 
down in the consideration of reports altogether. One clerk observed: 
 
You try and build up an esprit de corps by – the chair will say a lot about that. 
But also, it depends if you ever – all you need is a couple of very disruptive 
members and the whole thing begins to fall apart in terms of relationships 
(Interview S-03). 
 
Thus, individual members of the committee play a key role in sustaining a 
performance team among a committee. The interviewee also noted the role of 
chair. Chairs will indeed be pivotal throughout this process given the way in 
which they interpret and enact their role, something which returns to themes of 
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Chapter 5 and the dilemma they face in getting this right. One long-serving 
committee member believed that this was a recent development: 
 
I think it’s … interesting in terms of the development of the select committee of 
more recent years the extent to which the committee becomes a cohesive whole 
– not necessarily agreeing with each other on things but actually 
understanding where people are coming from and how the committee as a 
whole can best make progress. 
 
Adding, later in the interview:   
 
I think actually the current structure of select committees is far, far better than 
it’s ever been before – but not for the obvious reasons, but for the rather more 
subtle reasons that we’ve been discussing. So, it’s not that the select committees 
have suddenly been given a magic, you know, House of Representatives type 
wand … It’s that the dynamics of those select committees and the extent to 
which they can actually interact with their department change (Interview M-
07). 
 
Something similar was echoed by a committee chair, too (Interview C-03). This 
is possibly less often acknowledged when scholars think of the impact of select 
committee reforms (perhaps due to our often formal, institutionalist lens), but 
does not reduce the point: the atmosphere and relationships that make scrutiny 
work has changed as a result of the 2010 reforms and, in doing so, arguably 
made scrutiny more consensual, more cross-party and plausibly more effective 
as a result (admittedly, this remains a hypothesis at this stage, though widely 
supported by interviews). To examine specifically how norms and values (or 
‘norms of civility’) might affect committee work, it is worth exploring the impact 
of relationships between members over the course of an inquiry in constructing 
consensus, something which we identified earlier as of pivotal importance for 
committees. 
 
7.2.2. Inquiry processes: constructing consensus 
 
It is possible to identify a range of steps from an idea for an inquiry to the ‘end 
point’ (though it could be argued that scrutiny is always on-going), which have 
been described well in Robert Rogers and Rhodri Walters’ How Parliament 
Works (2015, pp.319-27). Over the course of fieldwork, I identified 11 steps, 
which have been summarised in Table 7.1. However, for the purposes of this  
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Table 7.1. Inquiry processes 
Theme Step Description 
Agenda-
setting 
(1) Inquiry idea 
and agreement 
A committee will often begin with an informal 
discussion about ideas for inquiries, which are 
subsequently agreed by the committee. 
(2) Terms of 
reference 
Committee staff will write draft terms to establish 
boundaries for the inquiry, which are then discussed, 
amended and agreed by the committee. 
Evidence-
gathering 
(3) Written 
evidence 
Terms of reference will be published along with an open 
call for evidence by the public (some groups and 
individuals may be invited to submit evidence). 
(4) Oral evidence 
This stage is closed in that witnesses need to be invited 
to attend and give evidence to committees (see Chapter 
7 for a discussion). 
(5) Committee 
visit 
Some committees may choose to supplement their 
investigations with a committee visit, which can range 
from domestic visits to international expeditions. 
Report-
writing 
(6) Heads of 
report 
Once all evidence has been collected, staff analyse the 
material and identify key themes, which are then 
discussed by committee members and the chair. 
(7) Chair’s first 
draft 
With the heads of report in mind, staff will write a draft 
report that will then be considered by the chair, which 
will then be sent out to the committee members. 
(8) Report 
consideration 
Members are invited to submit amendments that will be 
discussed informally and formally by the committee. 
Usually, committees seek to agree to a report 
unanimously at this point. 
Policy-
informing 
(9) Publication of 
report 
Once a report has been agreed, it will be published. 
Embargoed copies may be sent to witnesses, relevant 
civil servants/departments, and occasionally the media 
and other interested bodies. 
(10) Government 
response 
The government is expected to respond to the 
committee’s report within two months, particularly 
with regards to the committee’s recommendations. 
(11) 
Parliamentary 
debate 
This is an optional step, in which some committees may 
choose to debate the report on the floor of the House or 
at Westminster Hall. 
   
section, it is worth going through three parts that broadly cover inquiry 
processes: agenda-setting; evidence-gathering; and report-writing. 
 
Turning first to agenda-setting, this is the earliest opportunity at which point 
committee members seek to build common purpose and consensus. The variety 
of involvement is dependent upon committee members and affected by the 
chair’s approach. During fieldwork, there were anecdotal reports that particular 
chairs drove their committee’s agenda, for example, and one clerk explained 
(off-the-record) that the agenda of her committee was set entirely by the chair. 
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Whilst these are obvious examples of chairs acting as chieftains, other 
committees are less driven by their chair. One chair explained:  
 
Periodically, we have a session devoted to what inquiries shall we have. We’ll 
bat them around and again at least 50% of the inquiries are suggested by other 
members of the committee (Interview C-09).  
 
He went on to summarise the current inquiries of the committee, listing 
individual members associated with it (other interviewees from the same 
committee confirmed this). Another chair explained: 
 
The committee decides, not me, about future inquiry. I mean, I may make 
suggestions, the clerk makes suggestions, [policy stakeholder] makes 
suggestions. We’ve always said to bodies, if you’ve got any ideas of what we 
should be looking at, you know, don’t wait for us to call the inquiry and give 
evidence – tell us what we should be inquiring into! In the end it’s our decision, 
nobody else’s decision. It’s a committee decision (Interview C-07). 
 
This committee decision likely requires cross-party support and involvement 
from members across the political spectrum to be successful. This balancing act 
between divergent interests and views from committee members means that, 
according to some, the focus of inquiries is likely to be different from other areas 
of parliamentary work, notably the adversarial atmosphere of the main chamber: 
 
We work best when we’re concentrating on perhaps less … exposed areas 
where there is a degree of consensus, like [XX]. … These are all wonderfully 
interesting areas of our work where there is a lot of non-partisan discussion 
and disagreement but it’s generally, I regard that as the meat and drink of the 
committee’s work (Interview C-04). 
 
I did consciously avoid the areas of overt partisan debate on the floor of the 
House because at the end of the day this is a group of party politicians and they, 
they’re interested in [the committee’s policy area], and yes they can develop 
their own view independent of their party, but if there’s a high octane 
electorally significant debate going on, then that’s much more difficult. So, 
trying to avoid the partisan but not necessarily avoiding the important is 
rather easier than you might imagine (Interview C-10). 
 
A question remains as to whether committees consequently avoid contentious 
issues and topics. Though interviewee responses were inconclusive, many 
explained that the way in which any inquiry was framed was crucial to getting 
the right evidence, and later for the ability of committee members to agree to a 
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report, indicating any topic could conceivably be covered (e.g. Interview M-07, 
Interview M-10, Interview C-02, Interview S-09). A key theme associated with 
this is the idea that members must feel a sense of ownership over the agenda in 
order to support an inquiry. One chair, for example, indicated that it is 
important that members have a shared concern for effectiveness within the 
committee’s remit, even if they come from a different political perspective 
(Interview C-08). This may involve some horse-trading or ‘give-and-take’, as 
these two interviewees explained: 
 
I think you want to have a lot of behind-the-scenes chat and negotiation with 
different members and some of them [chairs] are good at that, you know, being 
able to say, “Well, look, you know, I know you don’t much like this inquiry, but 
I’d be really keen if you could turn up, and we’ll do your inquiry choice next”. A 
lot more give-and-take like that (Interview S-05). 
 
There is a sort of culture that you don’t … contradict aggressively because 
everyone gets their turn at it. So therefore you’re not going to kill somebody’s 
pet idea for an inquiry because it might be yours next week that you’ll try at it. 
So there is a sort of give-and-take – which works, usually, but if somebody 
keeps saying, “we must, we must” … that really irritates (Interview S-03). 
 
The sense of ownership implied in both quotes is something that acts as an 
undercurrent that binds committees together, something to which we return 
below (this also echoes themes from Chapter 5). The latter interviewee also 
explained other ‘irritations’ during evidence-taking: 
 
If the chair constantly interrupted everyone’s questions – I’ve seen that – drive 
the members to distraction. Or other members, you get a good riff of a question 
going and suddenly another member will just butt in in the middle of it and 
that ruins it. You can see them – absolutely seething. And if that’s repeated, 
that’s a problem (Interview S-03). 
 
This brings us to the second theme of the inquiry process. Though evidence-
gathering will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8, it is worth stating here how 
relationships contribute to this process. Interviewees noted that public sessions 
are often ‘pretty polite’ (Interview C-06), and depend on good personal 
dynamics or ‘personal chemistry’ because ‘if you’ve got that basic goodwill, it’s 
much easier to sort of rein somebody in or to accept in good humour that they 
need to shut up’ (Interview C-09). Personal chemistry or goodwill can be 
established in the margins of meetings, where members will chat and gossip, 
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learn about one another, share ideas, make jokes and caricature each other (e.g. 
FWD 2.1.2, FWD 3.1.12, FWD 52.12.3). At a deeper level, a range of interviewees 
explained that it is committee visits that are best at establishing goodwill 
because they ‘pull people together’ as part of a ‘common experience’ (Interview 
M-21). For example: 
 
The relationship on a select committee, I think, is crucial. … there will be 
occasions when you go away on visits. … So you’re travelling with these people. 
You’re having breakfast, midday and evening meals with these people. You’re 
going to the same briefing sessions. You are there as British MPs, you are not 
there as a Lib Dem MP. Yes, you are a Lib Dem MP, but you’re not there as a 
Lib Dem MP, you’re there as an MP on a select committee (Interview M-15). 
 
When you travel together and you go for dinner together the night before, then, 
you know … you start to learn about people’s, their family and things like that. 
So you see them real and … you can sympathise with them and the difficulties 
with their childcare and the travel and the constituents, you know. So there is a 
lot that we do share and that … building of the relationship, I think, is really 
important (Interview C-05). 
 
Travel and intense period together tends to bring you together and create a 
sort of personal bond that … might not otherwise be there, that’s very helpful, 
you know (Interview C-06). 
 
Given that MPs are under time pressure almost all of the time, visits can be 
especially important ways to build meaningful relationships between committee 
members without interruption (though it also makes it complicated and difficult 
to arrange in the first place). This does not necessarily mean that MPs will like 
each other more or agree with one another politically; rather, it builds a greater 
sense of respect between members and a sense of understanding in that they 
know where their colleagues are coming from in their approach to scrutiny 
(Interview M-21, Interview C-03 (FWD 43.10.16)). Additionally, of course, the 
depth of understanding gained from a field visit can be pivotal for committee 
work itself. For example, one chair of a committee noted that ‘visits confront 
people with the facts’, and went on to give a specific example of an inquiry where 
a visit had ‘significant influence’ on committee members’ views, which 
consequently ensured consensus for the inquiry’s final report. He gave another 
example: 
 
There was a classic occasion when … my committee, we tried to, we were 
struggling to agree a report on a difficult issue and benefited greatly from 
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being stuck in airport for a long time because of fog and a great many 
disagreements were resolved in the time we had (Interview C-01). 
 
Thus, the evidence-gathering process, particularly visits, are important in terms 
of constructing consensus. 
 
Once all the evidence for an inquiry has been collected, it usually falls to staff to 
write a draft report (one chair explained that ‘you can’t write by committee’ 
(Interview C-03)). This commonly follows a discussion by the committee of so-
called ‘heads of report’. For some committees, this is a detailed process in order 
to identify ‘where the sticking points might be’ (Interview S-11). Other 
committees do not discuss a heads of report in detail, which suggests different 
norms and values have been established by the group (Interview S-08, Interview 
S-10). In any case, from these heads of report staff will write a first draft to be 
considered by the chair, who will similarly identify ‘pinch points’ (Interview C-
05) ahead of report consideration by the committee as a whole. At that stage, 
committee members’ relationships are pivotal for select committees because 
they will have a direct impact on the extent of consensus for a report. One MP: 
 
You either respect or disrespect people at the end of that. People come out with 
their views. They compromise, don’t compromise. They can articulate their 
views as they mean. Whatever. You get to know people in that process. It’s a 
combination of outside the committee and inside the committee that does that 
(Interview M-21). 
 
It is here that the dynamics identified in the previous section, and in the 
preceding paragraphs, come into play. Committee members are very likely to 
give an input into a draft report as this is the key output in the scrutiny process 
to which an MP’s name is attached. Most will seek to do so by submitting 
amendments either formally or informally. Their amendments can be informed 
by a range of things, but are likely to be shaped at least in part by the scrutiny 
role that they habitually adopt (see Chapter 4). Based on observations from 
fieldwork and conversations in interviews, the vast majority of amendments or 
changes are based on informal discussions between members. Crucial to this 
process is the wording of a report: 
 
Before it came to a formal vote on it, it would [be] discussed by the committee. 
And there’d be a bit of negotiation, “Would you be happy with this alternative 
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wording for the amendment” and try and get everyone to agree on it 
(Interview M-22). 
 
These amendments do not necessarily need to be significant changes in a 
committee’s view, but could be a change of emphasis or ‘little nuances’: 
 
It might be something that’s bothering us but as a committee we might have it 
in there, “we’re concerned that”, and they’ll [the opposing party] change it to, 
“we note that” you know? So we still say it’s happening and something needs to 
happen, but they’ve just, it’s softening of language quite often is the way we get 
exactly the same recommendation out, but we just don’t say it in as adversarial 
a way (Interview M-10). 
 
One interviewee weaved this together with themes raised earlier about MPs’ 
ability to respect covered in earlier sections of this chapter: 
 
I mean today we had a dispute about a sentence … and someone was making a 
point about a sentence that doesn’t reflect the actual position, of how’s it going 
to look outside. And I said, “Well, here’s, we can make this in terms of wording”, 
“Yeah, that’s fine” … so that’s, I think a … the ability to respect each other, that 
people realise I make a suggestion, I’m not trying to trip people out, I’m 
actually genuinely trying to find a way through (Interview M-20). 
 
Certain recommendations or conclusions may be excluded from the final report 
to get consensus (Interview C-01), and one committee member recalled one 
report that wasn’t published because the committee was not able to get 
consensus (Interview M-21). More difficult discussions are often carried over 
with humour and laughter to lighten the atmosphere, as described in the 
previous sub-section (FWD 52.12.3, FWD 53.12.5). Each committee will develop 
their own way of considering reports, but all will be affected by committee 
norms and values that emerged over time. One clerk described the difference 
between one committee, where consideration of reports can ‘last several hours 
and stretch over several days’, and another, where ‘reports pretty much go 
through in about five minutes’ (Interview S-10). Explaining the achievement of 
consensus cannot be done purely on the weight of evidence, though this is 
crucial. Rather, committee traditions (let alone strategic political considerations) 
play their part in affecting the way in which the committee sets its agenda, 
gathers evidence, and then considers a report.  
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A crucial dynamic that has been implied throughout this sub-section is the sense 
of ownership that committee members have as part of the inquiry process. This 
was noted throughout interviews: 
 
Members must feel that the report is partly theirs (Interview C-09).  
 
You’re giving something to each member which allows them to say, “This is my 
work on the committee” and therefore, you know, they can get buy-in to it 
(Interview M-20). 
 
The select committee work is often what they enjoy the most … because they 
feel that, amongst other things, it gives them the feeling that they’re actually 
having some effect on the real world (Interview C-01). 
 
The role of chair is crucial in fostering this sense of ownership: ‘I’m very keen 
that kind of group responsibility should come about and makes it more likely 
they’re going to turn up’ (Interview C-06). This was echoed by other 
interviewees (e.g. Interview S-09, Interview C-05). It was something that was 
noticeable during fieldwork, too, where my committee was not able to agree to a 
report because it was perceived ownerless (sometimes also referred to as 
‘orphaned’ inquiries):  
 
The member that wanted it is [BB51] … he’s left. The other member that was 
interested, [MR43], he’s left. The chair has had no interest in it from the start 
and … it’s not his core interest. So … it’s a bit lost (Interview S-08). 
 
When it came to report consideration, each committee member gave their take 
on the issue, but divergent opinions persisted because of philosophical 
differences between members. Essentially, arguments revolved around political 
principles of the role of the state that replicated traditional Conservative (less 
interventionist), Labour (more interventionist) and Liberal Democrat (middle-
way) positions. Without the collective buy-in from all members, agreement was 
not possible and a report was never published (FWD 52.12.3). This additionally 
echoes themes from earlier sections about the effect of philosophical outlooks on 
committee work, but also raises a dilemma about the changing membership of 
select committees. This turns our discussion from the emergence of performance 
teams to how they are affected over the course of a parliament. Here, it is worth 
exploring the specific example of changing membership. 
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7.2.3. The dilemma of changing membership 
 
Whilst one MP noted that he switched select committee because of a vacancy 
opening that was more relevant to his constituency and another that he wanted 
to try something new, the main reason for changing membership of committees 
comes from frontbench reshuffles (of both the government and opposition side) 
(Interview M-08, Interview M-17, Interview S-09). The average length of 
membership between 2010 and 2015 was 32 months, or just over two and a half 
years (which varied between committees and members (see Appendix F)). This 
means that there is ‘always a bit of movement’ (Interview M-03). One 
committee chair believed that this was ‘extremely frustrating’ because it affected 
the political balance and descriptive representation of his committee, and 
required building relationships with new members all over again (his committee 
had comparatively high turnover) (Interview C-01). Other chairs noted that this 
was ‘quite a problem’ for similar reasons, additionally noting that you can lose 
talented members (especially if they have attended committee training sessions) 
(Interview C-05, Interview C-09). As a result of changing membership, then, 
new members join an established committee who could question existing 
practices. For example, one clerk pointed out that new members on his 
committee questioned a previous agreement between members and the chair 
that press notices and the media would be the chair’s responsibility, which 
created tension amongst newer committee members that wanted input to this 
(Interview S-05). More generally, it suggests that new members’ beliefs and 
practices could be ‘completely at odds with the norms that that group has 
already established’, as this clerk recounts: 
 
I’ve seen on a handful of occasions, members walk in, take no notice at all of 
the norms that the group has, and start to force divisions on reports and … it 
really upsets people because you have years of unanimity and consensus is 
blown away because some upstart’s walked in and started, you know, voted on 
things when you’ve never had to vote on anything before.  
 
Put slightly differently, new members’ ideas and beliefs affect the pre-existing 
web of beliefs of the committee and potentially ‘throw committees off balance’ 
(Interview S-10). Indeed, one MP said that it was ‘psychologically disruptive 
because you don’t know who’s going to be in the room when you walk in’ 
(Interview M-23). Therefore, changing membership can affect committees not 
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only in the sense that MPs would adopt the role of learner (as Chapter 4 
revealed), but also because the norms and values established by the group are 
questioned. This, consequently, affects inquiry processes and a committee’s 
ability to construct consensus.  
 
Other interviewees have pointed out that there are positive aspects to changing 
membership, too, in that new members can offer fresh ideas, experiences and 
purpose to committee work (e.g. Interview M-15, Interview M-18, Interview S-
08). On balance, does this mean that changing membership matters? One 
interviewee argued that, though change of membership does have an effect, this 
is ‘at the margins’ (Interview S-05). Other interviewees echoed those thoughts, 
too. The reason for this arguably stems from the committee’s norms and values, 
developed by ‘a reasonable core of people who … are kind of consistent 
attenders or participants’ (Interview M-01). For example, one committee 
member noted that newer members would be ‘absorbed’ into the committee 
tradition rather than ‘overturning it’ (Interview M-07). Another committee 
member:  
 
If you get one or two new people onto the group, you would bring them in and 
absorb them. But if it gets destabilised too much, then it can kind of really 
changes (Interview M-16). 
 
This indicates the importance of socialisation in select committees, something 
recognised not only by interviewees, but other academic research (Rush and 
Giddings, 2011, pp.152-9). One committee member gave the example of his 
colleagues early in the 2010 parliament, where MPs from the 2010 intake were 
elected to his committee but who, initially, saw their role in party political terms 
that led to ‘really quite difficult scenes’ because ‘there was a bloc effectively 
seeing itself as having a different job from either the chair or the other 
members’. He went on, however, to say that ‘that all quite surprisingly changed 
around and actually the committee as it is now is a very cohesive committee’. 
He explained that this was because of a change of understanding about roles: 
 
This was going to be a committee report and that you were a member of a 
committee as opposed to a sort of visitor on behalf of a bloc and that your 
function was not remotely the same as you would expect it to be on the floor of 
the House, but no one said that – it just was a kind of, it came to be. 
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He explained that this ‘came to be’ because, first, the chair was ‘very patient and 
inclusive’, who tried to ‘include everybody in all the discussions’ and, second, 
other long-serving committee members were ‘prepared to work together on that 
[consensus] and other people started to fall in behind them’ (Interview M-07). 
This particular example highlights the crucial importance of socialisation, but 
also that committees are able to overcome the potential dilemma of changing 
membership through these processes. Taking this into account with other 
themes raised in this section, it demonstrates that committee scrutiny is driven 
forward in many respects through everyday practices and committee traditions 
that develop over time. It also highlights the distinctive role of the chair, who 
will provide the consistency in approach and style over the course of their five 
year tenure. One clerk went further and suggested that changing membership 
empowers the chair: ‘I think it probably strengthens the chair in a sense that 
there’s nobody else who can challenge her knowledge or expertise or 
background’ (Interview S-05). This is an important point, and returns us to a 
theme covered in Chapter 5 about the role of the chair in driving forward not 
only the strategic priorities of the committee, but also in influencing the norms 
and values of the committee. Given the importance of the chair in fostering 
committee norms and values, this raises interesting questions about chairs’ 
relationships with one another to understand the sense of team that they do (or 
do not) develop across Parliament. This matters because of its influence in 
shaping the idea of a ‘systematic’ basis of scrutiny on which the select committee 
system is based. This shifts our analysis from the meso-level to the macro-level. 
 
 
7.3. Webs of scrutiny 
 
The broad aim of this section is to open a discussion about the institutional 
framework in which select committees are placed and to examine the extent to 
which wider webs of scrutiny, as opposed to the individual beliefs and practices 
of chairs (and committee members), make a difference to the scrutiny landscape 
in the House of Commons. Unsurprisingly, the Liaison Committee plays a key 
role in this as it is made up of chairs of all permanent select committees (Rogers 
and Walters, 2015, pp.307-8). Since the early 2000s, the Liaison Committee has 
campaigned to make the committee system (in particular) and parliamentary 
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scrutiny (more generally) more effective in the House of Commons. This has 
included important reports, such as Shifting the Balance (2000) and, more 
recently, Select Committee Effectiveness, Resources and Power (2012a). The 
Liaison Committee therefore presents an important opportunity for committees, 
and particularly committee chairs, to wield influence on a more systematic basis, 
especially given that the Liaison Committee holds regular evidence sessions with 
the prime minister (for a discussion on evidence sessions with the prime 
minister, see Kelso et. al., 2016). However, the committee itself has not been 
particularly forthcoming about its potential as a resource for leadership. There 
are arguably two reasons for this. First, there is a structural problem in that the 
committee has a membership of over 30 people. This makes it difficult to not 
only come to agreements, but also organise meetings and give each member the 
opportunity to contribute to the committee’s work. This is reinforced further by 
the committee chair’s double burden in acting simultaneously as chair of the 
Liaison Committee and as chair of a departmental or cross-cutting select 
committee (at least since 2010). This means that the chair will have much less 
time to devote exclusively to Liaison Committee matters. Second, something 
covered in previous chapters, each select committee (and particularly their chair) 
has priorities that push and pull it in a different direction. This is reinforced by 
the way in which most committees seek to guard their own terrain or remit (see 
below) (similar themes were raised by the Institute for Government (White, 
2015c)). These two factors can be illustrated by observing the Liaison Committee 
whilst the prime minister gives evidence: not all committee members are asked 
to attend because there is not enough space for each (members are rotated); 
each member that does attend is asked to lead on a particular theme (with 
unusually little interaction between committee members); and, seating 
arrangements for each member have to be carefully choreographed according to 
political party, theme that they are covering and their likelihood of attending the 
session (among other things) to prevent discord (FWD 19.5.33-19.5.40, FWD 
30.5.2). The Liaison Committee is arguably not to be seen as a cohesive entity 
that can act with one voice, in contrast to other committees, which inhibits the 
committee from viewing itself in a leadership role on a regular or consistent 
basis. 
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This isn’t to say that the Liaison Committee does not influence individual 
committees. Committees are affected through ‘core tasks’ that have been 
developed by the Liaison Committee and create a formal framework through 
which select committees undertake parliamentary scrutiny (see Table 1.1 in 
Chapter 1 for a summary of these tasks). However, core tasks do not seem to be 
significant for committee members: 
 
Nobody [MPs] even knows what the core tasks are by the Liaison Committee 
(Interview S-08). 
 
They’re useful from our [staff] point of view. Quite a few of them are staff-
driven. And the member involvement is limited, which worries me … (Interview 
S-03). 
 
Another clerk pointed out that his chair was not keen on being forced to 
undertake certain inquiries or evidence sessions because it would allow others 
(particularly the government) to put things on her agenda (Interview S-05). 
Though it is not possible to offer an evaluation of core tasks at this stage, it is 
worth noting that, throughout my fieldwork, core tasks were rarely mentioned 
by either staff or elected representatives. So while core tasks may be a useful 
device to frame committee work generally and to give a semblance of coherence, 
they are not things that matter on an everyday basis. On an everyday basis, it is 
individual committees that innovate and develop new ideas and practices. 
Occasionally, committees’ agendas may coalesce and find their way to the 
attention of the Liaison Committee (such as the development of pre-
appointment scrutiny as a core task for committees (see Flinders and Geddes, 
2014)). 
 
The above, formal framework in which committees are placed is supplemented 
through a range of informal relationships between committees. These 
relationships are often characterised by a competitive environment between 
committees, and especially their chairs. For example: 
 
There’s a certain amount of jostling for the limelight, you know, to be top 
committee … yes, I mean it’s a, and there’s healthy competition and perhaps 
one or two chairs are too obviously competitive to get into the limelight. I hope 
I’m not one of them [laughter] (Interview C-04). 
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As a result, committees have to, as one member put it, ‘tread quite carefully so 
as not to tread on another select committee’s toes’ (Interview M-19). A chair 
used similar language: ‘I think that we try and [be] quite sensitive to when they 
think we’re treading on their toes’ (Interview C-02). This was equally noted in 
fieldwork observations. On a couple of occasions, my committee’s chair 
complained that another committee should get ‘off our patch’ (FWD 52.12.3, 
FWD 57.13.7). If my chair veered into the remit of another committee, the clerk 
would strongly recommend that the chair contact his respective counterpart 
(FWD 39.9.7). Indeed, where committees do encroach on one another’s work, it 
fell to the relevant chairs to resolve tensions by agreeing boundaries (Interview 
M-01).35  
 
This competitive view is not universally shared, of course, with one committee 
member calling this sense of rivalry ‘childish’ (Interview M-18). A chair also did 
not think it was much of a problem, though added that he sometimes would get 
‘a bit annoyed’ because one or two committee members have got their own 
strong views and the other committee would not be ‘appropriate’ to look into 
the issue (Interview C-01). Likewise, another chair noted that it was ‘not a 
problem’, adding that a bigger problem is the time and capacity restrictions that 
committees collectively face. He went on to say that his committee could have 
tried to create a joint committee, but the logistics prevented committees from 
doing so (Interview C-06). This was echoed by another chair, who believed that 
joint committees are ‘fairly cumbersome’ to organise and often ‘too big’ 
(Interview C-07). Indeed, a committee member, citing experience from the 
Committee on Arms Export Controls (a joint committee), believed that: 
 
It’s quite difficult to make that work when you have a whole lot of people who 
are already quite busy, who are coming from very different perspectives and 
very different approaches to something and you’re to sit down in a committee 
room and get them all to agree on something and, so, I think it’s quite a 
difficult thing to pull off (Interview M-19).  
 
                                                          
35 In broad terms, interviewees noted competition between: the Communities and Local 
Government (CLG) Committee and the Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) Committee; 
Public Accounts Committee and Defence Committee; BIS Committee and Education 
Committee; and Public Accounts Committee and Treasury Committee (amongst others). 
Interviewees that noted competition between committees include: Interview M-01, Interview 
M-10, Interview M-11, Interview M-17, Interview M-19, Interview C-01, Interview C-02, 
Interview C-04, Interview C-07, Interview C-08. 
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Table 7.2. Relationships at different levels of analysis36 
Level Relationship Summary 
Micro-level MP-to-MP 
Relationships matter because this allows MPs to build trust 
and respect, which are often affected by their approach to 
scrutiny, philosophical outlooks, personalities and everyday 
behaviour. 
Meso-level 
Within 
committees 
MPs form performance teams within committees, which 
sustain norms and values and subsequently aid in 
constructing consensus (in part also through developing 
committee traditions). 
Macro-level 
Between 
committees 
While formal mechanisms exist to bring committees 
together (principally the Liaison Committee), committees 
often see themselves in competition with one another and 
rely on informal dynamics  
   
Though this structural limitation is indeed a big constraint, the competitive 
environment arguably also militates against further collaboration. In short, it 
seems that there is little will to collaborate between committees on a more 
frequent basis. 
 
Through informal relationships, committees establish a reputation against one 
another and, in doing so, a ‘pecking order’ (Interview S-10). Whilst on the whole 
this often reflects government departments (especially the great offices of state: 
HM Treasury, Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office), the chair’s 
personal standing often affects the informal hierarchy amongst committees and 
the extent to which committees are regarded as important in the House more 
generally. One clerk, for example, noted the shifting reputation of the Public 
Accounts Committee: seen as a ‘very senior’ committee before 1979, it ‘lost a lot 
of its significance with departmental committees coming in’, but has been ‘re-
galvanised by a new and very active chair’ to do things that are ‘interesting to 
the public’ (Interview S-04). It is perhaps unsurprising that the Public Accounts 
Committee is consequently seen as a competitor for many other committees. 
This informal standing matters because, as one MP pointed out, it serves as an 
indication of how seriously a committee should be taken by not only other 
committees and colleagues within the House, but more widely the public and 
potential witnesses (Interview M-11). Perhaps most importantly, this reveals the 
importance of informal relationships and practices, which play a key role in 
embedding scrutiny in the House of Commons. This has been a theme that runs 
                                                          
36 Note: ‘micro-level’ here is not to be confused with micro-level behaviour, which takes place 
individually, within committees and between committees. 
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throughout the chapter (summarised in Table 7.2), and so it is now worth 
turning to broader conclusions.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The scrutiny landscape, specifically the select committee system, is sustained by 
everyday practices of committee members, chairs and staff. Micro-level 
behaviour may seem dull, mundane or routine. However, it is precisely these 
everyday behaviours that entrench scrutiny not only along the committee 
corridor but throughout the parliamentary estate. This chapter has sought to 
show this by clarifying why relationships matter and looking at the factors that 
affect those relationships at an individual level. At this micro-level, it is clear 
that scrutiny of government is not affected only through formal, institutional 
relationships between the House of Commons and ministerial departments, but 
interpretations of scrutiny, philosophical outlooks, personalities of MPs and 
daily interaction. In the second section, analysis broadened to a meso-level to 
look at the way in which informal relationships and everyday practices develop 
and give sustenance to norms and values that form within a committee, 
something which may be termed a performance team. MPs’ ideas about what it 
means to be a good committee or effective committee become part of a wider 
committee approach. Each committee develops their own way of working and 
their own unique approach to scrutiny as a result, something strongly influenced 
by the members, chair and staff (as Part II was at pains to point out). These 
norms and values also exert their influence on the practices of MPs through 
socialisation processes, and in doing so prevent established norms from 
changing too much as a consequence of committee turnover. In the third section, 
the macro-level analysis situated chairs’ relationships in a formal (Liaison 
Committee) and informal (competition between committees) setting. Taking this 
analysis one step further, it indicates that, though we may think of scrutiny as 
systematic given that the select committee system has become a permanent and 
formal part of British parliamentary politics, scrutiny processes in the House of 
Commons depend on informal relationships and everyday practices. In other 
words, when we talk of systematic scrutiny, this often refers to webs of scrutiny. 
These webs of scrutiny are built through individual interpretations of, and 
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beliefs about, scrutiny, and relationships between a variety of actors throughout 
the parliamentary estate who push and pull in a range of different directions. 
This argument is central to understanding committees in the House of 
Commons. The broad thrust of this chapter has not been an empirical analysis to 
evaluate the effectiveness of these relationships, performance teams or 
committee traditions in terms of scrutiny or policy impact, but rather serves as 
an illustration of the importance of everyday practices to better understand 
behaviour along the committee corridor in the Palace of Westminster. To see the 
effect of some of these ideas, the final empirical chapter takes a detailed look at 
the evidence-gathering process in the House of Commons. 
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Chapter 8: Evidence 
 
 
 
 
ow that the complexity, diversity and crucial importance of how 
parliamentary actors interpret their select committee roles has been 
examined in sufficient detail, we can shift focus to the consequences of 
those interpretations on scrutiny itself. Specifically in this chapter, I turn to one 
of the most well-known aspects of committee work: gathering evidence. Oral 
evidence hearings, above all, have received widespread attention over the 2010 
parliament (perhaps in part through the growth of televising committee 
proceedings and the expansion of news channels (e.g. BBC Parliament)): in July 
2011, for example, an already intense and high-profile hearing was dramatically 
interrupted after Rupert Murdoch, chief executive of News Corporation, was 
assaulted with a foam pie (the afternoon, with two other witnesses, lasted close 
to five hours) (Plunkett and Martinson, 2011); later that year, in November 2011, 
members of the Public Accounts Committee were unhappy with a civil servant’s 
answers to questions and subsequently forced him to swear an oath to tell the 
truth as part of the committee’s investigations (Public Accounts Committee, 2011, 
Ev 44); and, in February 2013, Mark Carney appeared before the Treasury 
Committee for close to four hours in advance of taking up his post as governor of 
the Bank of England, having also submitted a 30-page document as written 
evidence before his pre-appointment hearing (Treasury Committee, 2013). 
These three examples of sustained, detailed scrutiny made headline news, and 
while they illustrate how the approach of committees has changed since they 
were established in 1979, these examples are arguably only the tip of the iceberg. 
Evidence is taken by most committees on a routine, everyday basis. Although 
this process is one of the most central aspects of committee work, this has not, 
N 
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on the whole, received significant analysis in British parliamentary studies. 
There are some exceptions (Berry and Kippin, 2014; Halpin et. al., 2012; 
Pedersen et. al., 2015; Rumbul, 2016), and the aim of this chapter is to build on 
the small pre-existing literature to open a debate about how evidence-gathering 
is affected by some of the themes raised in earlier chapters. It would be too 
ambitious an attempt to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of the 
evidence-gathering process; rather, my aim here is to provide a specific snapshot 
to illustrate the importance of individual beliefs and everyday practices in 
affecting scrutiny. In order to do this, the chapter is broken into three sections, 
which correspond with each of the main questions that govern this chapter’s 
focus. First, why does evidence matter? This section focuses on the beliefs that 
actors have about evidence, which is important on at least three levels: for MPs 
to build policy expertise and support their arguments; for committees to engage 
in robust and detailed scrutiny; and for Parliament to engage with the public. 
Second, who gives evidence to committees? This section looks at the actions and 
practices of committees, specifically the evidence base by looking at oral 
evidence from one parliamentary session (Session 2013-14). This reveals that 
witnesses are not reflective of the UK that Parliament seeks to represent (raising 
important questions about issues of democratic engagement). Third, what 
factors affect the evidence-gathering process? This question looks at the causes 
of why evidence draws from a limited pool of individuals through dilemmas. 
Committees are driven by short-term and multiple demands from committee 
members and chairs, which is exacerbated by the variety of roles that MPs seek 
to perform in select committees and, as a result, pushes and pulls committee 
scrutiny in different directions. It reminds us that we must not only look at the 
formal process by which the legislature holds the executive to account, but also 
the beliefs, practices and dilemmas that sustain scrutiny. This chapter, then, 
opens a debate about the coherence of the evidence-taking process and more 
generally posits some of the consequences from themes raised in earlier chapters. 
 
 
8.1. Why does evidence matter? 
 
Evidence underpins the select committee system, and it arguably does so on at 
least three distinct levels: on an individual level, it helps MPs to gain expertise  
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Table 8.1. Why does evidence matter? 
Individual 
level 
Building 
expertise 
Evidence allows committee members, chairs and staff to 
learn about policy issues and gain policy-relevant expertise 
Committee 
level 
Scrutiny 
Evidence gathered by committees allows them to scrutinise 
government policy and make evidence-based 
recommendations  
Parliamentary 
level 
Public 
engagement 
Engaging directly with the public ensures that Parliament 
sustains the link between representatives and the 
represented 
 
and use evidence to support political arguments; on a committee level, it informs 
scrutiny processes; and on a parliamentary level, it is a method by which the link 
between Parliament and public is sustained between general elections. Each will 
be briefly discussed in turn (see Table 8.1 for a summary). 
 
The first factor relates to the individual level of MPs to build policy-related 
expertise and to use evidence to enact their scrutiny role, which thereby links 
closely to themes raised in Chapter 4. Policy learning through gathering evidence 
from stakeholders, academics, service users and executive actors allows MPs to, 
as one chair put it, ‘really get your teeth into something’ (Interview C-05). 
Another MP said that being on a select committee is key for access and finding 
out information because it offers MPs ‘a chance to get in-depth access in a 
particular area’ (Interview M-03). He explained that, while Members of 
Parliament generally have good access to a range of individuals and groups by 
virtue of the position they hold, it is only through select committee membership 
that access to reticent individuals is likely to be ensured (though, as we discuss 
below, not guaranteed). More broadly, while for some MPs joining a committee 
involves learning about something new and different to their previous 
employment background, others use this opportunity to deepen their pre-
existing knowledge (and likely use it to advocate for change). One MP, for 
example, described it as ‘a good education to me, having come in as a new MP’ 
(Interview M-20). Indeed, in the absence of systematic and professional training 
for MPs, becoming an effective Member of Parliament depends on practising 
scrutiny activity in committee rooms at private and public evidence sessions to 
pick up not only effective questioning techniques, but also to hear and develop 
different lines of support and weakness for different party positions, to support 
the constituency’s case, and so on (Coghill et. al., 2008). In recent years, some 
(not all) select committees have given training to their committee members, 
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usually by experienced QCs or journalists (Interview S-08). Thus, evidence has 
an individual-level purpose. 
 
This policy learning is not limited to the individual level and, perhaps 
particularly important from a chair’s point of view, it is essential for the 
committee as a whole to better understand policy issues. One chair:  
 
It’s very important that the committee and the staff of the committee are 
genuinely learning through the process of the inquiry, who are not just going 
through a ritual in order to stick the pig at the end of it. There is a genuine 
intellectual exploration of the issues, of the surfacing of the information in 
order to advance the debate about whatever it is we’re scrutinising (Interview 
C-04). 
 
Similarly, another chair: 
 
I think we’re there to do a genuine … I think our committee is actually there to 
try and find solutions and to sort of build a solution, and build awareness and 
understanding and to identify gaps that there are that need to be addressed 
(Interview C-02). 
 
This leads us to the second factor regarding the importance of evidence: a way by 
which committees examine to what extent government policy is working, with 
the ultimate aim of enhancing or improving existing policy. A key theme from 
interviews and fieldwork suggests that scrutiny should be underpinned by an 
evidence-led approach (often relating this to a legalistic perspective) (Interview 
M-16, Interview M-20). For example: 
 
I think we act like a jury. Of course we have our own party political affiliations, 
that’s why we got elected here in the first place, but as with the jury and a court 
case, we really should only consider all the facts before us, the evidence before 
us (Interview M-15). 
 
This interpretation of evidence means that the scrutiny focus is on empirical 
cases. This isn’t to say that the politics is taken out of inquiries, nor that evidence 
cannot be used for political purposes (particularly given the plausible view that 
‘evidence’ is not neutral (see Chapter 2)). But the majority of committee 
members that I observed and interviewed do not view their scrutiny role in a 
party political way; rather, they seek to give greater credence to witnesses and 
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the views of others rather than themselves or, at the very least, try to do so. For 
example, one MP was frustrated with a colleague after an oral evidence session:  
 
The line of inquiry was more aggressive and attacking [the minister] and 
actually less … it was not eliciting information, it was, you know, letting us 
know what [the committee member] thought as opposed to asking what the 
minister thought. I suppose that’s a danger with all the politicians, they want 
to let you know what they’re thinking, including me (Interview M-04). 
 
More generally: 
 
The problem is, you know, … it’s easy to forget that these inquiries are not 
about what you think. Actually, what you think, you should do that somewhere 
else (Interview M-16). 
 
As these quotes show, even if MPs intend to approach evidence impartially, by 
virtue of their question style or topic that they cover, they may adopt a party 
helper role or act as a lone wolf (see Chapter 4). 
 
Broadening out one step further brings us to the parliamentary level. The link 
between representatives and represented is established through free and fair 
elections but, as Cristina Leston-Bandeira (2012, 2013) points out, the 
relationship between citizen and representative needs to be sustained between 
elections to maintain the link between Parliament and public. Parliamentary 
committees are a crucial mechanism by which this link can be sustained. In 
recent years, select committee engagement strategies have become increasingly 
important for MPs as an attempt to rebuild trust in politics, especially after the 
MPs’ Expenses Scandal in 2009 (Kelso, 2009a), and because members of the 
public generally respond positively to select committee scrutiny (Hansard 
Society, 2014, pp.27-39). In a sign of changing times, select committees adopted 
a new ‘core task’ (Task 10) to guide their committee work in 2012: ‘To assist the 
House of Commons in better engaging with the public by ensuring that the work 
of the committee is accessible to the public’ (Liaison Committee, 2012a, paras 
16-20). Most recently, the Liaison Committee commissioned a compelling piece 
of research into building public engagement by Matthew Flinders et. al. (Liaison 
Committee, 2015), which concluded that, while there has been ‘a significant shift 
within the select committee system to taking public engagement seriously’, the 
authors note that ‘this shift has not been systematic’ and may require ‘a deeper 
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cultural change at Westminster’ (para 3). These findings are echoed in 
interviews for this PhD, too, in that public engagement was not often mentioned 
by interviewees. That said, awareness was shown by some: 
 
I mean, you know, what we’re looking at the moment, [XX] … A lot of people 
are very unhappy about that and they may continue to be unhappy but at least 
the committee’s given them an opportunity to say what they think and shows 
that, you know, Parliament is taking notice of it. So that’s, you know, 
responding to our stakeholders or whatever is a good thing to think about 
(Interview S-11). 
 
We’ve done quite a lot of public meetings … we’ve gone out of our way to try 
and engage with people that wouldn’t normally engage with Parliament or 
with politics but are at the sharp end of suffering the consequences of 
government policy … and that’s quite difficult to get people in that are willing 
to speak on those things. And that’s why we’ll do it in a car and going out to 
them, to their communities. Making it accessible. … so we’re trying to break 
down some barriers of public engagement and things (Interview C-05).  
 
This link between Parliament and public by way of select committee inquiries 
has been acknowledged more widely in the literature on Parliament and public 
engagement, which matters because it gives the public a route to potentially 
impact parliamentary proceedings beyond placing an x on a ballot paper once 
every five years (e.g. Marsh, 2016). 
 
Generally, this discussion indicates that evidence matters to select committees 
for three key reasons: first, MPs note the policy expertise gained from committee 
service (individual level); second, committees use evidence to establish the basis 
for policy evaluation and detailed scrutiny (committee level); and third, the 
evidence-gathering process acts as a crucial mechanism to link the public 
directly to Parliament and the policy-making process (parliamentary level). 
Given this importance of evidence, it raises a crucial issue about the spectrum of 
evidence taken by the House of Commons. In exploring this a little further, we 
can better understand from whom MPs learn, how they scrutinise government, 
and in what way the representative link is sustained. Thus, our discussion turns 
from why evidence matters to who gives evidence; or, from individual beliefs to 
actions and practices. 
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7.2. Who gives evidence? 
 
In recent years, some research has been conducted to look more closely at the 
relationship between witnesses and select committees. Darren Halpin et. al. 
(2012), for example, look at interest groups at the Scottish Parliament, who find 
that there is a core of participants who are heavily engaged in evidence-
gathering processes (both in terms of written evidence and oral hearings), which 
raises a subsequent question about ‘usual suspects’ in parliamentary 
proceedings. Elsewhere, Rebecca Rumbul (2016) examines the gender balance of 
witnesses at the National Assembly of Wales, finding that witnesses are 
overwhelmingly male and evidence sessions are conducted in a gendered 
atmosphere. This similarly questions the representativeness of the legislature’s 
evidence base. Both of these sub-national examples are complemented by a 
national (though thus far isolated) report published by Richard Berry and Sean 
Kippin (2014). Their research focuses on evidence taken by Parliament 
(including House of Commons committees, House of Lords committees, and 
joint committees) between October and November 2013. Their report echoes the 
sub-national findings from Halpin et. al. and Rumbul, in that the authors found 
not only a startling gender disparity (only 24.7% of all witnesses were women), 
but additionally that trade associations were arguably over-represented due to 
their frequent appearances in oral evidence. Aside from this research, there has 
been one further, international, study. This research, by Helene Helboe 
Pedersen et. al. (2015), compared the effect of institutional arrangements and 
other factors to giving evidence in the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands. This 
found that it is not necessarily structural state-society relations that solely affect 
the relationship between legislature and public, but the institutional 
arrangements, too (such as the open or closed nature of evidence hearings). 
Broadly, these four studies collectively indicate that those who give evidence to 
parliamentary select committees do not reflect the wider public. However, aside 
from these aforementioned studies, there has been little further published 
research on the relationship between witnesses and select committees. Given the 
importance of evidence in scrutiny covered above, this is perhaps a little 
surprising. This chapter seeks to build on some of the previous findings by 
exploring the witness base on which committees draw. The research conducted 
here is limited in that it looks at 24 select committees (excluding the  
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Figure 8.1. Number of witnesses by committee 
 
 
Liaison Committee) from the House of Commons from 08 May 2013 to 14 May 
2014 (Session 2013-14), and looks at oral evidence hearings only (excluding 
written submissions and other forms of engagement). However, this alone 
amounted to 1,238 committee sessions, featuring 3,225 witnesses, which is more 
extensive than the only other national study on witnesses (Berry and Kippin’s 
report features 583 witnesses). 
 
The overall figures for committee activity are illustrated in Figure 8.1, which 
shows that the Public Accounts Committee had the most witnesses (255), closely 
followed by the Transport Committee (252); meanwhile, the European Scrutiny 
Committee (ESC) had the fewest (34 witnesses). The ESC is arguably an 
anomalous case because it examines draft European Union legislation. The 
Liaison Committee has been excluded because it is neither a departmental nor 
cross-cutting committee with few evidence sessions that would otherwise skew 
the overall findings. On average, each committee heard evidence from 134 
witnesses. In a similar vein to Berry and Kippin, I break down this data by 
analysing: (i) organisational affiliations; (ii) geographical breakdown; and, (iii) 
the gender balance (summary data is available in Appendix G). 
 
8.2.1. Organisational affiliation 
 
Figure 8.2 gives an overview of the organisations that gave evidence, which is 
examined by committee in Figure 8.3 (Appendix H explains these categories). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the single biggest category of witness is ‘government 
and civil service’, which makes up 36.0% of all witnesses over the parliamentary 
session. This category was broken down further (see Figure 8.4). This reminds  
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Figure 8.2. Organisational distribution of witnesses 
 
 
Figure 8.3. Organisational distribution of witnesses by committee 
 
 
us that public service delivery is both complex and fragmented, but also – and 
more importantly – that public officials appear in front of select committees on a 
regular basis (ALBs were the single-biggest sub-category over Session 2013-14). 
Though change over time is not shown here, these findings reinforce the trend 
indicated by other research that public servants have become public-facing 
figures (exemplified by Margaret Hodge’s (mistaken) claim to a civil servant in 
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departmental minister (Public Accounts Committee, 2011, Ev 39-40)) (Grube, 
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Figure 8.5 shows the distribution of non-profit organisations, indicating the 
importance placed on charities and/or campaign groups, business and/or trade 
associations, and professional associations. Interestingly, trade unions made up 
only 7.1% of non-profit witnesses, which is small in comparison to business 
and/or trade associations (21.7%). This reinforces the comment made by Berry 
and Kippin (2014) that trade associations feature frequently at public evidence 
sessions and who might be considered as over-represented. Generally, the non-
profit sector played a role in most committees, but especially the Business, 
Innovation and Skills Committee (perhaps unsurprising given the remit of the 
committee) and the Work and Pensions Committee. Turning to the private 
sector, Figure 8.6 analyses the sub-categories in more detail, and reveals that 
prominence is given to multi-national businesses and large/national businesses. 
Small and medium-sized businesses made up only 18.0% of private sector 
witnesses. 
 
The higher education sector made up 8.1% of all witnesses, predominantly 
universities and research groups. Generally, university-led research groups were 
subsumed into their university categories (such as the Glasgow Media Group 
into the University of Glasgow or the Institute of Education into University 
College London). The higher education category was examined in more detail by 
looking at institutional affiliations. These affiliations were used as a proxy to 
illustrate the nature of the types of universities that gave evidence. So, University 
Alliance tend to be business-engaged universities; Million Plus represents newer 
universities; Russell Group universities are perceived to be traditional research-
intensive institutions; and Oxbridge (though part of the Russell Group) 
represent the two most elite universities in the UK. Of course, these affiliations 
are not without problems because many universities did not fit into an affiliated 
group and were therefore labelled ‘non-affiliated’. With this caveat in mind, the 
data is visualised in Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8 (all higher education witnesses 
and only university witnesses, respectively). These figures show a predominance 
of Russell Group universities: excluding Oxbridge, this group makes up 52.3% of 
all higher education witnesses; looking at only university witnesses, and 
including Oxbridge, this rises to 75.6%. This is not necessarily surprising 
because these universities tend to be perceived as successful research institutes 
(either through research audits or through reputation). Table 8.2 shows the top  
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Figure 8.4. Government and civil service witnesses 
 
Figure 8.5. Non-profit witnesses 
 
Figure 8.6. Private sector witnesses 
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Figure 8.7. Higher education witnesses (all witnesses) 
 
 
Figure 8.8. Higher education witnesses (university witnesses only) 
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Figure 8.9. Geographical distribution of witnesses 
 
 
Figure 8.10. Geographical distribution of witnesses (academic witnesses only) 
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Figure 8.11. Geographical distribution of witnesses in the UK 
 
 
allows us an insight into the geographical range, particularly shedding light on 
the reach of select committee evidence-gathering. Additionally, it indicates the 
accessibility for witnesses to give evidence from different parts of the country. 
However, this data is gathered with difficulty for three reasons. First, location is 
not generally listed in oral evidence records (universities are an obvious 
exception). Second, the main office or primary location of an organisation might 
not be the same work location for witnesses (for example, staff may work from 
home, live in a different region and commute to work, work at a different office 
to listed headquarters of organisations, and so on). And third, some witnesses 
might travel regularly or might be in London over the course of an inquiry and 
therefore this would not impede their availability to attend. As a result, a large 
number of witnesses’ location is labelled as ‘not known’. These findings should 
therefore be treated with caution. 
 
Despite the above limitations, a large amount of information is available online 
through publicly available records (particularly for high profile and public 
figures). This reveals, even when government and civil service witnesses are 
excluded, that London dominates, making up close to half of all witnesses 
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(48.4%), followed by the South of England (18.7%) (see Figure 8.9). The others 
take up a much smaller proportion, with the North of England and Scotland 
representing close to 9% each, and the Midlands reaching 5.9%. Over the 2013-
14 parliamentary session, more witnesses seem to come from abroad than from 
Wales (3.8% against 3.2%, respectively). This trend is replicated for geographical 
distribution of universities, where data is most reliable. This shows (see Figure 
8.10) a predominance of universities in London and the South of England, which 
together make up more than half of all university witnesses. Two caveats must 
be attached to these findings. First, a range of committees were exploring the 
potential impact of the Scottish independence referendum during Session 2013-
14. This could explain why Scotland had a higher number of witnesses than 
might otherwise be expected given other trends. Second, devolved legislatures 
have their own evidence-gathering processes and policy competences, which 
means that witnesses might be drawn to legislatures in those areas. 
 
8.2.3. Gender balance 
 
A key headline raised from Berry and Kippin’s research project is the low 
number of women that gave oral evidence: of 583 witnesses, 24.7% were women 
(or 144); of all Commons witnesses they counted (391), 23.5% were women (or 
92). They also looked specifically at the organisational and committee 
breakdown, all of which reveal a strong disparity that favours men over women 
(with only one exception, a temporary committee to scrutinise the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005) (Berry and Kippin, 2014, pp.10-13). This led to a range of 
individuals, including academics, a chair of a select committee, and staff from 
non-profit organisations, to call for action (Democratic Audit, 2014). More 
recent research by Rumbul (2016, pp.70-1) echoed these findings for the 
National Assembly for Wales: over a 12 year period, only 27% of witnesses were 
women. 
 
The above findings are reinforced by this dataset, which shows that, of 3,225 
witnesses, 24.6% were women (792 witnesses). This almost exactly replicates the 
Berry and Kippin report. This is broken down by committee in Figure 8.12 and 
Figure 8.13, and by organisation in Figure 8.14. This reveals that the Treasury 
Committee called the fewest women to give evidence (less than 10%), while the  
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Figure 8.12. Gender balance of witnesses (numbers) 
 
Figure 8.13. Gender balance of witnesses (proportion) 
 
Figure 8.14. Gender balance of witnesses (organisational breakdown) 
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International Development Committee called the most (just over 30%). However, 
no committee came even close to calling an equal number of women and men to 
give evidence. Similarly, no organisational group called an equal number of 
women and men. Private sector witnesses were particularly unrepresentative, 
where women constituted only 10.4% of all witnesses. 
 
8.2.4. Discussion 
 
Although these findings represent a specific snapshot of one type of evidence in 
the House of Commons during one parliamentary session, this data is important 
in that it not only reinforces the initial findings from Berry and Kippin, but also 
offers slightly more depth. The data presented here questions the diversity of the 
evidence on which committees depend, in at least three ways. First, the 
organisational breakdown reveals that committees rely heavily on representative 
associations, particularly professional bodies, trade associations and 
large/multi-national companies. By comparison, trade unions, small and 
medium-sized businesses, and service users or members of the public made up a 
small proportion. Second, the location of witnesses indicates that Parliament is 
not listening to the public from across the country. Axiomatically, select 
committees are constrained in who they are able to invite for oral evidence in 
that they cannot choose where organisations should be based (and devolved 
legislatures may skew the findings, too). However, committees do have some 
room for manoeuvre. For example, despite the range of universities across the 
country, 37.8% of all academic witnesses are based in London, and four of the 
top five universities that gave evidence most often over 2013-14 came from 
London and the South East alone. Third, men vastly over-represent women in 
giving evidence in all areas of committee work, and anecdotal evidence also 
suggests that other social demographic groups are under-represented in 
Parliament (e.g. ethnicity, age, disability, sexuality). Perhaps one of the most 
worrying statistics is that, over one week, 25 November to 28 November 2013, 77 
witnesses gave evidence, of which only six were women (or 7.8%). This matters 
because – if the role of Parliament is to reflect the public – it suggests that the 
institution is falling short in its task to not only reflect the population, but also 
engage with all sections of society to inform the policy-process. Though the topic 
of representation goes slightly beyond the purview of this study, this does feed 
Chapter 8: Evidence 
211 
into a broader point about the importance of descriptive representation (Childs, 
2008; Phillips, 1995). Indeed, without descriptive representation in Parliament, 
it could perpetuate the perception that the House of Commons is a closed 
institution and does not hear from witnesses with whom the general public 
identify. This is particularly important given the earlier discussion about the role 
of evidence as a way to engage the public and link Parliament directly to the 
everyday lives of the citizens it seeks to represent. Instead, these three points 
suggest that select committees seem to rely on ‘usual suspects’, i.e. familiar 
witnesses that give evidence frequently, and individuals who are used to 
speaking in parliamentary or political environments. This questions the 
‘systematic’ nature of evidence-taking and reinforces the view, made in the 
previous chapter, that it may be more appropriate to talk of ‘webs’ of scrutiny. 
Axiomatically, these trends are not without reasons. In order to examine these, I 
now wish to focus more directly on the how everyday practices affect the 
evidence-gathering process. 
 
 
8.3. What factors affect the evidence-gathering process? 
 
In order to examine the everyday practices of select committees with regards to 
the evidence-taking process, I begin with a broad and brief discussion of the 
modes of gathering evidence for inquiries because this provides much-needed 
context for the findings set out above. From this, I point to a number of 
committee-related dilemmas and witness-related dilemmas that affect the 
diversity of witness panels in scrutiny and, while they do not justify the lack of 
diversity, they do provide explanations and give further weight to the 
importance of studying everyday practices. 
 
8.3.1. Modes of gathering evidence 
 
This chapter has, so far, focused on the most well-known aspect of committee 
work: oral evidence. However, committees gather information in other ways, too. 
Indeed, inquiries usually begin with an open call for written evidence based on 
the terms of reference issued by a select committee. This means that any 
member of the public or organisation is permitted to send evidence to a select 
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committee as part of its investigations. Though written evidence is not a 
prerequisite to give oral evidence, this form of engagement is a crucial way by 
which an individual, their research or their organisation more generally may 
come to the notice of committee staff, particularly if they are not part of a pre-
existing network or mailing list. Further research is needed to look at the role of 
written evidence but, based on fieldwork, it seems as though this is an important 
trigger for oral evidence. It may be that one reason for the narrow pool of oral 
evidence comes from a lack of diversity in written evidence. There is a perceived 
formality to this process (written evidence can be seen as legalistic, for example, 
to which many members of the public do not relate and therefore does not 
incentivise engagement), and so committees are increasingly attempting to use 
alternatives to both oral and written evidence.  
 
One alternative is a committee visit (though they can be combined with oral 
sessions, as some committees have done). Between 2010 and 2015, committees 
have gone to a range of places: Newcastle (Work and Pensions Committee, 
2014a), Gloucester (Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, 2014), or 
Edinburgh (Environmental Audit Committee, 2014). Between 2010 and 2015, 
committees went on 640 field visits (based on figures from sessional returns). It 
is perceived as a useful way to engage with the public and allows committees to 
gather information directly from members of the public and service users, 
especially (though not exclusively) for UK visits (Interview M-10). In advance of 
the aforementioned Work and Pensions Committee visit to Newcastle on the 
topic of Employment and Support Allowance, for instance, the chair Dame Anne 
Begg said:  
 
We want to hear from people who have experience of making a new claim for 
Employment and Support Allowance or who have been through the incapacity 
benefit reassessment process. Their observations on how the system is working 
and, crucially, suggestions for how it can be improved, will help inform our 
ongoing inquiry (UK Parliament, 2014). 
 
The visit was subsequently quoted in the report as part of ‘the claimant 
experience’ (Work and Pensions Committee, 2014a, paras 16-18). Evidence and 
information gathered from visits usually feature in committee reports, though 
the level may vary (in part because of procedural issues of using evidence not 
gathered ‘formally’). This form of gathering evidence may be a reason why 
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members of the public do not frequently give oral evidence; they are presumed 
to inform inquiries informally through public engagement events (though the 
extent to which these are attended by those already interested in politics and 
embedded in the select committee’s network raises the question as to whether 
this is true).  
 
Committees have taken to other forms of public engagement (and quasi-
information-gathering) to overcome the perceived dilemma or need to reach new 
audiences. The aforementioned research for the Liaison Committee (2015) 
discusses this in great detail, so it is worth noting only briefly that committees 
have tried, among other things: inviting the public to suggest committee 
inquiries; using Twitter to solicit questions; and, e-consultations, web forums 
and internet consultations to gather information from service users and 
stakeholders. Importantly, these are not about disseminating reports to the 
public or explaining how committees work; rather, these techniques are about 
trying to get input from the public. Though these examples illustrate some of the 
ways in which committee are changing their engagement with stakeholders and 
the public, the research conducted by Flinders et. al. also notes that public 
engagement is ‘uneven’ and has not been ‘fully embedded’ into the culture of 
Parliament (Liaison Committee, 2015, para 91). In part, this may be because 
committees continue to depend on oral evidence, which other forms of 
information gathering are unlikely to be able to replace. This is especially the 
case for those types of hearings where individuals are being held to account, 
rather than asked to provide information or give evidence of research (especially 
ministers, civil servants and high profile individuals). While different modes of 
evidence-gathering do not justify the skewed nature of witness characteristics, 
this explains in part why certain types of witnesses are underrepresented at 
hearings. However, there are many more reasons that witness lists are affected. 
This brings us to some of the dilemmas that committees face. 
 
8.3.2. Limiting the pool: agendas and networks 
 
In general terms, witnesses for oral evidence are invited after written evidence 
has been submitted, discussed and analysed. Initial lists tend to be drawn up by 
staff based on written evidence, pre-existing (and frequently informal) policy 
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networks, and/or advice from specialist advisers. However, the options of who a 
committee may invite depends on the focus of an inquiry, as this clerk explains:  
 
Some people select themselves because they have the knowledge that you want 
and they’ve done the research or analysis or they represent, you know, 
different client groups or whatever (Interview S-11).  
 
This agenda-setting stage arguably limits the pool from which committees can 
gather evidence because, quite simply, committees do not have a choice over 
these – especially for witnesses that are being held to account, rather than 
invited to give information or to provide evidence. For this reason, the statistics 
on organisations (especially government and civil service) arguably reveal as 
much (if not more) about the representational state of those organisations as it 
does about select committees. This is arguably limited even further because the 
policy area itself may well be quite small, or only a few individuals from which a 
committee can draw. As this clerk points out:  
 
We have a few, our favourite academics who come and they’ll give evidence 
several times a year because, you know, there’s not a huge number of [XX] 
academics and there’s not a huge number of people fascinated in many of the 
things we do (Interview S-02). 
 
Due to this factor, then, committees are restricted in widening the diversity of 
witness panels. To put this slightly differently: the pool from which committees 
seek to draw evidence may not be representative itself, and so imbalances of 
gender or location may reflect imbalances in organisations. 
 
8.3.3. Direction from MPs and achieving political balance 
 
As noted, initial lists are drawn up by staff. Additionally, the chair will offer 
direction and MPs will make suggestions. The extent to which MPs recommend 
witnesses varies considerably. Many MPs commended clerks’ political antennae 
(e.g. one member of staff: ‘I knew that there are some organisations [the chair] 
just didn’t like, so I’m not going to invite [them]’ (Interview S-08)), and this, in 
part, explains why committee members are generally not significantly involved 
in this process. One MP explained that he would ‘not very often’ suggest names, 
except if witness lists were not broad enough because he wanted ‘a range of 
views’ (Interview M-08). Another, however, noted that he would suggest names 
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‘both formally and informally’ and ‘often significantly’ change the witness plans 
brought forward by staff (Interview M-01). Another member: 
 
We need to get information in a certain format to allow us to prepare the 
report, as you’ll know, same thing the court finds, the way that you can’t rely 
on evidence which you haven’t actually taken as a committee. So that’s why 
choosing the witnesses is key because you want to get certain, you know, 
flavour across, who you choose to be witnesses are going to be quite important 
(Interview M-20). 
 
This indicates that the nature of evidence is still contested and political – some 
witnesses may be invited because they have to make an investigation appear 
more credible or to get things on record and thereby allow the committee to 
close debate into other areas where it does not wish to go (this, however, needs 
further research). That said, many suggestions from Members tend to be 
individuals that they are aware of or already know about. Thus, as one clerk put 
it: 
 
So, members will make suggestions. Very often they are straight from the 
usual suspects list. I mean that’s the biggest problem we have is there are a 
group of people who come often to give evidence and getting out beyond that 
group is a challenge. 
 
He went on to say that this is possibly accentuated by lobby groups, who have 
become ‘more crafty’ at getting their message in front of MPs, in order to 
subsequently be suggested for oral evidence (Interview S-10). This arguably 
presents a dilemma for staff because, though they are arguably most keenly 
aware of the diversity of witness panels, a broader set of witnesses would be 
contrary to members’ wishes (therefore non-negotiable). This means that 
committee staff do not have the capacity to invite a perfectly representative 
witness panel (though it also raises questions about the diversity of MPs’ 
networks).  
 
A further concern for committees is the need for political balance and/or 
breadth. For example, one clerk noted that, to ‘balance’ a lot of academics that 
have given oral evidence as part of an inquiry (she explains that ‘academics are 
generally seen as left-wing’ by MPs), she has suggested policy experts from 
centre-right think tanks to the committee at an upcoming session (Interview S-
02). Committee staff, then, see written and oral evidence submissions not only 
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in terms of their inherent value as a piece of research or evidence, but crucially 
where it sits on the political spectrum, and if it is broadly for or against a 
particular position that the committee may take in conclusions to its inquiry. A 
desire for breadth of view is shared by some chairs: 
 
If we think there’s two big organisations … that are going to say exactly the 
same, which they probably will, we’ll just choose one of them and try and get 
somebody along to say something different (Interview C-05). 
 
Therefore, staff and chairs attempt to ensure breadth of evidence across the 
political spectrum. It indicates, once again, that the characteristics of those 
giving evidence might be affected through the belief of the political nature of 
evidence (let alone the ostensible quality of evidence). 
 
8.3.4. Pressure on the timetable 
 
Though committees face problems in identifying potential witnesses, there are 
yet further dilemmas in organising evidence sessions. One issue stems from the 
desire among committee members to frequently extend the number of 
committee sessions as an inquiry is taking place, which means that ‘there’s 
pressure on the timetable’ (Interview S-03). One clerk explained that an inquiry 
where four evidence sessions were planned, ‘ended up being 12 to fit people in 
because their ideas kept adding’ (Interview S-02). This revisits the theme of 
multiple loyalties and time pressure that was identified in Chapter 4 (on 
members) and Chapter 6 (on staff) respectively. Some committees (such as the 
Home Affairs Committee and Public Accounts Committee) and their MPs are 
unmistakably reactive to the news agenda, or what another clerk described as 
‘ambulance chasing’ (Interview S-11) (for a discussion, see White, 2015b). 
Consequently, inquiries are drawn up at short notice, and pre-planned sessions 
are moved to make room for more urgent business. Alternatively, evidence 
sessions result in multiple witnesses, or back-to-back sessions, to squeeze MPs’ 
wishes into the timetable – though MPs themselves have responded by saying 
that multiple witnesses limits the depth of questioning that they are able to 
pursue (e.g. Interview M-01, Interview M-08). This clearly affects the availability 
of witnesses to attend. One MP acknowledged: 
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I remember when I put forward [XX] inquiry, I wrote a kind of five page wish 
list of all the people I thought would be interesting to hear from … the clerks 
will go away and try and work with that wish list. But then they will come 
back with what’s practical and also, within a very finite amount of time, when 
you might have only a handful of meetings or something (Interview M-19). 
 
One member of staff:  
 
Often we’ll give the chair a witness plan, but … with the best will in the world 
you never get even half the people you want on your witness plan. Because 
they’re on holiday, they can’t do it, they don’t want to do [it], you know, that 
kind of thing. And then you’re trying to find replacements (Interview S-08). 
 
To plan a session with the right witness for the right time can therefore be 
difficult, and highlights the unpredictability of everyday behaviour. Committees 
(particularly from the view of staff) are working within short, frequently 
changing deadlines with demanding committee members (whose own 
commitments vary) and chairs (whose ideas may be different from that of the 
rest of the committee). It is unsurprising that committees draw heavily from 
London-based witnesses as a result. They have to travel the shortest distance, 
are likely to be available at shorter notice, and are more likely to be known in 
relevant policy circles. 
 
8.3.5. The political performance of evidence 
 
Evidence sessions easily stray from original topics into the political sphere. Over 
fieldwork, for example, one academic witness noted (to her surprise) that the 
hearing was ‘very intense’ and ‘very political’ despite the fact that she was trying 
to impart information (FWD 15.4.6). This generally reinforces points made by 
the aforementioned research by Flinders et. al., in which witnesses indicated 
that questions by MPs can be much broader than the formal terms of reference, 
and also more political (Liaison Committee, 2015, para 77 and paras 83-85). 
Indeed, both through fieldwork observations and through interviews with staff, 
there is a growing concern that persuading witnesses to attend sessions has 
become more difficult in recent years because of the increasingly adversarial role 
adopted by some chairs in evidence hearings: 
 
We give them a kind of really broad brush description of what the session is 
going to be like and try to allay any nerves that they may have … I do that for 
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witnesses now because there’s a general nervousness amongst witnesses 
because all they see on the television is [EX57] and [GS63] tearing shreds off of 
officials and that’s quite counterproductive to the vast majority of select 
committee work, trying to get people to come and give evidence to us, I think 
(Interview S-04). 
 
This concern deserves further attention (though unfortunately goes beyond the 
scope of this research study) because these dilemmas are likely to impact the 
evidence on which committees base their scrutiny of government. 
 
This dilemma is exacerbated further by the perceived need to have witnesses 
who are ‘good’ at giving evidence. It is worth quoting the following clerk at 
length: 
 
There are people who you know are renowned experts but who are just crap 
witnesses. And there is an element of theatre to it, you know? … We had a 
seminar the other day, it wasn’t oral evidence session, but we had a seminar 
and we had high hopes of two people who were just so enthusiastic on the 
phone you thought this is going to be brilliant, they’re just going to blow the 
committee away. And it was so boring. And they were so uninspiring and they 
turned into these grey technocrats with nothing to say and you’re like, “Oh 
god!” (Interview S-10).  
 
He noted that this ‘theatrical performance’ needed to have witnesses who were 
‘accessible and understandable to members’ (Interview S-10). Not all witnesses 
are able to convey information in this way, whilst simultaneously trying to 
navigate the complex personal and political relationships between committee 
members. Committees remain risk-averse in that they are unlikely to seek oral 
evidence from individuals that could create divisions between committee 
members, arguments, or go against the agenda of the committee’s original aims. 
So, perceived ‘risky’ witnesses are avoided.  
 
More generally, we can say that witnesses are not only experts, but performers, 
too. They are situated within a particular kind of setting and asked to enact a 
particular kind of role. This requires applying the right social cues and etiquette, 
as well as the right form of speech and tone of voice (i.e. performing with a voice 
that is deemed fit for giving evidence) (as covered in Chapter 2). Not all 
witnesses are perceived to be suited to this environment, nor are they – perhaps 
– seen by some committee members or chairs as legitimate. Rumbul, in her 
research on evidence-gathering at the National Assembly for Wales, argues that 
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such political settings are gendered in such a way as to reinforce masculinity. 
This deserves further analysis and research, but unfortunately goes beyond the 
possibilities of this research project. 
 
8.3.6. Reticent witnesses 
 
A final dilemma that committees face is their ability to persuade reticent 
witnesses to attend evidence sessions. The idea of not being able to ensure 
attendance by witnesses may strike some readers as odd given that select 
committees have the formal power to send for persons, papers and records, 
including an official summons for an individual to attend (HC SO Nos. 121-152, 
particularly HC SO No. 135). However, parliamentary actors have mostly 
interpreted this formal power as a double-edged sword. In written evidence 
submitted to the Liaison Committee in 2012, the then Clerk of the House of 
Commons indicated that, though investigative committees have powers to 
punish non-attendance, the possible course of action that a committee may take 
could be limited due to reputational damage to Parliament through a possible 
legal challenge made against the Commons’ decision (notwithstanding the 
additional difficulty of the process of punishing miscreants, which is complex) 
(Liaison Committee, 2012b, Ev w77-85; Joint Committee on Parliamentary 
Privilege, 2013). In practice, therefore, witnesses are not ‘summoned’ by the 
Serjeant at Arms to appear at oral evidence sessions; they are ‘invited’ to attend 
by the committee to give their thoughts and views – and generally most 
witnesses are willing (some even enthusiastic) to do so. There have been only 
rare occasions when witnesses have been compelled to attend (during the 2010 
parliament, for example, the Culture, Media and Sport Committee successfully 
summoned Rupert Murdoch and James Murdoch as part of their investigations 
into the role of News Corporation in the phone-hacking scandal (Culture, Media 
and Sport Committee, 2012, pp.44-5)).37 This means that the relationships 
between witnesses and select committees are mostly governed by informal 
means and soft powers of persuasion, and a process that is usually the  
                                                          
37 Since 2015, there have been further examples that demonstrate this is an ongoing issue: 
Mike Ashley, founder of Sports Direct, had refused to give evidence to the Business, 
Innovation and Skills Committee until very recently (Armstrong, 2016; Bury, 2016); and Sir 
Philip Green, former owner of BHS, had initially been reticent about appearing before both 
BIS Committee and the Work and Pensions Committee with some heated exchanges between 
Green and the chairs of the committees (Butler, 2016; Davies, 2016). 
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Table 8.3. Dilemmas facing committees in taking evidence 
Agenda of inquiry 
The committee’s agenda limits the choice of witnesses who are able 
to constructively contribute to an inquiry, which is potentially 
exacerbated further by a small pool of witnesses from which 
committees can draw. 
Direction from MPs 
Chairs and committee members’ recommendations arguably 
reinforce problems of usual suspects. This dilemma is then made 
worse through the need for political balance and diversity (as 
opposed to social diversity). 
Pressure on the 
timetable 
Some committees tend to be more reactive to the political agenda, 
and therefore need witnesses to be available at short notice and/or 
flexible. Not all witnesses will be available for sessions as a result. 
Political 
performance of 
evidence 
There is fear from witnesses about attending because committees 
have become increasingly adversarial. Moreover, witnesses need to 
be able to make evidence accessible and understandable to 
members, and not all will thrive in this environment. 
Reticent witnesses 
Some witnesses are difficult to persuade to attend (sometimes as a 
result of other dilemmas), which then poses a problem as to how 
they might be persuaded to attend. 
  
responsibility of staff (on behalf of the committee). One interviewee explained 
that there are a number of things staff can do to persuade a reticent witness to 
attend: persuade the individual of the benefit of coming both for themselves and 
for the committee; indicate that the committee would be unhappy if it did not 
hear from the individual, which may be reflected in the report; or, third, the 
committee could issue a press notice, in effect publicly humiliating them 
(Interview S-10). For example, during my fieldwork, and in my capacity as 
research assistant, I had one session where the office of potential witnesses (key 
to the inquiry) excused themselves on the grounds of being too busy. My clerk 
told me that I was being ‘too nice’, and that my invitations need to be more 
authoritative; a select committee hearing should not be dismissed so easily (in 
the end, the focus of the evidence session changed and the witness was no longer 
required – to my relief) (FWD 14.4.46). However, as with the formal powers 
described above, soft powers are not problem-free. The aforementioned 
interviewee believed that embarrassing reticent witnesses presents ‘a real 
danger’:  
 
Do it once or twice, you look powerful and strong. Do it every week and you’ll 
look like you’ve got no power and you can’t, you’re not influential because 
nobody wants to come and talk to you. So you don’t want to look that way 
(Interview S-10). 
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Crucially, this reinforces the importance of beliefs, values and practices. It 
suggests that committees have more limited room for manoeuvre than formal 
rules or procedures imply because they need to be interpreted and re-interpreted 
(by staff, MPs and witnesses). Furthermore, given that the full effect of not 
attending an evidence hearing are not known, clerks’ and MPs’ interpretations 
are their only guide in dealing with reticent or unwilling witnesses (and as 
mentioned previously, this is not common). In any case, and importantly for this 
section, it also presents staff with a dilemma in persuading reticent witnesses to 
appear in front of committees.  
 
As a result of the everyday and political nature of taking evidence, committees’ 
room for manoeuvre in inviting and organising a diverse panel is always fraught 
with difficulty (as summarised in Table 8.3). One clerk suggested that it is only 
between one fifth and one quarter of witnesses where committees have options 
to seek greater diversity (FWD 20.5.7). Irrespective of the accuracy of this claim, 
there is a question that underlies this: to what extent should the House of 
Commons be more proactive in promoting social diversity of its panels? This is a 
possible tension for committees and particularly for staff, who wish to both 
ensure Parliament is able to listen to a broad cross-section of society, whilst 
simultaneously reflecting the wishes, concerns and interests of the committee 
that staff are tasked to serve. Though this dilemma is explored in more detail in 
Chapter 6, the impact of it is seen directly and concretely here. Staff in the House 
of Commons are generally unwilling to call for committees to increase the 
diversity of their witness base because it would indicate proactive, staff-led 
involvement. Thus, to increase diversity of witness panels depends on the will of 
elected representatives that populate committees. And yet, given the other 
dilemmas noted above, this seems unlikely to improve at the moment. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The cumulative effect of the issues raised above is that evidence sessions are 
complex performances, and that they do not necessarily always lead to what 
might be termed ‘good’ or effective evidence sessions. This matters because 
evidence matters. Evidence is crucial for MPs to learn about key political and 
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policy issues, it allows the committee more generally to assess government 
policy, and it acts as a crucial link between public and Parliament. Nonetheless, 
as the second section of the chapter revealed, the variety of evidence gathered by 
committees alone could potentially skew the representativeness of committee 
evidence. Axiomatically, this chapter has not comprehensively assessed who 
gave oral evidence beyond one parliamentary session, and so this whole topic 
deserves far more attention (e.g. the role of informal evidence, written evidence, 
the network of ‘the usual suspects’, the contested nature of evidence, the content 
of evidence, the framing and performance of evidence in oral sessions, etc.). The 
third section has sought to begin a discussion about this process by analysing 
some of reasons for why witnesses are not representative of the public. It 
indicates that committees face a range of dilemmas in gathering evidence from a 
diverse range of witnesses. This raises questions about if and how Parliament 
should be more responsive to these findings. These three sections, when taken 
together, lead to the conclusion that evidence-gathering is a complex process, 
and one governed by unpredictability from MPs. Though staff provide a constant 
through their diligence, and chairs provide overall steering capacity, evidence-
gathering is still dependent on wishes of MPs who have a range of competing 
demands and interests. It once again highlights the themes and dilemmas raised 
in earlier chapters. More generally, this chapter questions the extent to which 
scrutiny is uniform or systematic, and the extent to which evidence is diverse 
enough to ensure Parliament is able to effectively hold the executive to account. 
Given that committees are reliant on pre-existing policy networks and everyday 
practices, it suggests that talking of ‘webs’ of scrutiny is more appropriate than 
‘systematic’ scrutiny. This brings us to some of the wider themes that have 
permeated this thesis as a whole, which are considered in the next and final 
chapter. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
he centrality of everyday practices, though increasingly acknowledged 
by scholars in British political science, has only recently become a 
research topic within the field of parliamentary and legislative studies. 
This thesis has sought to open a debate about the role of everyday practices 
along the committee corridor of the Palace of Westminster by looking at the 
individual beliefs, performance styles and perennial dilemmas of parliamentary 
actors in select committees. In this final, concluding chapter, I wish to tie 
together the issues raised in previous chapters. To do this, this conclusion is split 
into four sections. First, I summarise the contribution of each section to 
answering the research questions that were set out in the Introduction. I also 
posit some wider themes that have cut across the thesis and the implications of 
the findings for our understanding of Parliament. Second, I turn to the future 
directions of this research, and the possibilities that this thesis has opened for 
further study on Parliament. Third, I reflect more generally on the process that 
has allowed this doctoral thesis to come to fruition. Fourth and finally, I bring 
this thesis to a close by placing the thesis in the wider context of the role of 
Parliament in British politics. 
 
 
9.1. Interpreting parliamentary scrutiny 
 
Scrutiny by select committees can be understood in a variety of ways. In this 
PhD, I have sought to give one interpretation of how parliamentary actors 
T 
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interpret committee scrutiny. A core argument flowed throughout each of my 
chapters, with some wider themes that cut across them. Here, I summarise the 
contribution of each section, the consequences of this study on parliamentary 
scrutiny, and the core argument of the thesis as a whole. 
 
9.1.1. Scrutiny landscapes 
 
Researchers of all colours and creeds tend to make assumptions about select 
committees in their analyses of scrutiny: for example, that MPs attend evidence 
sessions regularly and fully-prepared; that MPs ask robust questions and follow-
up evasive responses; and that reports offer a balanced assessment of widely 
collected evidence. These assumptions have often been made because the 
majority of research on parliamentary select committees has focused 
predominantly on the impact of committee reports, rather than focusing on the 
scrutiny processes that have allowed inquiries to be undertaken and reports to 
be written. This PhD has sought to change that by looking precisely at what goes 
into making a select committee inquiry. So, rather than looking at the output of 
scrutiny, I have looked at the input. In order to do this, I asked three questions: 
1. How can we understand the everyday lives of parliamentary actors? 
2. How do political actors interpret and perform their role on select 
committees? 
3. In what ways do everyday practices affect parliamentary scrutiny? 
In order to answer the three research questions, the PhD was split into three 
parts, and each section of the thesis focused on answering each question 
respectively.  
 
In Part I, I have sought to focus on the theoretical foundations of this PhD and, 
in doing so, answer the research question on how we can understand the 
everyday lives of parliamentary actors. This began by calling for greater 
ontological and epistemological reflection in parliamentary and legislative 
studies before then examining the foundations that guide this doctoral thesis. 
Chapter 2 identified the key concepts that were used to frame the analysis, 
including: beliefs, practices and performance styles, dilemmas, and webs of 
belief or traditions.  Part I makes two important theoretical contributions. First, 
it draws attention to the added value of philosophical reflection within the field 
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of parliamentary studies to ensure conceptually robust research. And second, it 
develops and takes forward the interpretive approach to political science as 
proposed by Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes  (2003, 2006, 2010) by 
supplementing it through insights from dramaturgy (particularly the work of 
Erving Goffman (1990)). Thus, to understand the everyday lives of 
parliamentary actors, we must look to how they interpret their role (beliefs), 
enact those beliefs (practices and performance styles) and respond to problems 
or contradictions between their beliefs and practices (dilemmas).  
 
Theoretical reflection in Part I provides the foundations for substantive 
empirical sections in Part II and Part III. In the second section of this thesis, 
three chapters focused on answering the second research question on how 
political actors interpret and perform their select committee roles. I identified 
the complex ways in which MPs interpret scrutiny, which indicates, at its most 
basic, that no MP interprets the concept of scrutiny in the same way. This has 
consequences for the way in which they enact their role. I identified six 
performance styles: (i) specialists and advocates; (ii) lone wolves; (iii) 
constituency champions; (iv) party helpers or safety nets; (v) learners and (vi) 
absentees. These are not fixed roles or types that MPs adopt throughout their 
career, but flexible performance styles that change depending on the type of 
evidence session or broader political agenda of the day (amongst other things). 
They are also affected by a range of dilemmas that MPs face. In Chapter 5, I 
build on these findings by exploring the role of chair. I argue that there is a 
spectrum along which chairs situate themselves: at one end are committee 
catalysts, who are committee-orientated chairs and who usually seek to influence 
policy; at the other end are committee chieftains, who are leadership-orientated 
chairs and who usually seek to influence the media. And finally, in Chapter 6, I 
turn to the role of select committee staff. Here, I find that staff interpret their 
role in three facets: being hidden, a desire to offer unparalleled service, and a 
commitment to passionate impartiality. These weave together to what might be 
termed a performance style of ‘clerkliness’. This offers a way by which clerks 
negotiate the overarching and perennial dilemma of preserving the institution of 
Parliament and its many traditions whilst simultaneously seeking to serve a 
specific committee of MPs (whose interests and practices occasionally challenge 
the prevailing norms of the institution). 
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Taken together, the chapters of Part II tells us that scrutiny is contested and that 
parliamentary actors inevitably push and pull scrutiny in different directions. 
This is the central finding of this thesis and the most direct answer to the second 
research question.  
 
The third question, on the consequences of everyday practices on committee 
scrutiny, falls to Part III. I have used Chapter 7 to show how different 
performance styles interact to form a performance team, develop committee 
traditions, and affect the ability of committees to build consensus for reports. 
The chapter also widened to look at relationships more broadly. In Chapter 8, 
the thesis explored the specific impact on evidence-gathering. This revealed that 
the diversity of witnesses that give oral evidence has been adversely affected by 
dilemmas that committee members, chairs and staff face in enacting scrutiny. As 
a result, witnesses are concentrated from London and overwhelmingly men. The 
final chapter of Part III – this chapter – is an attempt to bring these insights 
together to better understand the consequences of everyday practices on 
scrutiny. The remainder of this chapter will seek to do just that by addressing 
some cross-cutting themes that have appeared throughout empirical chapters 
and explaining some of the consequences of these findings for scrutiny in the 
House of Commons. 
 
9.1.2. Themes and consequences 
 
The single most important theme or conclusion from this research project is that 
the concept of scrutiny is contested. This has important consequences for our 
understanding and study of Parliament. Notably, it tells us that we cannot look 
only to the output of select committee reports to understand the effectiveness of 
committees to hold the executive to account or to improve and enhance 
government policy. Committee reports are the culmination of a range of 
preceding processes, including agenda-setting, evidence-gathering and report-
writing. Committee members, chairs and staff push and pull these processes in 
different directions. As a consequence, and reinforced through fieldwork and 
empirical findings set out in preceding chapters, this questions the extent to 
which we can talk of ‘systematic’ scrutiny, where ‘webs’ of scrutiny often seems  
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Table 9.1. Themes in select committee scrutiny 
Theme Description 
Webs of scrutiny 
Scrutiny is contested, leading to a range of interpretations and 
performances of scrutiny. Most importantly, this means that 
scrutiny depends on ‘webs’ to push it forward. 
Time pressure and 
multiple loyalties 
Multiple loyalties empowers the chair; creates a short-termist 
working environment; and affect actors’ ability to build effective 
relationships. 
Wright reforms 
This had five specific impacts, but in sum indicates that committees 
are perceived as authoritative and important actors within 
Parliament, which has changed the nature of undertaking inquiries. 
Multiple functions 
of committees 
Select committees not only exist to hold the executive to account, 
but allow MPs to structure their work, build policy expertise, 
practise asking questions and making arguments, represent 
constituents and, more broadly, serve as a link between Parliament 
and public. 
  
more appropriate. These webs of scrutiny are built on relationships and 
networks: between chairs and committee members; between chairs of 
committees through the Liaison Committee (though arguably not very 
effectively); between MPs and policy stakeholders; between stakeholders and 
parliamentary staff; between staff and MPs; and, ultimately, between Parliament 
and public. This arguably has significant repercussions for studying select 
committees because this aspect of scrutiny has not been addressed in as much 
detail as output-focused studies. Indeed, there is potential for joining the input-
side analysis pursued in this thesis with output-focused research on the 
effectiveness of committee reports in order to add a building block to better 
understand scrutiny in the House of Commons more generally. 
 
A second theme that has cut across all empirical sections is the issue of time 
pressure and multiple loyalties. This has been noticeable in all empirical 
chapters. During fieldwork, it was evident that MPs worked hard and faced a 
range of tasks to ensure that they fulfilled their role as elected representatives. 
This thesis has not been able to comprehensively assess the range of roles that 
constitutes the role of elected representative, but rather focused on one small 
aspect of an MP’s role, namely the way that they scrutinise the executive in select 
committees. The multiple demands placed on committee members and chairs 
have at least three effects. First, it empowers the chair because, though 
committee members may attend meetings regularly and prepare for them where 
possible, the chair is prepared for every session and immersed in their policy 
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area, while members focus more specifically on only a smaller proportion of 
select committee scrutiny. Furthermore, chairs are more likely to remain in their 
position over the duration of a parliament, while the average length of service for 
committee members is around two and a half years. This reinforces the chair’s 
ability to set the agenda and, consequently, empowers them vis-à-vis members. 
Second, multiple loyalties create a short-termist and occasionally last minute 
framework in which scrutiny occurs. MPs are placed in a reactive position that 
gives staff little time to write scoping notes or organise committee activities. As 
Chapter 8 has sought to show, this has an effect on evidence and the spectrum of 
witnesses that give evidence to committees. It additionally raises questions 
about the quality of inquiries more generally (unfortunately somewhat beyond 
the scope of this PhD). In particular, committees must consider the extent to 
which their reactive, short-termist approach enhances or hinders effective 
scrutiny. Findings from this research project indicate that the positive effects of 
paying attention to the media cycle may be outweighed by other factors, 
including their ability to adequately explore issues and ensure a diversity of 
witnesses in evidence-gathering. Third, multiple loyalties and time pressures 
weaken the ability for MPs to build effective relationships with one another. 
Chapter 7’s focus on relationships emphasised the importance of these networks, 
particularly to ensure robust scrutiny in evidence sessions and also to aid in 
constructing consensus. As members face competing demands on their time, 
their ability to devote time to getting to know each other and ensure cross-party 
working is diminished (especially because contentious inquiries would require 
significant time for members to resolve differences). This possibly raises the 
question as to whether committees are conducting too many inquiries and over-
stretching their capabilities (once again indicating that committees ought to 
reconsider short-termist approaches). In addition to these three effects relating 
to Members, staff also face multiple loyalties, especially between serving the 
institutions of Parliament, on the one hand, and a specific group of MPs, on the 
other. This is exacerbated by the increasing demands placed on them by chairs, 
with consequences for the relationship between staff and committee members. 
 
A third cross-cutting theme is the impact of the Wright reforms that were 
introduced in 2010. Though this PhD did not exclusively focus on the impact of 
those reforms on select committees in 2010, the time frame associated with this 
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PhD made it impossible not to consider its impact on scrutiny. Though it is easy 
to exaggerate the influence of the Wright reforms, they arguably made an impact 
on select committees in five ways. First, election of chairs by the whole House 
and election of members through party groups meant that parliamentary actors 
view committees with ‘renewed authority and zest’ (Flynn, 2012, p.74). This 
interpretation of a changing role of committees may not demonstrate tangible 
increases in policy influence, but it does indicate that committees are regarded 
as more important by elected representatives. This may have the effect of 
ensuring that frontbench colleagues pay closer attention to committees’ 
investigations and findings (see also Monk, 2010). Second, some have noticed a 
changing relationship within committees. This has two elements: on the one 
hand, there is a growing sense in which committees see themselves as part of a 
‘cohesive whole’ (Interview M-07) and therefore develop stronger bonds of trust 
and respect with one another as backbenchers (see Chapter 7, in particular); on 
the other hand, the relationship of accountability has changed between chairs 
and members, where the former are now less likely to see themselves 
accountable to their committee than in the past. This has strengthened the 
leadership role of chairs (see Chapter 5) (which possibly raises the question as to 
whether the Wright reforms have increased the influence of chairs at the 
expense of the committee overall). Third, the changing perception surrounding 
committees has placed greater demands on them as mechanisms to hold the 
executive to account. Interviewees (e.g. Interview S-06, Interview S-09, 
Interview C-01) and fieldwork observations have indicated that MPs, chairs in 
particular, are putting more of their time and energy into committee work (see 
also Part II). This raises the question as to whether committees are adequately 
resourced (Liaison Committee, 2012a). Findings from this project indicate that a 
blanket increase in resources is not a panacea because of the many other 
dilemmas that members, chairs and staff face. However, much more 
consideration must be made to ensure adequate training and skill development 
for MPs. Fourth, the media seem to be paying more attention to select 
committee hearings. The extent to which this is true requires more detailed 
analysis, but initial conclusions from some researchers (Dunleavy and Muir, 
2013), and anecdotally over fieldwork, would suggest an impact from the 
reforms. Fifth, committees have arguably become more adversarial vis-à-vis 
witnesses. Perhaps this stems from a renewed sense of authority and greater 
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media attention, but in any case, interviewees have (anecdotally) noticed that 
evidence sessions have become high-profile and combative (for a case study, see 
Matthews and Flinders, 2015). This raises questions over the relationships 
between committees and their witnesses, covered in detail in Chapter 8, and in 
particular with respect to committees’ framing of hearings and their powers over 
formally summoning witnesses for powerful yet reticent witnesses. In sum, the 
Wright reforms have changed perceptions of committees as more authoritative, 
with consequences for the way in which committees conduct and undertake their 
inquiries. These effects have not been assessed quantitatively here and so 
deserve further direct attention in future research. 
 
Committees have roles that are not limited to accountability, but serve multiple 
functions both within the House of Commons and beyond. This is the fourth 
theme. Within the House of Commons, select committees are a way that allows 
members and chairs to structure their everyday parliamentary lives. Committees 
give elected representatives purpose and structure. Committees can also act as a 
training ground for newly elected MPs (perhaps even older ones). Not only do 
they offer ways for MPs to learn about policies, but they are also spaces in which 
MPs practise scrutiny activity and engage in debates with one another. For some 
MPs, committee hearings are a way to rehearse questions or lines of inquiry that 
they would be able to pursue in other, more adversarial spaces. As noted above, 
this raises questions about the level of support that MPs receive both generally 
in terms of resources, but specifically in terms of training to question witnesses 
effectively. Though committee training has become more widely available, MPs 
themselves have (as pointed out in Chapter 4) remained resistant and perhaps 
even ignorant of making use of these training opportunities.  
 
Beyond the House of Commons, as noted above, select committees increasingly 
gain the attention of the media (Dunleavy and Muir, 2013; Kubala, 2011), which 
is arguably something that will increase in future years as chairs adopt an 
increasingly leadership-orientated style in the House of Commons to speak on 
behalf of policy areas. Additionally, as the chapter on evidence-taking pointed 
out, select committees are important beyond the House of Commons because 
their inquiries are a way by which Parliament can engage with the public. Clearly, 
Chapter 8 sends some warning signals as to the diversity of witnesses that are 
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called to give evidence. This indicates that this research project has not only 
important implications for our understanding of parliamentary select 
committees, but more broadly for democratic engagement between public and 
Parliament. The nature and importance of the relationship between public and 
Parliament has been analysed expertly by others elsewhere (Digital Democracy 
Commission, 2015; Liaison Committee, 2015; Leston-Bandeira, 2013), and so 
here it is worth only reiterating that it matters because it gives members of the 
public and service users an opportunity to directly affect select committee 
inquiries and, in doing so, contribute to policy-making. This PhD directly feeds 
into broader themes about democratic re-engagement with politics by exploring 
the evidence-gathering process of committees. The findings indicate that 
parliamentary select committees should make more attempts to gather evidence 
from a greater diversity of witnesses to adequately represent the British public. 
One specific way that this is possible is through greater use of select committee 
field trips and visits within the UK. This echoes some of the recommendations 
from research conducted for the Liaison Committee (2015). Based on this 
doctoral research, committee visits have at least three benefits. First, they allow 
MPs to gather evidence from a greater range of service users, members of the 
public and stakeholders. Second, it changes the perception that MPs are only 
interested in people coming to them, and interested only in events that occur 
within the ‘Westminster bubble’. And third, visits help committee members, 
chairs and staff to build closer relationships with one another because they are 
exposed to each other’s ideas and approaches to scrutiny. This, then, can ensure 
greater cross-party working, enhance the effectiveness of scrutiny and allow for 
more attuned staff support. 
 
Ultimately, this discussion indicates that select committees play a much bigger 
role in scrutinising the executive than we may ordinarily assume. The range of 
roles of committees depends on the diversity of interpretations of parliamentary 
actors that populate those committees. This discussion posits four key themes: 
scrutiny is contested and dependent on webs of scrutiny; time pressures and 
multiple loyalties exacerbate dilemmas that committees face; the Wright reforms 
have changed perceptions around the role of committees; and committees are 
more than accountability tools for the House of Commons. In sum, this PhD 
makes a theoretical contribution by demonstrating the importance of beliefs, 
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practices and dilemmas to study political phenomena; a number of empirical 
contributions by offering an input-based focus understanding select committees; 
and a number of normative contributions to aid public engagement with 
political processes. Of course, this PhD was also limited in scope in a number of 
ways. These may be viewed as future possibilities for further research, and these 
options warrant brief comment.  
 
 
9.2. Future directions 
 
The aim of this thesis was not to offer a comprehensive understanding 
parliamentary scrutiny in Parliament. To do this, it would have involved a 
variety of different scrutiny activities, a lot more parliamentary actors and 
relationships, and included research on the House of Lords. Crucially, in this 
study, my aim was to open a debate on how some parliamentary actors interpret 
their select committee work, and how those interpretations affect their everyday 
behaviour. In doing so, I hope to have opened avenues for future research. I 
summarise four of these possibilities here. 
 
9.2.1. Adding depth to understanding scrutiny 
 
In this doctoral research, I did not have detailed case studies (other than the 
committee for which I worked). However, now that the broad ideas about 
individual beliefs, performance styles, and dilemmas have been illustrated as 
part of an inductive study, there are many further opportunities to use these 
ideas in a more deductive sense and apply these ideas to detailed cases. This 
would then have the benefit of exploring the policy impact of everyday practices 
on scrutiny. Though ascertaining this was not one of the aims of this research, it 
remains a crucial way by which we can judge the effectiveness of committees 
overall, and so deserves further attention in future. This links input-based 
studies to output-based ones. To do this effectively, it will also be necessary to 
explore the relationships between chairs and ministers, or committees and their 
departments. Given that Chapter 7 highlighted the pivotal nature of ‘rubbing 
shoulders’, networks and relationships to making scrutiny happen, this idea 
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must be applied to frontbench and executive actors in order to fully comprehend 
the policy impact of committees.  
 
Additionally, there are questions about the impact of select committee reports 
not only on policy but on everyday practices. There are a range of questions that 
I could not answer in this PhD, but were dotted around the margins of papers 
and draft chapters, fieldwork notes and on others’ published work. Do reports 
just lie on shelves and gather dust? Or do committee members use those reports? 
What is the impact of Westminster Hall debates? How do committees affect 
debates in the main chamber? Are their reports frequently referenced in those 
debates? The point of this research project was to establish that interpretation 
matters and the possible ways that this can be enacted. The next stage of this 
research agenda is to explore further questions about the impact of 
interpretation on the effectiveness of scrutiny. 
 
Finally, to add further depth to select committee scrutiny, it would be interesting 
to explore more closely the leadership role of chairs. Chapter 5 has only opened 
the debate by indicating the spectrum of roles from which chairs can draw. The 
weakness of that chapter has been a lack of empirical weight that illustrates 
those performances in action. This might well be applicable to Chapter 4, too, 
but it matters particularly to chairs because these are the single most important 
actors in select committee scrutiny. 
 
9.2.2. Hidden servants 
 
Chapter 6 arguably offered one of the most distinctive and original chapters of 
this PhD, simply because we do not know very much about the House of 
Commons administration. The chapter focused on a very small proportion of 
2,000 members of staff that support elected representatives. The small group on 
which Chapter 6 focused lies within the Committee Office, yet the importance of 
the Office itself has not been adequately addressed. Additionally, the Committee 
Office is only one section of a larger House of Commons service. Attention to 
these diverse groups, offices and departments would give us many new insights 
to how the House of Commons works, and how practices and traditions within 
Parliament are sustained. This would open up how clerks interpret and enact 
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their role. From this, there are opportunities to explore the impact of clerks on 
MPs, politicians’ satisfaction of those services, and the extent to which MPs rely 
on staff to fulfil their roles as elected representatives. Further research into the 
way that the House of Commons is structured would be particularly timely given 
recent debates about the role of the Clerk of the House of Commons and the 
administrative responsibilities that they have as chief executive (Governance 
Committee, 2014).  
 
9.2.3. The politics of evidence 
 
Exploring the issue of evidence-taking has been one of the most rewarding and 
interesting aspects of this PhD. Indeed, despite the crucial underpinning of 
evidence as part of inquiries, it is perhaps surprising that the topic has not been 
discussed in more detail by other scholars. Parliamentary studies would benefit 
from greater knowledge on this topic because it gives opportunities to study the 
impact of select committees and, given the issues raised in the previous section, 
the link between Parliament and public. Some questions: on what types of 
evidence do MPs rely in their inquiries and from whom? Are there changing 
trends over time that indicate a changing pool on which committees rely in 
evidence-gathering? How pervasive is the problem of usual suspects? What is 
the nature of the policy networks on which committees rely? What kind of 
information do they ask for within oral evidence sessions (legal, quantitative, 
experiential, etc.)? What is ‘good’ evidence from the point of view of committee 
members, chairs and staff? How is evidence performed by witnesses and how 
does this impact inquiries? What is the effect of different types of evidence in 
other areas of scrutiny? Specifically, which type of evidence is cited in reports 
and which is ignored? What is the relationship between written and oral 
evidence? What proportion of those that submit written evidence are contacted 
or asked to give oral evidence (and why)? Is it possible to gather further 
information on social diversity of witnesses? Is it desirable to increase the social 
diversity of witnesses? Ultimately, and most importantly: how can the evidence-
gathering process be made more effective? The questions on this topic are 
seemingly endless, and serve to illustrate that this topic has many possibilities 
for rich empirical and policy-relevant research. 
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9.2.4. Interpreting parliamentary practices 
 
Finally, this doctoral research project opens further possibilities for interpretive 
approaches to be applied more widely to parliamentary and legislative studies. 
This thesis focused on MPs in select committees, yet there are possibilities here 
to go beyond scrutiny and explore other areas of Parliament to see how the 
analytical framework can be applied. For example, to what extent can we identify 
performance styles in other parliamentary settings, such as the main chamber of 
the House of Commons or constituency offices of MPs? What about the role of 
other MPs, such as members of the frontbench? In addition to looking at 
performance styles, there are possibilities to look at the impact of speech (e.g. 
rhetorical capabilities of MPs and their influence in the Commons) and space 
(especially in the context of the restoration and renewal of the Palace of 
Westminster (UK Parliament, 2015c)).  
 
One of the topics that were not explored, but deserve further attention, is the 
role of the whips in the House of Commons. Traditionally, they are viewed as 
mythical sources of ensuring party discipline and often as something sinister or 
to fear. In this thesis, the usual channels appeared in various chapters yet their 
influence and role in Parliament has not been substantiated. The usual channels 
possibly do play a role in select committee scrutiny through, for example, 
deciding the chairships allocated to the main parties or being able to prevent 
committees from going on visits through pairing arrangements. They may also 
play an informal influence in the membership of select committees or exert 
pressure on serving members to reduce the potential damage of a committee 
report on government (and occasionally the opposition). However, during 
fieldwork, the role of the whips was almost entirely absent in that interviewees, 
on the whole, did not admit to being influenced by the whips (except one). Nor 
were they mentioned during my fieldwork. However, this was in part because 
interviews and fieldwork did not focus on the role of the whips, and so hints may 
have been missed. In any case, they are a particular group that warrant further 
academic attention to shed light on not only their often negative or sinister 
perception, but also to explain the role of the whips as necessary tools for 
managing business in the House of Commons. The extent to which whips 
Interpreting Parliamentary Scrutiny 
236 
themselves would want the spotlight turned on their everyday practices is 
another matter, however, and an unlikely future research prospect. 
 
What this section demonstrates is that this PhD has been able to show the 
importance of studying beliefs, practices and dilemmas in select committees, 
and opened up many further questions to study Parliament in a range of ways. 
 
 
9.3. Reflections on the research process 
 
The choice of using the work of Bevir and Rhodes stems from a longstanding 
commitment to anti-foundationalist principles to which I have been committed 
for many years. Those principles could have been applied in a range of ways and 
the choice of using the approach of Bevir and Rhodes was certainly not the only 
one. So, how useful was their analytical framework? The interpretive approach 
by Bevir and Rhodes gave me a useful way to hook many of my research themes 
and ideas. However, their framework was also very broad and acted as an open 
canvas that was difficult to apply and pin down in practice, especially during 
fieldwork. The concepts remain flexible, which is both useful for applying the 
approach to a range of contexts, but also a weakness because it requires 
significant energy to deepen the analytical framework for specific contexts. 
Arguably the biggest weakness was the ability to cope with the importance of 
relationships in the House of Commons. The predominant focus of the analytical 
framework is on individual beliefs and the individual dilemmas that a 
parliamentary actor faces. This individualised approach means that networks 
and relationships were not something that could be easily explored using the 
analytical tools available. It is for this reason that, occasionally, the analytical 
framework and tools were not at the forefront of some empirical chapters. The 
concept of performance has arguably begun to broaden the reach, particularly 
because it places a heavier emphasis on the how performances are affected by 
styles and speeches of others within a broader spatial setting. Furthermore, 
Goffman also acknowledges the importance of performance teams. Without 
these amendments, it is here that the interpretive approach arguably reaches its 
limits. The importance of communities, networks and relationships cannot be 
understated, and is traditionally something central in ethnographic research (e.g. 
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Crang and Cook, 2007). This possibly requires further theoretical reflection and 
refinement to enhance Bevir and Rhodes’ interpretive approach. 
 
Turning to the process of undertaking fieldwork itself, this was arguably the 
single biggest challenge of this PhD – yet also its biggest reward. It was 
exhausting because it was much more than simply studying select committees 
away from a desk. I had moved to a new city, began a new job, did not have a 
familiar network of friends around me, moved into a house with people I did not 
know, and had much of my family living in different cities and countries. At the 
same time, I was trying to study towards a PhD through observation, interviews 
and analysis of texts, whilst keeping up with trends in the academic literature 
(including attending conferences). These social effects were significant, and need 
to be acknowledged because they did make an impact (for a discussion, see 
Crang and Cook, 2007). I made mistakes, I was slow to grasp some of the 
demands of the research placement and, indeed, felt foolish on occasions. For 
example, I was unable to complete tasks on time for my clerk because I was 
trying to observe my surroundings as well as undertake given responsibilities, 
which must have frustrated the committee team (FWD 12.3.17); another time, 
there was an awkward situation in which the chair of my committee asked my 
advice on an inquiry, yet I was completely unable to offer any thoughts because 
all my notes were about the committee itself and not about the inquiry he was 
asking about (FWD 2.1.25). My chair did not ask my opinion on a committee 
matter again. Self-doubt over my research was noted throughout my fieldwork 
diary (e.g. FWD 38.9.36, FWD 38.9.40, FWD 39.9.24, FWD 42.10.23, FWD 
51.12.27, FWD 52.12.1, FWD 53.12.16).  
 
Nonetheless, I fitted in very quickly (after only a few days, a member of staff 
introduced me as having worked for the committee for a couple of weeks (FWD 
6.2.10)). I was lucky in that I started working for my committee six days before 
another member of staff joined. This meant that there was someone else there 
who was also naturally inquisitive about the way that the select committee 
worked and asked a lot of questions (FWD 6.2.22). And ultimately, the fieldwork 
was the most fascinating part of doing this research. My research placement has 
been immensely valuable with far-reaching effects for this academic project on 
select committees. Working for the Committee Office confirmed the principle 
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that simply ‘being there’ (Rhodes et. al., 2007a) is crucial to understanding a 
subject matter, place, or community. I was immersed in the everyday life of 
people that inhabited an imposing, grand palace. I could have completed a PhD 
without ever setting foot in the Palace of Westminster. Would I really have 
understood their lives if I had not been there for a sustained period of time? On 
a daily basis, I was squeezed on the Victoria Line with a thousand other 
commuters at 7am; I ate lunch in the Palace next to (occasionally with) clerks of 
the House; caught up with friends in the Sports and Social Bar; rubbed 
shoulders with frontbench and backbench MPs as I rushed from meeting to 
meeting; and attended a range of events in the evenings where I had the 
opportunity to listen to (and meet) prominent parliamentarians – often by 
chance. Indeed, these chanced meetings gave them the opportunity to share 
their points of view, experiences and expertise – some of whom I would not have 
met in any other way. Working for the Committee Office offered a wealth of 
other practical opportunities: I was close to the Parliamentary Estate, which 
meant that I could listen and observe evidence sessions and proceedings as I 
needed; I was given a parliamentary email address that hugely increased my 
chances of positive replies when requesting interviews with MPs and clerks; and, 
with my pass, I could be flexible for MPs’ diaries and meet them in most places 
and at most times convenient to them. All of these things helped me to break 
down conventional access barriers that many academics face. These barriers 
could otherwise have prevented me from undertaking this project. 
 
Aside from these practical opportunities, I was able to gain remarkable insights 
into the way that politics worked at the heart of British political life. I learnt how 
select committees operate, their interpretations of their role, and their unwritten 
rules or ‘norms’ of behaviour. All of this has made a positive impact on the way 
that I look at Parliament and embedded new points of view for my study that I 
would not have thought about otherwise. For that, I’m extremely grateful to the 
Economic and Social Research Council and the White Rose Doctoral Training 
Centre for making the funds available, and to the Committee Office in the House 
of Commons for making the time and resources available (especially the Scrutiny 
Unit and the committee that I worked for). Without this opportunity, my 
doctoral thesis would be poorer and my understanding of British political 
culture more basic. 
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9.4. So what? 
 
In this final section, I want to briefly think about a final question: why does all of 
this matter? I argue that this doctoral research matters for two key reasons: first, 
it shows us that ethnographic research and interpretive approaches add 
significant value to issues in political science; and second, it feeds into wider 
themes about the Parliament’s role in British politics and parliamentary 
democracy. 
 
The publication of Interpreting British Governance in 2003 by Mark Bevir and 
R.A.W. Rhodes opened a considerable departure for studying executive 
governance in the UK (see also Turnbull, 2016). Within parliamentary studies, 
we have also seen the growth of interpretive approaches to understanding 
Parliament (e.g. Crewe, 2005, 2015; Rai, 2015a, 2015b). This doctoral research 
has attempted to build on those trends over the past decade to demonstrate the 
importance of everyday practices as a way by which we can study Parliament. 
More generally, and directly addressing the ‘so what?’ issue, this PhD gives 
greater credence to interpretive approaches in political science. This PhD 
intentionally contrasts modernist empiricist approaches to political science with 
anti-foundationalist principles to illustrate that using interpretive approaches 
are not only possible in theory, but also feasible in practice. This has brought 
new and different insights to understanding British politics. Returning to the 
opening paragraph of this PhD, this has highlighted how the everyday is political. 
Beyond the committee corridor of the Palace of Westminster, this means that 
everyday practices from those delivering public services to what happens on our 
pavements is political. This is important because it means that we can and 
should look to individual beliefs, everyday practices and performance styles, 
dilemmas, and traditions to understand political phenomena. This focus offers 
nuance, texture and depth that other approaches – especially broadly 
comparative and quantitative approaches – might miss otherwise. Interpretive 
approaches offer us distinctive vantage points from which we can assess issues 
in political science. Indeed, given that politics is ultimately a human endeavour, 
it is surprising that so many studies do not look to humans to understand 
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politics. The interpretive approach focuses analysis precisely on how politics is 
made and remade by human beings with their own interpretations, beliefs, 
motivations, routines, habits and agendas. 
 
Given the importance of everyday practices in Parliament, this raises interesting 
questions about the future of Parliament in the context of changing public 
debates. This takes us further beyond issues in political science to debates about 
British parliamentary democracy. One specific example of this is the emerging 
issue about restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster (UK 
Parliament, 2015c). This project will span many years and consume vast sums of 
public money. In many ways, this PhD indirectly highlights how important the 
restoration and renewal project will be for British democracy because it touches 
directly on issues of space that are so important for the performance of politics. 
Consequently, the restoration project will have an effect on everyday practices of 
parliamentarians and, therefore, MPs’ ability to enact their representative role. 
The restoration and renewal programme offers an opportunity to not only think 
about everyday practices further but also – critically – to assess how we can use 
parliamentary spaces to ensure that Parliament is fit for the twenty-first century. 
Situating this PhD in this wider context means that we need to pay closer 
attention to everyday practices in order to support and strengthen democracy in 
an age of growing cynicism about politics. Indeed, to broaden from this specific 
example, this PhD matters because it directly contrasts with public, media and 
academic assertions that Parliament is irrelevant (see Introduction and Chapter 
1). It illustrates the importance of parliamentary democracy in the UK. 
Parliamentary select committees, in particular, matter because they act as 
crucial sites in which MPs enact or perform politics, including scrutiny of 
government, partisan clashes between political parties and to represent 
constituents. MPs generally work hard on behalf of the public and try to make 
decisions according to their interpretations of the public interest (even if we 
strongly disagree with those interpretations). Of course, select committees are 
not problem-free: they do not hold many formal powers over the executive, nor 
do they engage with all sections of society (based on Chapter 8’s findings). 
Nonetheless, Parliament remains the place where politics happens because this 
is where our laws are made and government is held to account. Ultimately, it is a 
crucial nodal point in which politics takes place. In this sense, this PhD has 
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hoped to defend the importance of Parliament by showing how the institution’s 
inhabitants interpret, enact and perform their role. 
 
- 
 
In general terms, this PhD finds that scrutiny is contested in a range of ways by a 
range of actors. We can only understand this by looking at the individual beliefs, 
everyday practices and performance styles, and dilemmas of parliamentary 
actors. In taking those ideas seriously, this PhD finds that parliamentary actors 
have their own performance styles and these are used to enact their beliefs about 
scrutiny. At its most simple, this PhD argues that scrutiny is contested, and so 
committee work is pushed and pulled in a variety of different directions by 
different parliamentary actors. There is no such thing as uniform, systematic 
select committee scrutiny; there exist only dense webs of scrutiny that rely upon 
committee members, chairs and staff to enact their roles in such ways to be 
conducive to holding the executive to account. These dense webs of scrutiny 
affect committee relationships, their ability to question witnesses in select 
committees, and construct consensus in writing reports. It is, ultimately, beliefs 
that shape political behaviour. 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
  
  
 
  
Notes, appendices and bibliography 
245 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: List of committees, 2010-15 
 
 
 
 
Committee Chair Party Size 
Business, Innovation and Skills Adrian Bailey L 11 
Communities and Local Government Clive Betts L 11 
Culture, Media and Sport John Whittingdale C 11 
Defence James Arbuthnot (2010-
14); Rory Stewart (2014-15) 
C 11 
Education Graham Stuart C 11 
Energy and Climate Change Tim Yeo C 11 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Anne McIntosh C 11 
Environmental Audit  Joan Walley L 15 
European Scrutiny Committee William Cash C 16 
Foreign Affairs Richard Ottaway C 11 
Health Stephen Dorrell (2010-14); 
Sarah Wollaston (2014-15) 
C 11 
Home Affairs Keith Vaz L 11 
International Development Malcolm Bruce LD 11 
Justice Alan Beith LD 11 
Northern Ireland Affairs Laurence Robertson C 14 
Political and Constitutional Reform Graham Allen L 11 
Public Accounts Margaret Hodge L 14 
Public Administration Bernard Jenkin C 11 
Science and Technology Andrew Miller L 11 
Scottish Affairs Ian Davidson L 10 
Transport Louise Ellman L 11 
Treasury Andrew Tyrie C 11 
Welsh Affairs David TC Davies C 12 
Work and Pensions Anne Begg L 11 
 
Additionally, the Liaison Committee (chaired by Alan Beith (LD)) may be 
included, bringing the total to 25 committees. Excluded from my study: ad hoc 
committees; sub-committees of any of the above committees; joint committees; 
domestic or internal committees; or, legislative committees. 
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Appendix B: Ethics agreement 
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Appendix C: House of Commons confidentiality agreement 
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Appendix D: Standard interview consent form 
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Appendix E: Interview themes and checklist 
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Appendix F: Summary statistics for committee members 
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